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Ripples of Globalization

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To Ms. Nellie Voudouris and Ms. Bronwyn Rice for their continued support and encouragement.

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Foreword

McGill

It is my great pleasure to introduce the 2016 issue of the *McGill International Review*. Major research institutions like McGill are world-renowned for the quality of the research they produce, and that includes the research produced by our undergraduate students. The 2016 issue of the *McGill International Review* is a good example of why. Covering virtually all of the major themes in the study of international relations today, from remittances and refugees to more traditional concerns such as international trade and security, the five articles in this issue highlight how our undergraduate students are effectively engaging in many of the cutting-edge debates that define the sub-discipline. Their research, writing and analytical skills are impressive. Please join me in congratulating the authors on their accomplishments, and enjoy reading what they have worked so hard to produce.

Philip Oxhorn, PhD.

Professor of International Development Studies and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at McGill University

Editorial Board

Maéva Proteau — Editor-in-Chief

Maéva Proteau is completing her degree in Political Science and Middle East Studies. Her interests include international law and security. After working in the Middle East, Maéva became convinced that international relations—an area in which she plans on pursuing a career— can help tackle some of the world's most pressing crises.

Niki Kashefi — Managing Editor

Niki Kashefi is entering her final semester at McGill where she studies Political Science and Economics. Her academic interests include trade policy, FDI and international security. This summer, she is heading to Detroit, Michigan where she will be working at the Consulate General of Canada in the department of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.

Miro Guzzini

Miro Guzzini is a third-year student at McGill University, currently pursuing a Joint Honours B.A. in History and Philosophy. His research interests encompass modern European/Middle Eastern history as well as anti-systematic continental philosophy. Miro fully appreciates the value of learning and aspires to pursue his passion for knowledge.

Alfonso Marin-Aponte

Alfonso Marin-Aponte is entering the final year of his B.A. (Hons) in History and Political Science. His academic interests include: political Islam, civil-military relations, and the dynamics of insurgency. He also holds a minor in Arabic Language. Alfonso aspires to join Global Affairs Canada as an analyst.

Anne-Cecile Favory

Anne-Cécile Favory is a U3 student in World Islamic and Middle East Studies and Political Science. She was co-Editor-in-Chief at the McGill Journal of Middle East Studies for the 2015-2016 academic year. Her academic interests include social justice movements particularly climate and labour justice, Islamic political theory, and national liberation movements.

Max Segal

Max Segal is in his first year at McGill, studying International Development and Computer Science. He was drawn into the McGill International Review as an avid reader of academic journals. His research interests are led by illiberal regimes, transitions, and international law. He speaks three languages: English, Russian, and French.

Suzanne Holcomb

Suzanne Holcomb is pursuing a joint-honors major in history and political science with a minor in Chinese language. Her research focuses on international relations and Asian politics. This past summer, Suzanne interned at the American Institute in Taiwan and is currently studying abroad at Nanjing Normal University in Nanjing, China.

Sophia Harms

Sophia Harms studies International Development. Originally a hard science student, she switched majors after a class on the wheat rust pandemic. Her areas of interest include effective implementation of innovations in healthcare and agriculture, gender equality in education, and North African linguistics. She was born and raised in Manhattan, Kansas.

Constantine Valettas

Constantine (U3, PoliSci/History) was born in Montreal but grew up in the considerably less interesting city of Ottawa. He finished high school at IMG Soccer Academy, in Florida, where he entertained delusions of athletic grandeur while cramming desperately for AP exams. He enjoys playing the piano and writing pithy autobiographical statements.

Kyle Dickinson

Kyle Dickinson joined the McGill International Review as a design editor. He is a graduate student in the Department of Experimental Medicine at McGill University. His research focuses on pediatric renal genetics. He is from Toronto, Ontario.

Introduction:
Ripples of Globalization

I speak for the entire group in saying that the past couple of months have been tumultuous yet enriching and rewarding as no other experience before. We've all been on one end of the academic process – perusing endless journals and sieving through academic jargon. Nothing out of the ordinary. But being on the creation side of the matter was extraordinary.

Over the course of several months, we read over thirty academic papers, ranging from the deterministic view of Sino-Japanese relations to the cultural motivations of Filipino migrant workers in Quebec. In the process, we were taken through sociological methods, historical postulates, and economic theorems. But at the same time, we were tasked with assembling a collection of pieces that we felt was to be a worthy addition to the existing academic discourse. If any of us worked below full caliber, it would impact our contribution to the discussion.

We began our journey with picking a strong roster of papers. My editors were then paired off into writer-editor collectives, and were tasked with refining prose and checking sources. As an interdisciplinary journal, the Review's team was particularly cognizant of the limitations we faced with regard to picking a theme. My editors worked tirelessly to find a theme that would encompass the major works presented in this edition. From, *2016: A Global Odyssey* to *Globalization: A Midlife Crisi*s, nothing seemed to fit the bill. At that point, we decided to recalibrate our approach. Finding a theme wasn't about forcing a square peg into a round hole; it was about embracing the range and diversity of the scholarship presented in this year's edition, rather than trying to cloak it.

As such, the Review's 2016 publication focuses on the *ripples of globalization*—a theme that captures the externalities generated by emerging global trends, such as large-scale human migration to Putin's pipeline politics. The occurrences described herein discuss the ripples that are produced by a smaller, flatter and more dynamic international system. These occurrences all trace their roots back to globalization, but have matured into their own unique entities that merit their own discussion.

In 'My Neighbor, My Enemy: Understanding the Protracted Conflict Between China and Japan', William Doan explores the historical roots behind enduring hostilities between China and Japan. Using McGill Professor Michael Brecher's framework of analysis, Doan presents a compelling argument on the roots of conflict and provides insight into the power rivalries these states find themselves in today.

Acknowledging the dearth of research on the social meaning of remittances within labour diaspora, Marko Palaming de Guzman studies the case of Filipino Live-in Caregiver mothers in 'A Life for Others: The Meanings of Filipino Labor Diaspora Remittances from Canada". Nested between a strong

heuristic framework and personally conducted interviews, he concludes that remittances act as a tool of resistance in response to victimization, a strategy which reaffirms their familial and cultural norms. His inquiry is especially insightful given its salience to contemporary political trends of global human migration.

In "Russia-West Trade: An Instrument of National Power? Explaining Variations in Russia-West Political and Trade Relations, 1995-2015", Gérald Sigrist provides a thorough quantitative analysis on the ways in which retaliatory trade policies can be used to wield power and change state behavior. Sigrist's nuanced argument delves deeper into the inextricable link between international trade and security.

In "*En Route to Beirut:* Discovering the Palestinian Refugee Paradox in Lebanon," Carol Stephan explores the civic disconnect between the Lebanese government's supposed care for Palestinian refugees, and the simultaneous neglect of their quality of life in several spheres. Stephan's comparative study of socioeconomic refugee policy and Palestinians' abject reality highlights a national cognitive dissonance towards harbored refugees in Lebanon.

In "Regional Rivalry in the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopia-Somalia Protracted Conflict Unpacked", Natalie LaMarche investigates the roots of protracted conflict against the backdrop of historical grievances and the onset of colonialism. LaMarche provides a detailed account of the enduring power asymmetries between Somalia and Ethiopia and makes a sobering case for the state of regional security and conflict management in the face of interstate crises.

All in all, these papers reaffirm the evolving nature of the international system and unpack the externalities its changes have precipitated. The world is very different than it was just two decades ago, and yet it still remains paradoxically the same. The papers showcased herein are a testament to a newfound stark reality. Although the world is smaller, flatter, spinning faster and faster, it continues to be denominated in the same unchanging historical and realist narratives.

It is with great honor that I present the McGill International Review's 2016 publication on the *Ripples of Globalization.*

Niki Kashefi,

Managing Editor

MIR

My Neighbor, My Enemy: Understanding the Protracted Conflict Between China and Japan

William Doan

The China-Japan conflict is one of the oldest and deadliest protracted conflicts (PC) in history. The two states have undergone multiple phases of protracted hostility via violent and verbal acts as well as peaceful normalization within a tributary system. In order to clarify the reasons why the conflict between China and Japan has persisted, this essay will examine different patterns of conflict, especially the modern phase of the PC that led to the onset of the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) over the Korean peninsula. The central argument of this essay is that the PC lasted until 1945 because of the rise of Japanese and Chinese nationalisms, a relationship of distrust between the two states, and ambition to be the dominant power in the region. Power imbalance and territorial dispute are still the root and the persisting factor of conflict between China and Japan.

Among several frameworks of analysis of interstate PC proposed by some political scientists, such as John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, James Fearon, and Geoffrey Blaney, a model written by Michael Brecher is particularly useful because it allows for a precise division of the conflict into its constituent parts and allows researchers as well as readers to have a thorough and complete view. This model posits six necessary sections to examine a PC in detail; the paper will be structured accordingly. First, it will emphasize the historical roots of the conflict between China and Japan, along with the transformative event that made the relationship between these two states ripe for the development of PC at its onset in 1895. Second, it analyzes the basic causes of the start of the PC and further discusses two precipitating events to onset. The third section focuses on the attitudinal prisms of China and Japan, considering how these prisms influenced the adversaries' perceptions of each other's goals and capabilities. Fourth, it analyzes two essential strategic decisions taken during the PC, with attention to the major decision makers on each side and their respective decision-making processes. The fifth section discusses three themes of persistence in the PC: discordant objectives, conflict-sustaining acts, and imbalanced military capabilities. Finally, the last section considers how the countries in question tried to manage these flare-ups and to resolve the broader conflict, and concludes with

a discussion of the most recent instance of tensions between China and Japan, this time prompted by a clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (BBC, 2015a).

Figure 1. *Chinese Dragon, "I Say, Do Be Careful With That Sword! If You Try To Cut Off My Head I Shall Really Have To Appeal To The League Again" (Japan Swings His Sword After Having Already Cut Off The Dragon's Manchukuo Tail).*

Historical Roots and Transformative Event

The historical relationship between China and Japan is ancient and complicated. James C. Hsiung determines that their relationship began in 589 A.D. (Hsuing 2007, 1) from which time the two states have passed through various stages of enmity and alliance. In ancient times, the Chinese Emperor treated Japan, Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries as vassal states. Initially, Japanese society was heavily influenced by the Chinese culture, the Chinese writing system, and by China's law and institutions (Chu 2007, 23). However, when Western countries forced Japan to open trading in the mid-19th century, Japan came to consider China as a weak civilization unable to protect itself. The potential conflict lay dormant until Japan decided to modernize its own institutions and military capabilities for the first time in the Meiji era (Hsuing, 1). Nevertheless, the first conflict between China and Japan occurred during the Sengoku period (1400-1600), Emperor Taicosama attempted to invade and conquer China (Hsuing, 10). In 1592, his military invaded the most important Chinese frontier, the Korean Peninsula. However, the Chinese supported the Korean armies to drive the Japanese forces to the south.

During the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), the Japanese Empire replaced the old patriotic slogan "Enrich the Country and Strengthen the army with "Revere the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians" (Ibid., 212). The Meiji government focused on duplicating modern Western military power and accelerating the industrialization process to bring wealth and power to Japan (Ibid.). While China faced several crises, such as Taiping and Boxer Rebellions and the Opium Wars with Britain, the Qing dynasty became weaker and more exhausted (Zarrow 2005, 22). Therefore, the Emperor Guangxu and his courtiers, Kang You-Wei and Liang Qichao initiated the Self-Strengthen

Movement (1861-1895). They followed the Western model to reform and modernize the country. Many young intellectuals were sent overseas to learn and adopt Western educational, military, industrial, and administrative systems to protect China from the other Western colonizers (Liang 1996, 75-76). However, the movement was suppressed by a coup d'état led by Empress Dowager (Rowe 2009, 216-219). The Qing dynasty consequently agreed to be colonized and divided by the Imperial Powers, including Japan. China and Japan had a mutual interest in removing Western powers from the region; however, Japan was more interested in protecting its dominance rather than supporting China (Hsuing, 5). After the success of the Meiji Reform, Japan became an industrialized world power with a strong military that expanded its sphere of influence. To protect Japan and fight China for power, Korea was seen as a perfect place to control: it was a frontier state of China and it was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan" (Duus 1976, 175). Korea therefore became an important vector of conflict between China and Japan. After the defeat of the Qing Dynasty in two Opium wars, the Chinese government was not able to protect itself and its vassal states from Western powers. Japan thus decided to replace China's influence in the Korean Peninsula with its own, and sent armies to help Korea suppress peasant rebellions in the 1880s and 1890s.

The first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) initiated the true PC between China and Japan. The defeat of the Qing dynasty in the war with Japan served as proof of the failure of the modernization process in China and the success of Meiji policies in Japan. After signing the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Japanese state gained control over Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula (Jansen 1975, 25-27).

By defeating China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, Japan earned recognition as a new imperialist power (Paine 2003, 3-5). The Emperor Meiji determined to benefit from China's weakness and sent the Twenty-One Demands to the young Republic of China (RoC) in 1915 in order to control the region of northern China and Manchuria. Although these demands were opposed by the United States (U.S.) and Britain, Japan still obtained four of five concessions it demanded over China, failing only in the creation of a puppet regime through which completely to control the Chinese economy (Jansen, 209-223). The Japanese government also set up the South Manchurian Railway (1905-1907), which ran from Lushun Port at the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula to Harbin, and was connected to the Chinese Eastern Railway (Encyclopedia Britannica, "South Manchurian Railway"). The Chinese people responded with outpouring of anti-Japanese sentiment, expressed through boycotts of Japanese goods, expressions of hatred towards Japanese people and Japanese culture, and an entrenchment negative feelings and distrust of Japan (which remains in place today) (Luo 1993, 297-319). Therefore, the event caused the relationship between China and Japan to worsen and to become more difficult to resolve.

In addition, since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Japan was considered if not on the same footing as a powerful Western country, in terms of influence in Asia, then at least close to it (Paine, 179-189). The issue of the Shandong peninsula was raised during the treaty negotiations because of the dispute over Article 156 of the treaty (Griswold 1938, 239-268). Instead of returning the peninsula from Germany to China, control of this territory was given to the Japanese state. Although the U.S. intervened to return control to China,

Japan still maintained its economic dominance of the province and its control over the railway. These events triggered the May Fourth Movement of 1919, which occurred in China to protest against the weak Chinese government and against Tokyo's control over the Shandong peninsula (Spence 1981, 117-123). These demonstrations spread quickly and became national protests, caused a further development of Chinese national sentiment. This event, combined with a long history and several incidents after 1895, made the hostile relationship between China and Japan grow deeper and stronger.

Basic Causes and Precipitating Causes

The concepts, Basic Causes and Precipitating Cause, as used in Brecher's framework, are closely related but analytically distinct. Basic Causes are defined as long-term general sources, including tangible and intangible variables[1] of interstate PC. In addition, Basic Causes refer to the "independent, causal, predictor variables that, individually and as a group, constitute the conditions most likely to lead to the outbreak of a PC." Brecher 2015, 146-147). Comparatively, Precipitating Causes refer to the short-term sources or specific act(s), and includes verbal or physical triggers of a PC. The Precipitating Cause is considered to be an intervening variable that links the independent variables and dependent variable (Conflict Onset) together and determines the environment in which the PC is likely to occur (Brecher, 147).

Among six postulated basic causes of PC to explain the onset of the China/Japan modern PC, there is one relevant tangible variable, power rivalry among states, and one relevant intangible variable, identity conflict. The most prominent cause of the PC was, and has since been, power rivalry. While China managed to maintain its dominant power over East and Southeast Asia, Japan attempted to upset this balance and to seek greater recognition from neighboring countries throughout the twentieth century. Japan's ambition was to replace China as the dominant power in eastern and southern Asia. This ambition began to appear more realistic after the Chinese military was defeated in two Opium Wars, during which it revealed its inability to protect its vassal states.

The economically asymmetrical relationship between Japan and China caused two different power struggles that led to the onset of the modern phase of the PC. Since the Meiji era, the Japanese Empire had been increasing in strength by westernizing its government system, initiating industrialization, and modernizing its military (Holcombe 2011, 249-254). With its new slogan, "Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Army," the Japanese leadership nurtured and harnessed the forces of nationalism in order to transform Japan into a great power. Moreover, the advent of Japanese Empire caused a rift in the Sino-Japanese relationship, and China began to fear that a stronger Japan could later become a threat to the Qing Dynasty (Kissinger 2011, 87-89).

The second major power rivalry issue took place at the regional level, regarding Korea, "one of the three major strategic locations in Far East" (Paine, 33). Control over Korea became necessary for the protection of Chinese territory, the Japanese military's expansion, and for the economies of both countries. After losing the Ryuku Kingdom[2] to the Japanese Empire, the Qing Dynasty determined



Figure 2. Protracted Conflict — Onset. Adapted from: Brecher, Michael. "Framework of Analysis: Persistence Model." In POLI 444 Course Pack. Edited by Michael Brecher, 207. Montreal: McGill University, 2015.

to keep Korea as its most important tributary in order to restrain Japan's growing influence in the East Asian region (Paine, 55-56).[3] For geographical reasons, Japan felt that for another power to have a military presence on Korea would be detrimental to Japanese national security, and so Japan resolved to end the centuries-old Chinese suzerainty over Korea (Duus, 125). Moreover, Japan lacked natural resources; the Japanese Empire therefore had to seek out other neighboring countries to obtain these materials. Japan realized that having access to Korea's coal and iron ore deposits would benefit Japan's growing industrial base and the Gapsin Coup in Korea provided it with an opportunity to prepare an invasion to eliminate Chinese control (Paine, 58-59). As a result, Japan successfully forced Korea to open its ports and to agree to be a co-protectorate of both Japan and China. The volatile power rivalry further deepened the split between China and Japan, and reinforced each state's suspicions towards the other.

Chinese and Japanese civilizations both developed on the basis of Asian values and Confucianism, and Japan was for a long time considered a daughter of Chinese civilization and one of its tributaries. However, Meiji Japan was

determined to usher in a new conception of civilization and in the process to make its first major bid for modernization. *Bunmei Kaika*, or "civilization and enlightenment" was conceived with a mission to expand the values of personal independence, political pluralism, and a disciplined but free individuality as the basis for a modern society (Fukuzawa 2008, 17). In order to spread this concept to other countries, Japan needed to transform from "a natural commercial nation" to "an industrial country; and as a natural consequence [...] a democratic country" (Science Encyclopedia, "Meiji Japan) and become the leader of the region. Hence, all traditional values such as those of the Middle Kingdom, were to be left behind. China, one of the world's earliest civilizations, and until recently suzerain of Japan, resented this innovation (Paine, 58-59). According to Chinese historical practice, other countries were required to follow the Emperor's rules and ask for his permission to trade and conduct diplomatic relations. The relationship between China and Japan consequently became hostile, and the likelihood of a conflict increased accordingly. Thus, the conflict over Chinese and Japanese identity was the last basic cause of this PC.

The modern phase of the PC was sparked by the first Sino-Japanese War on August 1st, 1894. This was directly preceded by two events which occurred in Korea and acted as the precipitating causes for the onset of the PC. The first precipitating cause was the Gapsin Coup of 1884. This was a three-day coup d'état in the late Joseon Dynasty of Korea. With the failure of the Peking government to protect vassal states and the rise of the Japanese Empire's influence, the Joseon Dynasty was divided into two factions: pro-Japanese reformers and a conservative, or pro-Chinese group (Paine, 58). Although the coup was suppressed by Yuan Shikai, a general of the Chinese Army, Japanese leadership was successful in forcing Korea to accept Japan as a suzerain power like China. Hence, China became aware of Japan's ambitions and perceived the newly concluded Convention of Tientsin to be the result a failure of the Middle Kingdom's philosophy.

The second precipitating cause was the Donghak Rebellion on January 11th, 1894. When the Joseon Dynasty was not able to repress the Donghak peasant army, it requested assistance from the Qing Dynasty (Paine, 112-113). China's goal was to solidify its deteriorating position in Korea by sending 3,000 troops to Asan Bay.[4] At the same time, Japan immediately took this occasion as a chance to expand its influence in Korea, not only to restore its position of political primacy, but also to gain access to a profitable market. Hence, the Tokyo regime ordered the deployment of 7,000 troops and seven warships to Incheon (Paine, 113-115). After the defeat of the Donghak army, the Qing Dynasty proposed a joint withdrawal to Japan, supported by the Korean Empire, but the Japanese rejected the plan. Japan suggested instead that the two powers should together undertake to reform Korea's internal administration (Paine, 115). The underlying purpose was to propose an unacceptable issue to China and seize upon China's reaction as an excuse to engage in hostilities. By this point, Japan felt that there was no other option than to use military force towards China. Thus the two basic causes of conflict were compounded by the two precipitating events—the Gapsin Coup of 1885 and the Donghak Rebellion of 1894—which caused hostility and insecurity between these two adversaries. The First Sino-Japanese War prompted the resumption of an historic PC that has proved insoluble due to deeply rooted historical mistrust and animosity.

Attitudinal Prisms[5]

Three main factors shaped China's attitudinal prism, including its longstanding history as the dominant power in the region, the harsh peace treaty demands from Japan, and the adoption of Sino-centrism. For at least two millennia, China had been the strongest economic, political, military and cultural power in East and Southeast Asia (Kissinger, 10). Since the Meiji era, China had begun to see Japan as a traitor because it rejected all traditions and Confucian customs from China, and adopted the Western ideas about imperialism and civilization instead (Paine, 100). China's humiliation deepened when, as the former leader of Asia, it was forced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to sign a series of unequal treaties with colonial powers.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the Annexation of Korea of 1910, and Twenty-One Demands of 1915 also shaped the attitudinal prism of China. These agreements were tough on the Qing Dynasty. The Japanese leadership declared that Korea was an independent country, no longer tributary of the Qing, and made it a Japanese protectorate (Duus 1995, 18-24). These agreements also brought Taiwan into Japan's possession and granted an indemnity from the Qing of 200,000,000 silver taels (Paine 261-269). Finally, the Qing dynasty ceded territorial and economic control over the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas to Japan. To make matters worse, China had been defeated by a member of the Confucian world, a much more humiliating fate than any Western defeat. In the words of Paine, "the war kicked the bottom out of [China's] world" (Paine, 5). Nevertheless, these agreements brought the upsurge of a genuine Chinese nationalism and an increase of distrust, hostility, and hatred toward Japan and other Western powers.

The development of Sino-centrism further shaped China's attitudinal prism by instilling a sense of superiority over other countries. This ideology holds that China is the center of the world, while others peoples are less developed and inferior. In this view, minorities are less intelligent, less civilized, and trivial, and are responsible for the failures of China in the Century of Humiliations (Scott 2008, 2-4). Others were obligated to kowtow to the Emperor of China (Hsu 1970, 152). The ideology also emphasized the idea of China's self-appointed position as the leader in Asia, which outside powers were constantly trying to "encircle" (Esherick et al. 2006, 232). Thus, these three factors of historical conflict and Sino-centrism shaped the lens through which China viewed the events that unfolded between itself and Japan in the nineteenth century.

Japan's attitudinal prism was also shaped by three factors, including its historical experience of power asymmetry, its successful industrialization, and its rightful claim to be the leader in Asia. Japan had a long history of tributary relations with and discrimination from China, and was for many years dependent on its economic and cultural stewardship. The Japanese state perceived Chinese control over the Korean peninsula and other Southeast Asian countries to be indicative of China's monopoly on power. Yukichi Fukuzama in his famous essay "On Throwing off Asia," urges his countrymen:

> We must not wait for neighboring countries to become civilized so that we can together promote Asia's revival. Rather we should leave their ranks and join forces with the civilized countries of the West. We don't have to

> give China and Korea any special treatment just because they are neighboring countries. We should deal with them as Western people do [...] I reject the idea that we must continue to associate with bad friends in East Asia (Dower 2015).

He encourages the Japanese people to contribute to Japanese independence by building their confidence and national spirit, and by encouraging them to join the military and cultural fight against other countries.

Industrialization during Meiji's era was also an essential factor. During this period, the Emperor implemented several policies to reform key sectors of the Japanese economy, such as agriculture, industry, trade, banking, and taxation (Holcombe, 225-227). Japan's industry was transformed while China's economy was exhausted due to rebellions and corruption. Such rapid industrialization helped the Japanese armies to develop and prevented Japan from "slipping into poverty and becoming a mere supplier of raw materials for industrialized foreign countries" (Holcombe, 225). The success of Japan's industrialization and its economy inspired the Japanese leadership to eliminate China's control over the surrounding region and to reverse the far Eastern balance of Power.

Finally, Japan came to consider itself the rightful leader of Asia. Since the Meiji Restoration and the victories over China and Russia (two powerful states), Japan had come to believe that it had enough military and economic power to replace China's position. After the Opium War, Japan saw China as a "Sick man" of Asia and continued to seek influence over the Korean peninsula as a main strategy to develop its economy and military (Holcombe, 18). The concept of Pan-Asianism was created as propaganda to justify Japanese external invasions (Bialock 2007, 186). Therefore, instead of helping China to overcome its difficulties, Japan aimed to dominate and put China under its control before invading other Southeast Asian countries. This idea expressed Japan's ambition to expand its empire, expel all Western countries from China and Asia, and build a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' under the Japanese hegemony (Hsuing, 7). These three historical experiences and ideals shaped the way that Japan perceived China's actions in the buildup to, and onset of, their modern PC.

In sum, China and Japan had conflicting perceptions of each other because of their different attitudinal prisms. China feared the rising power of the Japanese state, and was wary of Japan's ambitions in the Korean peninsula, since both clashed with China's own desire to be the dominant power in East and Southeast Asia. Conversely, Japan saw China's power over the Korean peninsula as an obstacle to Japanese leadership of East Asia These opposed attitudinal prisms contributed to an increase in the commission of hostile acts in the late 1890s and made the relationship between China and Japan ripe for resumption of PC in 1894.

Goals and Capabilities

At the onset of the modern phase of the PC, China's main goal was to restore its position as the dominant power in the East Asian region. Viewing itself as the dominant power, China was unwilling to accept Japan's growing influence. Thus, the first Sino-Japanese war occurred in 1894 with the objective of restoring the traditional Sino-centric balance of power. China was particularly convinced that

Japan's military capabilities were inferior to its own, and it was believed that modern Chinese warships could damage Japanese military forces and infrastructure and would deter her from acting up again.[6]

Japan was aware of China's superior military capabilities, but there were several factors that gave Japan a heightened sense of security and confidence. First, during the Nagasaki Incident, a Japanese man discovered a Beijing Navy sailor's dictionary that was a guide to decipher the Qing codes (*Institute of Quing History*). This dictionary helped the Japanese navy gain advantage in the war by reading Chinese codes, and it easily destroying the Beijing Fleet. Second, because China had been struggling with peasant protests and Western occupations, Japan assumed that the Beijing regime would not able to launch a large-scale attack. Finally, the Japanese advisors realized that China's armies were "poorly trained, seldom paid, and led by officers who specialized in avoiding danger while enriching themselves" (Edgerton 1997, 45-46). Thus, it could be a valuable opportunity for the Japanese army to begin an unexpected attack on Asan Bay blocking the Chinese and encircling them with its land forces (Edgerton, 45-50). Thus Japan did not fear China's superior military forces as it worked to free all of Japan and conquer Chinese territories.

China and Japan had opposing perceptions of each other's claims to power. Based on their attitudinal prisms, each power felt threatened by the other's objectives. However, neither side was deterred from action by their perceptions of the other's capabilities. Japan decided not to withdraw from the peninsula and maintain its protectorate to further its goal of gaining influence in East Asia and becoming a great imperial power. China fought against Japan during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894 to assert its dominance in the region, and to restore the balance of power after losing some tributaries.

Behaviour

The first strategic decision taken by China was to depart from Japan's influence by establishing a new government, the Republic of China (RoC) in Nanjing and to adopt a consistent policy of appeasement and conciliation toward the Japanese (Coble 1982, 295-310). The Kuomintang (KMT) realized that China was not ready to fight against Japanese military power, and so a strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (Chor 2002, 213) was adopted in 1925 by Chiang Kai-shek, the successor of Sun Yat-sen and the leader of both KMT and RoC. Accordingly, the RoC followed two basic strategies to maintain and increase its powers, oscillating between them and ensuring that China had enough soldiers to fight against the Kwantung Army of Japan. The first emphasized the creation of hierarchical bureaucracies, strong division of responsibilities, and legal routines to gain more authority for the central power "even while it delegated powers" (Zarrow 2005, 51). The second stressed indoctrination and the popular mobilization techniques of the mid-1920s. This meant that the RoC had to appoint men to carry out the main goals of eradicating Northern warlords (Northern Expedition) and Communists, and expelling Japanese from the country.[7] This policy was opposed by Chinese intellectuals and citizens because the RoC had accepted the Twenty-Demands from Japan and was focused on attacking the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[8] Nevertheless, the policy was a suitable strategy

because it forced Japan to see that China was unsatisfied and humiliated with the status quo of territorial distribution and with the economic influence of Japan.

The main decision makers in China at this time were Chiang Kai-shek and his right wing faction of the KMT. Chiang, who was an autocrat, nationalist, and Confucian, was recognized by the world as the single ruler of mainland China from 1928 to 1948 (Taylor 2004, 1-3). He realized that the ambition of the Japanese Empire was to take over China, but, as discussed above, he believed that the Chinese military was not strong enough to fight against the Kwantung Army.[9] A divided China became an obstacle for the KMT in the PC (Coble 293-310). While adopting the appeasement and reconciliation policy with Japan, he used the Green Gang to support the Japanese boycott movement to weaken the Japanese economy, which in turn would weaken the Japanese army (Coble 295).[10] After unifying Chinese warlords, Chiang became deeply involved in the civil war with the Communists and neglected the main goal of expelling the Japanese. Yet he failed to stem the tide of anti-Japanese feeling in China (Coble 1985, 308).

The main decision makers in Japan at this time were Ishihara Kanji, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army stationed in southern Manchuria, and Itagaki Seishiro, a General of Imperial Japanese Army (Jansen 2000, 581-582). They believed that Japan had a responsibility to resolve the Manchuria-Mongolia problem through military force in order to gain a dominant position over China, to promote China's unity and stability and to guarantee peace in the East. Moreover, the decision to take over the Manchurian region through armed combat was influenced by the fact that Japan could not solve the problem of food supplies for its army and people (Jansen, 582). Finally, Ishihara and Itagaki realized that the RoC was stretched militarily by the Chinese civil war, and seized the opportunity to engage in active combat by initiating the Mukden Incident of 1931.

The second strategic decision taken by Japan was to establish a new political and economic order. After defeating China in 1895, Japan determined to replace China as leader of East and Southeast Asia (Holcombe, 249-253). Ito Hirobumi, four time Prime Minister of Japan, adopted the "Southern strategy,"[11] encouraging Japan to attack other Southeast Asian countries to create its own empire. He was assassinated, but the strategy was resumed under the leadership Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in 1940. The Japanese Empire assumed that "The future world would be divided among large regional blocs dominated by major powers like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States" (Duus 2008, 622). The implementing act of this strategic decision to take over Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceanic under Japanese's control took place on August 1940 when Japan established the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Earlier, Japan had invaded China in an act of war in 1937 (Duus, 623-624). As a result, Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam in 1940 and 1941.

The main decision maker in Japan at this time was Konoe Fuminaro, a Prime Minister of Japan (1937-1941) and his cabinet (Duus 617-618). Theodore de Barry explains that Konoe administration cabinet members decided to establish a new political and economic order, "entailing wide-ranging domestic political reforms to strengthen Japan in its confrontations with the outside world" (Duus, 620) because of a desire to expand the Japanese Empire. The reality, however, was dictated by Japan's lack of natural resources. Japan's main incentive for

expansion was that it afforded the possibility to exploit the resources of neighboring countries (Duus 620-621). Their eventual control of much of China during WWII brought Japan into the Southeast Asian sphere, and as a result its dominance became widespread.

The main decision makers in China at this time were still Chiang Kai-shek, who remained in power until his death in 1975, and Mao Zedong, who became leader of mainland China from 1949 to 1976. With the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and the Japanese invasion of Shanghai and Nanjing, Chiang had to change his earlier strategy of fighting against the Communists (Coble, 294). The CCP's strategic decision had not changed from 1919 that China should ally with the Soviet Union to fight against the Japanese. Mao commanded that the CCP, "conclude anti-aggression alliances and anti-Japanese pacts for mutual military aid with all countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression provided that this entails no loss of our territory or of our sovereign rights" (CCCP of China 1998, 2). As a result, Chiang and Mao agreed to stop the civil war and determined to expel the Kwantung Army of Japan from China. The decision-making process in China around this time of collaboration was influenced by China's feeling of insecurity. Also, Chiang was kidnapped by his generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in Xi'an Incident of 1936 (Zarrow 2005, 302-303). Therefore, the Second United Front was established in 1936 to facilitate military collaboration between the KMT and the CCP against Japan in 1937. Finally, the U.S. and the Soviet Union also called for Chiang and Mao to stop the civil war to eliminate the power of Japan in China. For these reasons, China felt secure against a threat from Japan (Zarrow, 302-303).

With the defeat of Japan by China in 1945 and U.S. occupation, the Japanese leadership, itself led by American General Douglas MacArthur, shifted Imperial policy to one of pacifism and neutralization (Scalapino 1992, 194). The Japanese Empire was dissolved and the Japanese Constitution was amended to include the following provision:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Scalapino 1992, 194).

Furthermore, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and his cabinet approved the Yoshida Doctrine[12] as Japan's foreign policy. It is still in effect. Japanese defense has since then been totally dependent on American protection; this is known as the "Buck-Passing Strategy" (Mearsheimer 2001, 157-158).[13] These strategies shaped Japanese Foreign Policy throughout the Cold War era and beyond.

Comparatively, China's strategic posture toward Japan had changed after 1945. The civil war between the KMT and the CCP resumed until Chiang fled to Taiwan in 1949. Mao, who became the chairman of the CCP, implemented another strategic decision: China had to cooperate with other countries due to the insecurity of the new regime. As a result, China signed several agreements

with the Soviet Union to receive military and economic aid, it protected North Korea in the war of 1950, and it initiated the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1955 and 1958 in an attempt to re-unify China (Deng 2008, 4-5).

China's decision to challenge Japan's expansion over the Chinese territories and economy and Japan's decision to counter China as an obstacle to its dominance in the East and Southeast Asian region were both strategic because they greatly affected the course of relations between these adversaries throughout the 1930s and the 1940s. The main political actors in these states had important sway over the decision-making process.

Persistence

This section is divided into three parts to discuss the reasons for the persistence of the modern PC between China and Japan until 1945. Each section addresses on of the following variables: discordant objectives, conflict-sustaining acts, and asymmetrical military capabilities.



Figure 3. Protracted Conflict — Persistence. Adapted from: Brecher, Michael. "Framework of Analysis: Persistence Model." In POLI 444 Course Pack. Edited by Michael Brecher, 207. Montreal: McGill University, 2015.

Discordant Objectives[14]

For both adversaries the primary discordant objective has always been power in East and Southeast Asia. Japan's goal from 1895 to 1945 was to eliminate China's influence completely in the regions and to incorporate East, Southeast, and South Asia, as well as Oceania into the Japanese Empire. Prime Minister Fuminaro Konoe popularized a political slogan *Hakkō ichiu*[15] or, in the words of the Japanese ultranationalist propagandist Tanaka Chigaku: "imperial rule had been divinely ordained to expand until it united the entire world" (Jonckheere 2011, 62). The slogan became a moral goal and a symbol for world domination through the Japanese military force. It also emphasized loyalty to the Emperor as essential to

achieving dominion over the world. Contrastingly, China sought to prevent its small neighbor with the same Confucian ideology from gaining any power over the region in which China had long been dominant, and viewed the acquisition of power as a zero-sum objective.

The second persistent discordant objective was territory. With victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Empire of Japan was able to annex the Korean Peninsula, the Pescadores group, Taiwan, and Liadong Peninsula. The collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the weak government of the RoC, and the damage of the Civil War were together seen as a valuable opportunity for the Tokyo leadership to force China to grant concessions. As a result, the Empire of Japan gained control over much of northeast China and smaller areas along the southern Chinese coast. Japan's ambition to control Chinese territories was also evident in 1931, when it invaded Manchuria and established a puppet state called Manchukuo. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan took over Beijing and Nanjing to establish another Chinese government. These actions showed Japan's long-term commitment to using Chinese territories for its development of the Kwantung Army before expanding to Southeast Asian countries. From China's perspective, it was humiliating to lose sovereignty to Japan over the northern region and urban cities, including the RoC's capital city, Nanjing.

Although the PC ended in 1945, power continues to be a discordant objective between China and Japan. The present discord has manifested in the form of conflict over the Senkaku Islands. As the islands are neither central to either's claims to statehood nor an integral part of their ethnic or national identities, they do not constitute a discordant objective over territory. Rather, these islands are seen as an extension of power for both China and Japan. If one state were to gain control over the islands, it would signify a loss in power for the other, thus making conflict over the islands a manifestation of one discordant objective: power.

Conflict-Sustaining Acts[16]

The first type of conflict-sustaining act was the settlement of a series of especially harsh agreements between 1895 and 1935. After the failure of China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894, Japan requested severe concessions from China.[17] These agreements brought lots of benefits and power to the Japanese Empire, but caused an intensification of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese boycotted Japanese products and expressed their discontent through several rebellions, like the May-Fourth Movement of 1919, in which the Chinese fought not only the Japanese occupation over Chinese territories but also the RoC's appeasement and negotiation policy towards Japan. Taking advantage of weak response from the RoC, the Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria and captured the entire region by February 1932 (Jansen 2000, 582-583). Then the Chinese government appealed to the League of Nations. In February 1933, the League ordered Japan to leave Manchuria immediately. However, Japan refused to withdraw its military and left the League. The League could not impose any sanctions on Japan because several countries still maintained trading relationships with Japan. Thus, Chiang decided to propose another cease-fire agreement with Japan on May 31st, 1933 to end the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. He agreed to all of the severe

demands from Japan including the creation of a demilitarized zone from Beijing to Tianjin and the Great Wall of China under Japanese control. There would be no KMT military units in the zone, except Japanese aircraft and ground patrols. The RoC recognized the Manchukuo government and acknowledged the loss of Rehe province. The Chinese public and the CCP were humiliated by these agreements, and, although the agreement was signed, Japanese ambitions to control China remained as strong as ever and led to the persistence of political hostility through a severance of diplomatic ties between the two adversaries.

The second type of conflict-sustaining act was the use of violence to settle territorial disputes. China and Japan had previously fought against each other over various territories. After the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, the Shandong Peninsula was granted to Japan, which prompted a hostile response from within Chinese society. Moreover, with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Japanese expansion through the Chinese territories, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, with the goal of expelling the Japanese army from China. Finally, the Kwantung Army of Japan was defeated by the combination of KMT and CCP armies as well as by the Allies in other Southeast Asian countries in 1945, which ended the Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere. Despite Japan's defeat, hostility between the two countries remained, and occasional skirmishes over Chinese territories continue to mar relations between China and Japan to this day.

Military Capabilities

The military capabilities of China and Japan became unequal due to the deterioration of Chinese armies (Li 2007, 26). Additionally, Chinese armies did not have political unity because of continuing tension between National Revolutionary Army of the KMT and the CCP troops. They were forced to collaborate with a main goal of expelling the Japanese from China when Japan began to expand its control over the Chinese territories (Li, 35-37). In contrast, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the official ground-based armed force of the Empire of Japan from 1871 to 1945, developed significantly after the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 (Drea 2003, 76).

Several reasons led to the defeat of Japan in the 1937 war. Firstly, while Japan quickly captured all key Chinese ports and industrial centers (Jansen 2000, 642-644), the KMT and the CCP were still able to resist Japan in the mainland, where Mao and his guerilla fighters dominated the countryside. This caused a stalemate (Encyclopedia Britannica, "Mao Zedong"). Secondly, Western intervention in the form of economic sanctions against Japan weakened the Japanese army's fighting capacity (Arima 2015). Finally, because the Empire of Japan was too ambitious, not only in regards to invading China, but also because of its operations in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Pearl Harbour, the Japanese armies had to divide into several units and were weakened by the division.

Despite discordant objectives, conflict-sustaining acts and high levels of tension during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937, violence did not escalate into another war in the region after 1945. This may be partially due to the asymmetrical military capabilities between China and Japan. During the period of Mao's leadership, China suffered several disastrous attempts at reform, such as the Great Leap Forward, which affected negatively not only the economy but

also the military (History, "Cultural Revolution). Also, the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Korean and Vietnam Wars occurred in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and shifted the attention of China's military from Japan to Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam. Moreover, in 1967, China succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons (Wire 2015). Japan, on the other hand, experienced major economic hardship after WWII. Its economic growth was low, inflation was high, and there was a major food shortage forcing Japan to import hundreds of tons of rice and to reform its economy. Moreover, its new constitution required it to shrink its military and to close weapons factories (Hane and Peres 2013, 63). Japan's safety was assured by the U.S., although in reality China had a much stronger military than Japan. This may have helped keep Japan peaceful, although this may change. The recent amendment of the Japanese Constitution under Abe's administration—with the support of the U.S.—has helped Japan resume its manufacturing of such items as aircraft carriers, and has allowed it to establish some measure of national missile defense as well (Genser and Brignone 2015).

The main discordant objectives between China and Japan have historically been power and territory. Together, discordant objectives and conflict-sustaining acts have contributed to the persistence of the China/Japan PC. However, the asymmetry in military capabilities after 1945, as well as the occurrence of other crises in the region, and the availability of the U.S. as a guarantor of Japan's security, have likely been the factors preventing further violent conflicts.

Conflict Resolution

Causes of Conflict Resolution

The China/Japan PC ended largely as a result of Japan's exhaustion[18] due to simple military defeat. The China-Japan stalemate was broken by American fire-bombings. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused Japan's exhaustion, in both physical and psychological terms (Jansen 2000, 647-661). As a result, the Japanese forces had to withdraw from all territories and surrender to the Allied Powers. The presence of exhaustion in Japan led to the issuing of the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, the defeat of Japan and the recognition of China's success in WWII.

External pressures[19] on the PC increased over time. Japan became isolated when it decided to leave the League of Nations in 1932 and violated the Washington Conference to invade China and Southeast Asia (Burkman 2007, 177). Both Germany and Japan adopted militarily aggressive attitudes towards their respective neighbors, but the Axis countries could not support each other because they were fighting separate wars (Hoyt 1990, 101). Moreover, the Kwantung Army was responsible for the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, which severely damaged Japan's prestige and trust in the eyes of Western countries, especially the U.S., Britain, and France (Yang 2002, 10). Furthermore, the attack of Japanese armies on Pearl Harbor led to the entry of the United States into WWII (Jansen 2000, 626). In contrast, China received support from the USSR as well as the U.S., Britain, and France during the War (Taylor 2004, 156). The Soviets used China as a deterrent to prevent a Japanese invasion through Siberia

and to save themselves from involvement in WWII. In September 1937, the Soviet leadership signed the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation



Figure 4. Protracted Conflict — Resolution. Adapted from: Brecher, Michael. "Framework of Analysis: Persistence Model." In POLI 444 Course Pack. Edited by Michael Brecher, 207. Montreal: McGill University, 2015.

Zet.[20] Furthermore, the U.S., Britain, and France provided loan assistance for war supply contracts to the RoC. In 1941, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt pressured Japan to withdraw its military from Chinese territories by increasing the number of American troops in China, by giving financial aid to the RoC, and by beginning an oil embargo against Japan (Wakeman 2009, 75-78). The final and most severe application of external pressure was again the influence of the atomic bombs on the economic and military power of Japan. These external pressures thus coalesced into a single force to bring China and Japan towards resolution.

Reconciliation

The Second Sino-Japanese War ended in 1945 when the Japanese signed an "instrument of surrender," which also been signed by the Allies (National Archives and Records Administraton, "Japan Surrenders"). Later, the Treaty of Taipei, which ended the War, was officially signed by the RoC in 1952 (Treaty of Taipei). However, by this time, the PRC had taken power in mainland China, so there is no evidence of reconciliation between the PRC and the Japanese government. The current tension over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands is the main source of persistence of the PC today, although the leaders in these two countries also engage in verbal hostilities against one another. While relations between China and Japan have been normalized and trade has been widespread since 1972, disagreement over the island groups continues. Between 1978 and 1990, the bilateral relations between the two states constituted a "Golden Age," especially economically (Zhao 2002, 32). The Japanese and Chinese economies flourished as a result of an increasingly fruitful trade relationship. There were many

Japanese companies investing in production in China and as well as in other developing countries. At the same time China's economic development was rapid and now appears to be catching up with Japan.

Yet as far as the Senkaku Islands are concerned, the conflict is mainly about power. Neither side is willing to give up its historical claims to sovereignty over the islands because the struggle has become part of each side's narrative of conflict (Taylor, 2015). Strong nationalist sentiment has developed in both states regarding the islands. For instance, the anti-Japanese sentiment had been growing, as evinced by the violent 2012 anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in many Chinese provinces that were related to the Diaoyu Islands dispute. According to a survey of Chinese public opinion carried out by the Institute of Public Opinion of the People's University in Beijing, the percentage of people who had negative views of Japan increased from 38.5 percent 53.6 percent between 1994 and 2004 (Chu 2007, 35). In the same year, right-wing activists held the national flag and placards inscribed with phrases such as "Sink the Chinese boats in our waters" and "Do not give in to the Beijing terrorists" as they walked through the central shopping district, before arriving at the Chinese Embassy (RT 2015). The demonstrations came in response to the mass anti-Japanese rallies held in Chinese cities that resulted in the vandalization of Japanese businesses. The Anti-Japanese Riots of 2012 in China caused even more fear of China within the Japanese public (RT 2015). According to the Pew Global Attitude Project, an unfavorable view of China was held by 84 percent of the population and an unfavorable view of Chinese people was held by 73 percent (Pew Global Project Attitude 2015). Matters were made worse when the current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made his first visit to the Yakusuni Shrine in 2013 (Brecher 2015). The Shrine temple tributes the Japanese war dead, many of whom are classified as war criminals for their involvement in massacres in China and other Southeast Asian countries. In response to Shinzo Abe's visit, the President of the PRC, the General Secretary of the CCP, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping introduced the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Diaoyu Islands and declare them part of China's sovereign territory (BBC 2015b) Finally, Abe's administration succeeded in amending the Constitution in September 2015, by inserting a provision allowing the Japanese army to fight abroad (Ripley 2015).

The presence of exhaustion and external pressures contributed to the end of the conflict between the RoC, not the PRC and Japan in 1945, with an official treaty of Taipei in 1952. However, according to Professor Brecher's explanation, conflict resolution precedes reconciliation between adversaries locked in a PC. The China-Japan PC might therefore be seen as an exception, since there was resolution without reconciliation. Hence, despite some meaningful cooperation between the two states, the conflict over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands remains active both because of a general desire to be the principal power in the region, and because of the significance to each country of their historical claims to sovereignty over the islands.

Conclusion

China and Japan remain sworn enemies despite numerous attempts at political reconciliation and increasing levels of economic interdependence. Charismatic

leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, Tanaka Giichi, and Konoe Fuminaro played an important role in building narratives of hostility about their adversaries. Their decision-making processes in times of conflict and crisis were shaped by their historical experiences and by perceptions of each other's capabilities. The conflict persisted from 1895 to 1945 due to discordant objectives, the commission of conflict-sustaining acts, and because China and Japan had asymmetrical military capabilities. The PC was formally ended via the Treaty of Taipei of 1952, signed by Taiwan and Japan, though not by communist China. There has since been increasing cooperation between the China and Japan, including the normalization of relations and increased trade, although China and Japan have not formally been reconciled. The tension continues today largely because of the conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This issue is rooted in a power imbalance, in which Japan feels threatened by China's regional dominance and growing world influence. As long as the balance of power remains tilted in China's favor, Japan will not feel secure and will continue its attempts to upset the status quo. China still takes umbrage at the memory of Japanese troops storming it territory, is alert the threat of rising Japanese power, and may react threateningly. Thus, the two states are again locked in a state of tension, with little hope of reconciliation.

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William Khoa Doan was born in Saigon, Vietnam. He is completing his final year (U3) in Political Science and International Development Studies, with a minor in East Asia studies. His research interests include Asian politics, foreign policy, and security issues in East and Southeast Asia. Following graduation, he looks forward to pursue his Master's degree in the United Kingdom and eventually become an expert in security and conflict.

[1] In Brecher's framework, Basic Causes consists of three tangible variables – disputed territory, power rivalry among states, and economic access, and three intangible variables – competing ideologies, identity conflict, and rivalry among political leaders (Brecher 2015, 141).
[2] The territory roughly consisted of the Okinawa Islands of Japan.
[3] Li Hong Zhang wrote in his work that, "Our country regarded [Korea] as part of the empire and dispatched [...] troops [...] Now the entire world knows that Korea is our dependency" (Paine 2003, 55).
[4] The Convention stated that (1) Both nations would pull their expeditionary forces out of Korea within four months of the signing; (2) King Gojong of Korea would be advised to hire military instructors from a third nation for the training of the Korean army; (3) Neither nation would send troops to Korea without prior notification to the other side (McClain 2002, 276).
[5] **Attitudinal prisms**. "Every decision-maker in foreign policy operates within a context of psychological predispositions. These comprise: a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy; and b) personality factors—the idiosyncratic qualities of decision-makers—that is, those aspects of elite attitudes which are not generated by their role occupancy. Together, these influences constitute the screen or prism through which elite perceptions of the operational environment are filtered" (Brecher 1972, 11).
[6] Li Hong Zhang observes that that, "Japan would not wage war, but the Japanese were fully prepared to act." However, he also observes that the Beijing Fleet was one of the four modernized Chinese navies and the dominant warship in East Asia, so China could not lose if the war happened (Peres 2013, 500-502). Hence, at the onset of the modern phase of protracted conflict, China viewed its military capabilities as superior to those of Japan.
[7] Before expelling Japan from China, Chiang determined to eliminate Communists as a first priority policy (Zarrow 2005, 251).
[8] The Chinese Civil War was a civil war fought from 1927 to 1950 between the Communist Chinese Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT), headed by Chiang Kai-shek. In 1950, the CCP won the conflict, took over mainland China, and established the People's Republic of China (PRC), while Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan and claimed to be the official government of China, or the Republic of China (RoC) (Hutching 2001, 83).
[9] The Kwantung Army was the largest and most prestigious command of Japanese Empire in the first half of the 20th century.
[10] During his visit to Japan, Chiang emphasized to the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi that "to reassert China's sovereignty [...] the Japanese government [should] not interfere but rather aid" (Zarrow 2005, 251).
[11] The Southern Strategy, or the Southern Expansion Doctrine (Nanshin-ron), was a political doctrine which held that Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands were in Japan's sphere of interest and that the potential value to the Japanese Empire for economic and territorial expansion in those areas was greater than elsewhere (Beasley 161).

[12] The Yoshida Doctrine aimed to reconstruct Japan's domestic economy while maintaining the security relationship with the U.S. to prevent invasions from China and Korea (Scalapino 1992, 194).
[13] A "Buck-Passing Strategy" is "the act of attributing to another person or group one's own responsibility. It is often used to refer to a strategy in power politics whereby a state tries to get another state to deter or possibly fight an aggressor state while it remains on the sidelines" (Mearsheimer 157-158).
[14] **Discordant Objectives** refer to any high-value objective over which the involving adversaries in a specific PC disagree. Disputed Territory is a prominent objective in Brecher's framework. Disputed territory includes the following disputed values: territory, power, ideology, and material benefits – access to sea water, to international waterways, and to natural resources, and economic gains from regime change (Brecher 2015, 191-192).
[15] Hakkō ichiu means "eight crown cords, one roof" (Jonckheere 2011, 62).
[16] According to Brecher's framework, **Conflict-Sustaining Acts** can be grouped into four categories of hostile behavior: political hostility; violence; economic discrimination; and verbal hostility-propaganda (Brecher 2015, 204).
[17] The list of agreements included the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, Twenty-One Demands in 1915, and treaty of Versailles in 1919.
[18] In Brecher's framework, there are two general types of exhaustion, physical and psychological, experienced by the populations whose countries are involved in interstate conflict (Brecher 2015, 230).
[19] External System Pressures refer to several interactions—economic, political, cultural, and other—that reinforce the behavior of principal adversaries in the PC, through an array of forms of pressure. Brecher emphasizes that, "Pressure may or may not be effective in influencing policy choices and actions by the target, one or more principal adversaries" (Brecher 2015, 234).
[20] As part of this secret operation, Soviet technicians upgraded and ran some of China's transportation systems. Bombers, fighters, supplies and advisors, including Soviet general Vasily Chuikov, the future victor of the Battle of Stalingrad, arrived to support the CCP. Prior to the entrance of the Western Allies, the Russians provided the quantity of foreign aid to China, totaling some $250 million in credits for munitions and other supplies. Although the aid from the Soviets was ended due to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941, the Soviets continued to support the CCP secretly with a total of 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots (Taylor 2004, 156).

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A Life for Others: The Meanings of Filipino Labor Diaspora Remittances from Canada

Marko Palaming de Guzman

Having lived in the Philippines during my childhood years, I realize that my migration trajectory has played a major role in my life. I became conscious of the struggles and challenges which the Filipino diaspora community faces, particularly the precariousness of Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers (FLCM) in Canada. These groups of women face structural constraints in their everyday life. They are, what I classified, victimized labour diaspora within the Filipino labour diaspora in Canada.

The key problematic questions of this paper are the following: how does motherhood, remittances and feeling of self-victimization perpetrated by the state, market and by self-perception intersect? How do FLCMs cope with the structural constraints which they face? Do remittances play another role aside from the traditional economic benefits? Why do the FLMCs suppress their victimized character? Who and what perpetuates this victimization? Overall, I aim to understand the labour migration narrative of FLCM through the analysis of remittances, and the structural constraints that render them victims of migration.

The paper argues that FLCMs are victimized labour diaspora who prioritize their family through remittances, even when constantly oppressed, marginalized and discriminated. This argument is a direct challenge to the assumption that the prominence of women in migration and labour participation brings equity and empowerment. By analysing the social meaning of remittances, this research contributes to the lack of research and understanding on this matter. The literature on Filipino Live-In Caregiver has thus far focused on the issue as an isolated and individual case. There is little research on the collective struggle of Filipino caregivers in Canada. This research therefore aims to show that Filipino caregivers share a collective struggle, constraints and challenges, one with which they try to cope individually (i.e., informally) and collectively (i.e., formally), as a form of resistance. It acknowledges that the informants are not hopeless.

The chart below shows how the research project is operationalized. Each part will be examined and analysed in the introduction and in the literature review.



Chart 1.1: Research Project Operationalization.

This following section describes the 3D human well-being (3D-HWB) approach, but particularly, the subjective dimension, victimized labour diaspora, structural victimization and coping strategy to victimization (CSV). They often intertwine together in describing the FLCM. Referring to Chart 1, the Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers (FLCM), the objective dimension, the household strategy and the structural constraints (i.e., states, markets and self-perception) will be detailed in the literature review.

Chart 1.2: The interconnectedness of subjective dimension, structural victimization and CSV.

3D Human Well-Being Approach as Research Framework

The three-dimensional human well-being approach, or simply 3D-HWB, is an emerging international development approach that complements the human development and capability approach in the study of poverty and deprivation.[1] This approach is conceived by the Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC's) Well-being in Developing Countries or WeD network and the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) from their five-year multi-country research in 2007.

McGregor defines the approach as the interplay between "the resources that a person is able to command; what they are able to achieve with those resources and what needs and goals they are able to meet; the meaning that they give to the goals they achieve and the process in which they engage".[2] It focuses beyond the incomes and narrow human development indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), by considering three dynamics and interacting dimensions (3Ds): material well-being, subjective well-being, and relational well-being. It gives importance to the perceptions, experiences and relationships of individuals. Gough and McGregor, White, McGregor and Sumner, and Wright summarize the 3Ds in the following way: the objective dimension deals with practical welfare and standards of living, the relational dimension refers to the individuals' personal and social relations, while the subjective dimension concerns values, perceptions and experience.[3]

Subjective Dimension: The Self as a Level of Analysis

The subject level of analysis uses social processes as a setting to analyse subject-positions, which are generated by discourses which institutional agencies have propagated.

By using this analysis, women's dislocation is acknowledged. Parrenas believes that through this lens, perspectives of migrants are considered. [4] Wheedon clearly defines this notion as "the conscious and unconscious thoughts

and emotions of the individual, her sense of self, and her ways of understanding her relations to the world".[5] In the context of Filipina domestic workers, these self-evaluative thoughts include the perception of being racialized women, low-wage workers, highly educated women from the Philippines.[6] The subject level

Table 1.3: 3D well-being – dimensions, areas of study, indicators and key determinants

Dimensions of well-being	Material	Relational	Subjective
What is to be studied	Objectively observable outcomes people are able to achieve	The extent to which people are able to engage with others in order to achieve particular needs and goals, and the nature of these engagements	The meanings that people give to the goals they achieve and the processes they engage in
Indicators	• Needs satisfaction indicators • Material asset indicators	• Multidimensional resource indicators • Human agency indicators	• Quality of life indicators
Key determinants	• Income, wealth, and assets • Employment and livelihood activities • Education and skills • Physical health and (dis)ability • Access to services and amenities • Environmental quality	• Relationships, love, and care • Networks of support and obligation • Relations with the state: law, politics, and welfare • Social, political, and cultural identities and inequalities • Violence, conflict, and (in)security • Scope for personal and collective action and influence	• Understanding of the sacred and moral order • Self-concept and personality • Hopes, fears, and aspirations • Sense of meaning/meaninglessness • Levels of (dis)satisfaction • Trust and confidence

Sources: Gough and McGregor (2007); White (2008) and McGregor and Sumner (2010).

Table 1.3: The area of study, indicators and key determinants of 3D well-being.[7]

Katie Wright from the University of East London applied this approach in 2012 in her research with Peruvian migrants based in London and Madrid, whose immediate relatives and close friends were based in Peru. She investigated how her participants, and their left behind kin, constructed the concept of well-being, and how it spanned across geographies. She concluded that the 3D-HWB successfully fills the research gap about the psychosocial impacts of out-migration, given that the literature has been centred on the impact of financial remittances to the migrants and their kin. Alternatively, Nicola Jones and Andrew Summer used the 3D human well-being to advance a holistic understanding of child poverty and well-being in their book *Child Poverty, Evidence and Policy: Mainstreaming Children in International Development*[8]. Their research is a good example of how this 3D-HWB approach serves to offer multiple angles and understandings of a complex issue in international development. The following sections will further unpack each of three facets of the 3D-HWB as relevant to FLMCs: the subjective dimension, the victimized labour diaspora, and structural victimization.

analysis also enables researcher to analyse the intersection of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nationhood that affirms the multiplicity of the self.[9]

The subject level of analysis allows for further understanding of the twofold reality of migration. One consists of the formation of the self, while the other is the resistance to dislocations. These new insights are significant, given that, as Parreñas has recognized, the average Filipina domestic workers view their migration process based on the justifications of their dislocations, rather than on the global structural constraints such as patriarchy and global capitalism. Parreñas claims that dislocations are the defining characteristics of experience. This paper follows this argument, and claims that dislocations, coupled with imagined victimization, inherently defines their migration processes.[10] Lastly, using subjective level of analysis will help me explore what factors my informants categorize as symbolically meaningful to their migration trajectory. [11] In *The Kitchen Spoon's Handle* by Ruth Gamburd, this concept of social meanings and symbolic meanings are significant in analysing Naeaeagama women's migration experience.[12] Rhacel Salazar Parreñas' work on in book *Servants of Globalization,* in addition to that of Ruth Gamburd and Aihwa Ong, will serve as a model for this research project.[13]

Victimized Labour Diaspora: Structural Victimization

The word victim comes from Latin *victima* that translates to a sacrificial animal. This word is chosen in this paper because the FLCMs see themselves as victims, and regarding their migration, as a sacrifice to their family;

> [Structural victimization] takes many forms, some visible, some hidden, some subtle, and others not so subtle. One of the common forms of structural victimization is the abuse of power, in particular, the violations of human rights. What sets structural victimization apart from other kinds of victimization is its magnitude and the ubiquitous character of many of its forms, such as war, genocide, tyranny, dictatorship, oppression, repression, persecution, torture, censorship, exploitation, discrimination, racism, sexism, ageism, and classism.[14]

Structural victimization in this paper is an umbrella concept that encompasses the oppression, exploitation, discrimination and family especially separation of children of Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers in Canada.

Victimization of women has also been widely studied in legal and policy practice literature. Some literature has focused on Black women's oppression from their husband. Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality to emphasize that victimization takes multiple sites and forms, which include forced sex, verbal abuse, economic deprivation, systemic gender discrimination, and racism.[15] Gender, class and race intersect in the victimization of Black women.

Also, the word victim is chosen because it implies that perpetrators exist. In the case of the informants, the perpetrators are the Philippines and Canada, the structure political economy or simply the market and their self-perception. This classification of perpetrators will be extensively analyzed in the literature review.

Coping Strategy to Victimization (CSV)

The concept of Coping Strategy to Victimization (CSV) is coined here to consolidate and differentiate the forms of resistance the FLCM employ. Coping strategies are defined in psychology as behavioural and psychological conscious efforts of an individual to master, tolerate, reduce or minimize stressful events.[16] Resistance in this paper is linked to James Scott's (1985) *Weapons of the Weak* in which subgroups or lower classes of a given society, such as the FLCM, resist in a fashion similar to peasants. They resist informally by gossiping, petty theft and reduced efforts at work against perceived unfairness and inequality. Their way is realistic, common and accessible to everyone. Thus, Scott argues that they engage in *everyday resistance*. This theory does not undermine the formal way of resistance such as the formation of lobby organizations. It even more so demonstrates that resistance is a conscious effort to manage unchangeable structural constraints and structural victimization they experience in their everyday life. Scott offers four criteria for a *genuine* resistance: collective and organized, principled and selfless, produces revolutionary consequences and rejects the basis of domination. These criteria will be used to evaluate whether the forms resistance of the FLCM are genuine.

Remittances as Informal Form of Resistance

Conventionally, under the *New Economics of Labour Migration* (NELM), migration is a household strategy for the purpose of income diversification (as is indicated in Chart 1). It is based on a rational choice and cost-and-benefit calculation of migration.[17] When a worker migrates abroad, he or she takes part of an implicit contract with his or her household. This contract entails that remittances will be sent back home.[18] This contract happens with motives derived from altruism, mutual obligations and understandings.[19]

This research refocuses our attention, not to these dominant micro-economic benefits of remittances, but to the migrants as the remitters. The literature on remittance studies has been focused on its effects on countries of origin.[20] Migrants are conceptualized as "shadow households."[21] The transnational and labour diaspora senders in their host countries have been overlooked and neglected. Their characteristics and their remittance processes have been under-researched. This paper moves away from the economically functionalist approach, and uses a transnational perspective. It hopes to tackle these gaps by exploring the social meanings of remittances from the Filipino labour diaspora perspectives.

In the context of Filipino Live-In Caregiver Mothers (FLCM) in Canada, both an informal and formal form of resistance emerges. They use remittances as their CSV to counter the structural constraints (Chart 1.1). The informal form is through remittances, which is simply the act of sending money abroad. The act of remitting money in Canada is practical, if not completely available to everyone. It is a common practice of immigrants. It is realistic and accessible to all. The demise of this informal resistance is its private and unorganized nature. Thus, it is difficult to change the structure revolutionarily and reject the basis of domination understood as a calculated act of conformity to the norms and institutions established for migrants.

Associations as Formal Form of Resistance

Another form of resistance that supposedly fits the genuine resistance criteria of Scott is the creation of formal civil society organizations (CSOs) or advocate groups. Tungohan's research explains that Filipino Live-In Caregivers try to negotiate their victimhood using political actions and mobilization as their Coping Strategy to Victimization (CSV).[22] Yet, a lack of coordination and programmatic goals, agendas and strategies exist within the existing CSOs or advocate groups for Filipino nannies and domestic workers in Canada. They too have differing nature and preoccupations. For example, the National Alliance of Philippine Women in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, the Migrant Workers Family Centre in Hamilton, the Migrante Canada, the Immigrant Workers Centre in Montreal, Caregiver Action Centre in Toronto PINAY in Montreal and the Migrante International all lobby for policy change in favour of better treatment and working conditions of LCPs. Some of these associations are experts in awareness campaigns, while others have a greater bargaining ability and influence with the provincial and federal governments. Yet, they often lack collective political action, cohesion and unity to to politically engaged and negotiated with the provincial and federal governments in Canada.

These advocate groups provide a place of belonging and raise consciousness on migration issues. They also provide free or cheap legal aid, paralegal, counselling and immigration consultancy services to domestic workers. However, they lack funding, resources and manpower. Some organizations survived through generous help of unpaid volunteers and donors, which hinder them from resisting efficiently.

Hypothesis

A hypothetical question remains; how might Filipino Live-In Caregivers use remittances as their coping strategy to victimization? Another question follows; what do remittances bring to the FLMCs when used as a coping strategy, or simply, what are its effects to the migrants? My hypothesis is that remittances become their source of familial and cultural reaffirmation, which motivates the labour migrants to work strenuously despite structural constraints. I hypothesized that the migrants turn to their family for validation, for inspiration and for encouragement when they are faced with oppression, discrimination and victimization abroad. The act of remitting momentarily cuts the feeling of victimization and the pain of family separation. Their ability to support their family and their relatives make their painful separation worthwhile. It gives them agency and will to go on with their lives. This hypothesis relies on the idea that remittances are not simply financial advances, but are also endowed with a social meaning. Remittances mean much more to the migrants. This angle is significant because it highlights the life of liminality and 'duality' that these workers experience every day. They are here working very hard to earn money, but their minds and concerns transcend boundaries.

PART I: AN ACADEMIC UNDERSTANDING

Literature Review: Theories, Role of States and the Market

This literature review is divided into four parts. First, it surveys the theories of international migration and how the states are often marginalized in the theories. Secondly, it summarizes how Filipino Overseas Workers become labour diaspora. Thirdly, it scrutinizes both Philippines as a sending state and Canada as a receiving country. Lastly, it examines the role of the market in perpetuating gender role and victimization in labour diaspora.

Theories of International Migration

Theories of international migration studies often neglect the role of the state that produce and shape the process.[23] Yet, politics and the states underlie much of the international migration movements through immigration policies and institutionalized bureaucracy related to migration.[24] For instance, both Neoclassical Economics and Segmented Labour Market theory focus on opposite referent objects. Neoclassical Economics explains that developed countries attract migrants because they offer a positive net return to the individual migrants in a rational cost and benefits calculation.[25] Yet this macroeconomic theory does not directly account for states. The New Economics of Migration is a rational choice theory that acknowledges migration as a household strategy of maximizing income benefit for exiting a poverty trap.[26] Alternatively, Segmented Labour Market theory explains the migration process by focusing on the pull factors, which the permanent labour demand of modern industrial societies has created. These pull factors essentially translate to the need for low wage workers.[27] This theory includes the states only when migration recruitment programs are mentioned.[28]

An additional set of theories focus on a set of structural factors, albeit to varying degrees. Articulated in the 1950s, world system theory explains the migration process as a result of unequal political and economic structures of the developed (core) and developing or underdeveloped countries (i.e., periphery and semi-periphery). Followers of world system theory believe that migration is neither an individual decision nor a household strategy, but a response to the product of structural outcome of market expansion.[29] Here, the state is integrated only when it deals with market expansion, political power or any other capitalist interests of the government.[30] Conversely, the social capital theory explains structural links, such as the memberships gained from networks and social institutions both in countries of origin and destination.[31] Lastly, the theory of cumulative causation explains the personal, social and economic changes, which migration brings to an individual and its community (Massey 1999). Here the role of states is left behind or if it is mentioned, it one-sidedly deals with receiving countries.[32]

The Making of Filipino Labour Diaspora: Overseas Filipino Workers

In this section, each constitutive element of the Filipino Labour Diaspora (i.e., diaspora, labour, Filipino and Overseas Filipino Workers) will be explored separately to better understand the phenomenon collectively. First, the diaspora is defined by Milton Esman as "a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin."[33] Diaspora studies

in the 1980s and 1990s surfaced as a sociological approach to account for international migration and assimilation. Diasporas are believed to not have assimilated into their host country, and consciously share a collective memory[34] because they formed an imagined community and a global village made possible by globalization.[35] Another definition used in this research is of James Clifford who argues that diasporas are a dispersal from an ordinary habitat, myths and memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support for the homeland, and a collective identity defined by relationship to the homeland.[36]

Secondly, the labour in Filipino labour diaspora traces its roots to the dictatorship regime of President Ferdinand Marcos, characterized by high unemployment and serious foreign-debt crisis in the 1970s. As a solution, Marcos had implemented the Labour Export Policy, infamously known as the "warm body export" in 1974. Encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank through the Structural Adjustment Programs, the policy led to the emergence of Filipinos as export migrant labourers. In 1983, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was established, deeming it mandatory for Filipino migrant workers to send remittances to the Philippines, as another solution for the government to increase their dollar reserves (Pratt 8). The Labour Export Policy and the POEA agency became further institutionalized, forcing the country to redefine its concept of citizenship.[37]

Presently, the latest statistics of POEA dated from 2013 estimates that there are 10 238 614 OFWs around the world (Dec 2013). On average, 3 400 Filipinos leave the Ninoy Aquino International Airport daily to become an OFW. These figures average over a million per year, in relation to the 92.34 million which formed the country's population in 2010. These figures endow the Philippines with the largest global diaspora after Mexico.

The State: *The Philippines as a Sending Country and its Immigration Policy*

The push and pull factors of migration is studied using the conceptual framework of United Nations International Research and Training Institute or the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) .[38] The push factors identified by UN-INSTRAW in sending countries like the Philippines are the existence of structural adjustment policies, widespread poverty and inequality, lack of opportunities, lack of social advancement, low wages, high unemployment and lack of upward mobility.[39] There is also an infringement of human rights such as gender-based violence, unbalance workforce (i.e., male unemployment) and a decrease in household purchasing power (thus migration serves as a household strategy). Overall, the political, social, and economic instability pushes women to migrate abroad to support themselves and their relatives in their countries of origin.[40]

American Colonization: The Inception of Labour Brokerage

During the American occupation of the Philippines, Filipino immigration to the United States of America became the locus of international migration. Filipinos immigrated to the U.S. through two pathways: low-skilled cheap agricultural labourers, and skilled training programs and *pensionado* programs. During this time, the Philippine government minimally intervened in the migration process.

It allowed private actors and recruitment agencies to facilitate the migration of Filipinos to the States. For example, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association recruited Filipino low-skilled, cheap labourers who worked as houseboys, chauffeurs, and hotel workers in Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast were recruited in 1910-1930. The Filipino elite in the Philippines became the ward of the U.S. colonial apparatus, gaining roles and ranks in the civil service and in government institutions. Their sons were sent to American universities to be educated in the American Western tradition, and were expected to spread the principles of the "American Dream" upon returning to their home country. The high-skilled nursing professionals also immigrated to the States to be trained in American institutions under the U.S. Exchange Visitor program of 1948. The American rulers framed this broad migration process as a form of benevolent assimilation. This immigration colonial legacy of the U.S. became the backbone of the present-day immigration system in the country.

Marcos Regime: Neoliberalism and the Export of Labour

Robyn Rodrigues argues that the Philippines, under the 1946 Marco regime, officially became a labour broker that facilitated exports of migrants around the world. In begun when Marcos implemented a neoliberal policy of Export-Oriented Industrialization. [41] This was heavily promoted by the IMF and IBRD/World Bank, to solve the balance of payments deficit and the unemployment in the country. Under his administration, he institutionalized labour export with the Presidential Decree 442 that formed the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), and the National Seaman's Board (NSB), which served as promoter, regulator, and supervisors of private recruitment and placement agencies.[42] The government created these pragmatic institutions, and the out-migration process as an economic stabilization strategy. Forced remittances essentially commodified cheap, low-skilled temporary labourers. Furthermore, state migration offices were institutionalized. Sending remittances to the Philippines became mandatory in 1983. All the existing migration agencies were consolidated in one agency now called the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in 1982. The POEA is a highly centralized and institutionalized state bureaucracy that promotes and manages Filipino labour migrants in two distinct ways. First, Filipino manpower appealed to the hardworking Filipinos and marketed them as the viable solutions to labour shortages in developed countries from 1978 to mid-1990s.[43] Secondly, POEA humanized the labour migration industry by creating Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) but continues to commodify them as the state actively "sell" this marketing strategy of hardworking workers to the rest of developed countries in their bilateral agreements.[44] The government became the sole recruiter migrant workers to the regulator of private overseas labour recruitment agencies.

Rhetoric of OFWs as New National Heroes

Following Robyn Rodriguez's conception of the Philippines' immigration policy as labour brokerage, the Philippine state thus targets victimized prospective migrants and migrant returnees, given that the state views labour migration not

only as diaspora strategy, but also as a development strategy. Prospective migrants became migrants before they even left their country of origin.[45] Migrant citizenships emerged from the active participation of the state to craft the national membership and patriotic adherence of OFWs. Their first duty as Filipino citizens is to send remittances.[46] To expand on this, this section will highlight the evolving discourse of the Filipino migrant, focusing on the *balikbayan* (nation returnee), the *bagong bayani* (new heroes), and "heroes welcome". This section will outline how the government invested heavily in a new governmentality for the creation of new Filipino nationals, citizens, with specific rights and duties to their country.

Balikbayan, or literally nation returnee, started in 1973 as a program created under the Marcos regime. It encouraged Filipino permanent residents and expats who went to U.S. to study under EVP program and the *pensionado* programs.[47] They held special privileges in going back to their home country. They were allowed to bring tax-free *balikbayan* boxes full of goods, and they could purchase lands and invest in the Philippines. This special allowance disseminated the clear division of class between the well-off expats, the land-owning elites of *pensionado* programs, and the poor rural people.[48]

In 1998 under President Cory Aquino, the debates on *Bagong bayani* or new heroes became the new discourse. It acknowledged the sacrifices, suffering and the blood and sweat struggle of the OFWs abroad.[49] It also explicitly informed the population of the role of OFWs as the agent of national development goals of economic growth through their remittances. Rituals and activities such as "Month of Overseas Filipinos", "Migrant Heroes Week" began to be nationally celebrated.[50] Under former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, this new heroes discourse was extended to the new type of migrants called the OFI or the Overseas Filipino Investors, in which Filipino well-off residences, or citizens of receiving countries, were encouraged to maintain their ties as investors to the Philippines.

Presently, during December when most OFWs come back to celebrate Christmas, the government hosts a "heroes welcome" at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, a ceremony which began during the presidency of Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada since 1993.[51] The evolving discourse surrounding the Filipino remitter is indicative of the high degree to which the government had, and has, involved itself in propagating a specific conception migrant citizenship. Specifically, it expects OFWs to perform their duty of sending remittances, going back to the country, and investing or returning back to their receiving country for work.

IV. The State: Canada as a Receiving Country and its Immigration Policy

1. The Pull factors

The pull factors in receiving countries consists of a high demand for low-wage workers, for transferring reproductive work (i.e., caregiving and in the private sector) to migrant women. These women perform domestic work: senior care as live-in or live-out caregivers, and childcare as nannies. They also find themselves employed in customer service oriented jobs such as waitressing, cuisine, trade, agriculture and industry, all of which are also typical places of employment for male migrants. Additionally, Rhacel Parreñas adds that Filipino women migrants are in high demands in the entertainment industry such as in the sex trade or

other miscellaneous occupations.[52] This persistent demand for labour in the reproductive sector is attributed to the aging population in developed countries.[53] Additionally, the prospect of better economic opportunity, political freedom and stability, the possibility of social upward mobility in the destination countries attracts migrants.

Canada's Immigration Policy: A Solution to Labour Shortages

Canada's immigration policy has always been in favour of employing workers to fill in labour shortages. In the 1960s, the focus of immigration policy was predicated on a selection process based on the correction of occupational imbalances, according to points system with the goal of meeting short-term labour market needs.[54] The Live-In Caregiver Program (LCP) used to be distinct from the TFW program, because Live-In caregivers could directly apply for permanent residency after twenty-four months of continuously working with the same employer. Now, they can be classified as TFWs because, after their twenty-four month quota, they can apply to another pathway of health professions.[55] Although elaborate, the attempts of both TFW and LCP workers were hindered due to labour market discrimination and the lack of credential recognition.

The Live-In Caregiver Program was enacted in Canada in 1992 as a solution to the shortage of women working reproductive sector such as in the care of children, the elderly, the disabled or sick, and domestic workers. Women can conditionally immigrate to Canada by working as Live-in caregivers for a period of continuous twenty-four months.[56] New changes to the program afforded caregivers the choice of whether to live in so they can live out on themselves, and attend their presence at work to their work hours. The recent changes also ended the direct pathways for applying towards a permanent residency. Now, new caregivers and caregivers currently under the program must apply for permanent residency under one of two pathways: the pathway of caring for children, or the pathway of with high medical needs.[57] Important criteria to these programs include a minimum of two years of Canadian work experience as a home children provider or a registered nurse, registered psychiatric nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse aide, orderly, patient service associate, home support worker or other similar occupation with a work permit. Also, workers are accepted to this pathway only if they have completed a one-year Canadian post-secondary credential or equivalent foreign credential (CIC). In sum, the sending state, the Philippines and the receiving state, Canada, perpetuate what Stasiulis and Bakan have called *non-citizens* through institutionalized structural constraints.[58]

The Market: Gender-Remittance-Development Nexus

The global market also commodifies Filipino women who migrate primarily to send money back home to improve their economic situation. Intersectionality between the gender, remittances, and development is significant here because gender cannot solely account for the inequalities that remittances try to resolve.

Gender is defined as that which denotes the social and cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity.[59] Migration in the Philippines is gendered, which means that patterns of migration are shaped and rooted on gender roles.[60] The conventional narrative for Live-In Caregiver mothers from

the Philippines is that they migrate abroad as social agents through their own will. They have decided with their household to use migration as a strategy to seek better employment opportunities, in order to send money back to the home country as a means to better their family's menial conditions. In relation to remittances, they are supposedly better remitters, less corrupt, more altruistic and more peaceful compared to their male counterpart. Thus, one believes that they play an important role in the development process.

Remittances are classified as a transnational practice of sending money to the home country, in this case the Philippines. It is transnational by virtue of its regularity that facilitates the creation of a new transnational culture, sphere and identities.[61] In regards to Filipinos, remittances are first obliged by the states, awaited by the family, and performed as duty and responsibility by the OFWs abroad.

Methods

Ethnographic Perspective and Sampling

This paper may have been interdisciplinary but it primarily employed anthropological method of ethnographic research. Local realities and local knowledge are taken into consideration and informants and their words are taken as the reflection of reality. Fourteen Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers were chosen to participate to this research. They all send regular remittances to their household in the Philippines to support their children and entire extended family. They came to Canada under the LCP. They have been working in Montreal, Canada as live-in caregivers for an average of 4-5 years. This study is an explorative in nature, and, thus, the representations of the informants to the rest of the LCP workers are barely considered. Each section of analysis will follow one specific informant, whose personal story echoes that of others.

Survey and Semi-Formal Individual Interview

Survey questions and qualitative and one-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted for this research. Semi-formal and individual interviews were chosen to allow informants to contribute questions, and to ensure an open-ended flow to the interview[62]. The interview topics centered on notions of Live-In Caregiver shared identities, motherhood, obligation, responsibility, sacrifices, the motivation for migration, the reason for remitting and structural constraints, and personal victimization experiences. These survey questions and interviews were analysed using the human well-being approach, the victimized labour diaspora notion, and a discourse analysis approach. The reflective nature of the survey questions and the interviews both confirm and clearly articulate the victimization experience of these Filipino OFW mothers.

A CRITICAL APPROACH

To critically analyse the topics of this problem, I will be consistent and follow the same conceptualization which this research has thus far followed. It will be

divided according to shared structural victimization and the psycho-social effects of remittances as a coping strategy.

Shared Structural Victimization: Shared Mentality and Reality

This research focuses on victimization for several reasons that intersect and overlap: the victimization of FLCMs as a state of being, and their remittances as a justification for this state of being. Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers (FLCM) are recruited to work in Montreal because of their personality and character. They are docile, accepting and unthreatening. This characterization relates to their victimization as a state of being.[63] From the onset of their migration process, FLCMs are stereotyped to fit the perfect caregiver migrants to which they conform and take credit. According to the literature, these 'perfect' migrant stereotypes are called positive stereotypes. For example, they are called hard-workers, caring, loving and patience, which all are sought attributes. However, these stereotypes place these women in a group, diminishing their individuality. They are viewed as one of the Live-In Caregivers. All of the eleven women interviewed for this research perceived themselves as caregivers. They embodied the stereotypes given to them.

The substantial aspect of this positive stereotype of FLCM is its discriminatory tone. It tends to label Filipino caregivers as part of the *Other*. This stereotype tends to encourage a just-world phenomenon in which the rest observe these *Other* women as deserving of their situation, given that they obtained what they deserved. They work hard to obtain money, which they remit back to the Philippines, for them to eventually perhaps bring their family to Canada. This just world hypothesis maintained by the Filipino caregiver stereotypes rationalizes the injustices which these women have experienced. Thus, the victimization of FLCMs is derived from their experience of discrimination.

When asked for the purpose of initially migrating to Canada, the provided answers by FLMCs point to an even more reduced individuality. Ligaya[64] states that she migrated to Canada, in order to afford the possibility of sending her three children to school. In her case, the objective dimension of migration is definitely emphasized. Her occupation as a nanny is a household strategy for her family to give opportunity and chance for their children to have a better future through their education. This sacrifice towards their family is essential in the migration narrative of FLCMs. This sacrifice is the central driver for each of them to endure the average four years of separation which they undergo as a Live-In Caregivers. Another important shared collective narrative which these women share is that of their obligation to their family and extended family. When asked why these women chose Canada as a place to work, the majority of them answered because Canada offers a better life for their family. This obligation to give a better life to their children is one of duty.

The aforementioned observation challenges the literature on Live-In Caregivers which frames their victimhood as an isolated and individual case. Their structural victimization is shared mentally and realistically. They are presently working here in Canada, but they worry and care about their family in the Philippines. Their familial concerns take priority over their structural victimization. This observation actually resonates with the insights of

Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila articulated in their study of Latina transnational motherhood.[65] They affirm that these Latina mothers, and by extension the Filipino mothers of this research, are conscious of the consequences of the familial separation with their children. They often take pride that they can provide for their children from afar.

Remittances as CSV: Familial and Cultural Reaffirmation

a) Familial Reaffirmation: Maintaining Membership

Reiterating my argument, I hypothesized that remittances are the source of familial and cultural reaffirmation. This research has demonstrated how this reality might be the case for Filipino Live-In Caregivers. Familial reaffirmation is clearly exhibited in the needs of my informants: to maintain their membership with their own household and to their external family in the Philippines by sending remittance.

Malaya Santos

In 1993, Malaya Santos, a forty-five-year-old mother of one child aged sixteen years old, left the Philippines for Israel. She cleaned houses and nursed babies for fifteen years until she decided to migrate to Canada in 2000. In Canada, she works as a caregiver. When I asked her to compare living in Israel and here in Canada, she described:

> In Israel, I was much happier. There was no tax so my remittances were bigger. Here in Canada, life is very redundant. I go to work in a house then go back to work in my house. I do the same thing five days a week. The only benefits of being here are that I get to be with my family. In Israel, I could not apply for an immigrant status, which I did here in Canada. But, I am content here with my family because we are finally together.

Her story demonstrates the physical desire to maintain membership and remain with her family. She is a mother, and she wants nothing but to physically care for her child. While being a caregiver in Canada, Marissa has been with two employers. Her first employer abused her physically and emotionally. She, the employer, did not pay her for working five consecutive weeks. She took care of three kids (two years old, five and six years old at that time). Her boss manipulated her by issuing bouncing checks on three occasions. Her employer even dismissed her from employment without valid reason. Marissa has reported her employer to the Minister of Labour and the case has been under investigation at the time of this article redaction. Her second employer is very kind to her. She now babysits two children aged five and six years. Her employer allows her to leave early at work. She respects her and treat her fairly and equally.

When asked how remittances may assist her extended family since her family permanently lives in Canada now, she replies:

> I send money to my mom when there are family emergencies. These include hospital bill payments for my mother, *(abuloy)* financial alms and offerings for the funeral of a relative who have passed away, for the reconstruction of houses of my *titos and titas* (aunts and uncles) who are elderly and have no pensions, and for special occasions like birthdays. I am glad when I helped

> out because all the struggles here are worth it. Sometimes my help comes from a sense of pity to my family. *Nakakaawa naman sila* or I pity them. I feel obliged to give something... What would others [my neighbours] say if I do not send money? Regularly it's my mom that directly receives the money, or my younger sister. What is difficult with this setting is when you get shocked with the variety of emergencies that keep coming. In the end, it comes out of love, so it is all good.

Malaya's story reflects the embedded importance of maintaining membership and belonging to the external family. Through remittances, she signals her presence to her relatives in need. She becomes a valuable member of her family as they seek her in times of emergency. Her victimization no longer defines her identity. Her altruism and obligation as members of her extended family endow her with purpose. Her commentary also shows that remittances can act as a source of tension between her as the sender and the receivers. Marissa may become overwhelmed with the amount of emergencies to which she has to attend by sending money.

b) Cultural Reaffirmation: Sacrifices and Responsibility

Using the subjective level of analysis, this research has unearthed that the main priority of FLCMs is to become the financial benefactors of the family. Although they do not forget their experiences of structural victimization perpetrated by the states, the market and their self-perception these experiences become part of the shared reality of being a labour diaspora. Filipino Live-In Caregiver mothers learn to become accustomed living with these structural constraints.

Marilag Reyes

Marilag has been working as a Live-In Caregiver for four consecutive years in Canada. She is thirty-six years of age, and has received a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration in General Management from the Philippines. She migrated directly to Canada because she had an obtained a pre-arranged contract of employment. On a daily basis, she was responsible for serving two adults and two children. She was responsible for cleaning the house, cooking, babysitting the two children, and doing the laundry. She currently works 40-45 hours each week while she remains as a live-out employee Her weekly salary is $353.10 and pays $337 for her room as she lives out in an apartment with her fellow caregivers.

Despite this constraint, she feels the need to send money for the tuition of her three children. As a mother, she feels it her obligation and responsibility to support for her children's education. Her sacrifices and her responsibility as a mother reaffirm the cultural expectations and norms from the Philippines. Remittances make this transnational maintenance of value possible. For Marilag, the act of remitting money to her family is very positive. Without remittances, she would not be able to send her children to private schools. Sending money demands sacrifice to fulfill their responsibility as mothers. Their ability to remit empowers them to assert their position as mothers from afar. Remittances become a form of informal resistance. While remittances may have preserved the gender norm that women are the caretakers of children's education, FLCMs are satisfied with this norm.

c) Familial and Cultural Reaffirmation: A Testimony

Cristina Liamzon and the Leadership and Social Entrepreneurship (LSE) Program

Tala is 34 years old and the sister of Malaya; she lived in Italy for ten years before coming to Canada as a Live-In Caregiver for the promise of easier upward mobility. While in Rome, she took part in a program called Leadership and Social Entrepreneurship (LSE). I had an opportunity to exchange correspondence with the program's founder, Dr. Cristina Liamzon.[66] While working for the the Food and Agriculture Organization since 1990, she became the president of an NGO named Overseas Filipino Society for the Promotion of Economic Security (OFSPES). She also founded LSE program to provide leadership training, financial literacy and social entrepreneurship skills. The LSE program recognizes that remittances reaffirm familial and cultural values of Filipinos. They educate the migrants to save and invest their money properly, in order for them to achieve their financial goals as quickly as possible. They also provide basic business and entrepreneurship skills for migrants to develop beneficial projects and enterprises that will address social problems. The LSE program acknowledges the need for membership, the sacrifices and responsibilities of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) that they express through remittances. The program emphasises how these workers play a role in nation-building of the Philippines. Through leadership and social entrepreneurship skills acquisition, these workers are able to regain their agency, to dream again and to contribute back to their country. The LSE now offers twenty-five programs for OFWs throughout eleven cities.

PART 3: DISCUSSION

The Effects of Remittances on Transnational and Diaspora Identity

As demonstrated in Chart 1.4, Filipino Live-In Caregivers use remittances as a coping strategy to victimization. Specifically, remittances reaffirm the commitment of FLCMs towards their familial and cultural values and identities. These identities are transnational, given that they are shared across borders, in Canada by the informants, and in the Philippines by their family. Both are diaspora identity because they are lived out, shared and spread by them as the labour diaspora.

FLCMs experience structural constraints. They are oppressed, marginalized and discriminated by the states, markets and their portrayal in the society. The closest and tangible 'materials' which they use to cope are remittances. Their act of sending money reaffirms their familial and cultural norms and values. It empowers them, gives them a sense of purpose, and reminds them that they belong to their family. Essentially, remittances fuel their sacrifices, and it reminds them of their responsibility towards their children.

While structural constraints and their shared structural victimization are real, they do not hinder FLCMs from fulfilling the objective dimension of their migration, which is to send money as a household strategy. They realize that these constraints are not going to change, and, thus, use remittances to assert their

power and position silently. They use it as their weapons and tools of resistance, albeit at unawares. They are, however, widely conscious of the vicious cycle effects of remittances on their social construction of identity, and consequently share this identity of resistance against constraints through remittances.



Chart 1.4: This chart demonstrates the vicious cycle effects of remittances on the social construction of transnational and diaspora identity of Filipino Live-In Caregivers.

Analytical Limitations

The methodological limitations of this study include its relatively small sample size. I had only been able to secure fourteen informants, seven of which answered survey questions, while the remaining seven qualitatively interviewed in one on one basis, or through phone calls. My self-reported data might also contain biases such as exaggeration, attribution bias, or selective memory. My personal knowledge and cultural understanding of this issue perhaps also hindered my attempts to objectively analyse the data in question. Given my awareness to this cultural bias since the beginning of my research process, I thus acknowledge here that it may have played a role in the way in which I presented my data.

Conclusion

This research builds on the existing understanding that remittances act as a coping strategy to household shocks, and adds that they also act as a coping strategy to victimization. It draws on 3D Human Well-Being approach and the self as a level of analysis. It also draws on work of various labour migration researchers on topics of structural constraints of domestic workers. Ultimately, this paper has sought to identify the link between structural constraints, shared structural victimization and remittances. It demonstrated how the states, the market and societal perception have perpetuated the victimization of Filipino Live-In Caregivers. It argued that structural victimization is a genuinely shared mentally by FLCMs. These workers became part of labour diaspora in Canada;

they have used remittances as their coping strategy to victimization. Remittances affect their social construction of identity by maintaining membership, the rhetoric of sacrifices and responsibility. All these three major aspects reaffirm familial and cultural values and norms of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Thus, the social meanings of remittances, or rather what it means to be a Filipino labour diaspora, remains to be a life for others and a life of service to the family. These social meanings of remittances bind all labour diasporas together. This author hopes to have *disturbed the invisibility* of the Filipino victimized labour diaspora in Canada.

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Marko Palaming de Guzman is a U2 Political Science and International Development Studies major. His main interest lies in political economy of development and inequality, international labour migration, gender and development. Aside from academic pursuits of knowledge, he is also passionate about youth activism and campus mobilization for McGill Students for Oxfam-Québec to alleviate poverty around the world.

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Appendix

Interview Questions

Part l: Experience as a transnational mother
How many child(ren) do you have? How are they doing?
How are your children in the Philippines?
What does being mother from afar (transnational mothering) mean to you?

Part 2: Female labour migrants, Live-In Caregiver Program. Experience as Labour Diaspora
Tell me about your experience of being a live in caregiver, domestic worker
Probe: Ask them to relate experiences since living in Canada (i.e. did it affect family member, friend, extended family, spouse, family relation)

Prompt: how do you feel about working here in Canada? Did you work in other country as domestic worker? If so, how is it different or similar?
What do you like here in Canada?
How much do you earn/hours or per 2 weeks?
How many hours do you work every week?
Did you experience any difficulty? (psychological and verbal abuse, isolation, depression, lack of friends, lack of community, etc)
How did you cope to this?

Part 3: Remittances
Do you send money to your relatives, close, extended and family back to the Philippines?
Why do you do so?
How often do you send money to your family every week?
What does it mean for you to do this?
Who encourages you to send money?
If you lose your job today and you only have a little money on your saving, would you still send money to your family at home?
Do you know what they do with the money you send?
Do they tell you how, where and in what situation does your family spend your remittance back home?
Do you have special projects, plan or investment that requires you to send money regularly?
Who is in charge of the money you send back home?
How important is remittances/ or being able to send money to the Philippines to you?

Part 4: Family: Sacrifices, Obligation and Responsibility
Tell me about your own family when you were single in the Philippines?
Prompt questions:
Are your parents still alive?
Who takes care of them?
Who provides for them financially?
Do you help them? And how?

Do you maintain your ties with them? How? How often?
How many are you in your family?

Part 5: Transnational Family Intimacy and Relationships
Are you married?
What does your husband do in the Philippines/ what is his occupation?
Who takes care of your child/children in the Philippines?
Who provides for your family back home? How? Why?
Do you maintain your ties with them? How? How often?
What do they do with the money you send them?
How do they spend it?
How does your family deal with you being separated with them?
How long have you been away with your family?
Do you go back home to visit them?
What does your children ask when they call you?
How do you stay connected/ intimate to your children?

Survey Results

7 Informants

Age:	25-30	31-35	36-40	41-50
Total:	1 informant	2 informants	3 informants	1 informants

Education: all are college and university graduates ranging from a B.A., B.Sc. and B.M.S. (management)

Push Factors:

Economic Difficulty in the Philippines	6 informants
Change of environment	3 informants
Lack of opportunity, job, upward mobility in the Philippines	3 informants
Inaccessibility to healthcare and other services	2 informants

Pull Factors:

For Children	7 informants
Less crime	2 informants
To Financially support family	7 informants
Comfortable life	1 informant
Diversity	1 informant
Access to education, healthcare (social services)	6 informants
Relatives in Canada	3 informants

Entry to Canada:

Direct entry through Sponsorship: 6
Permanent Residency: 1
All came directly from the Philippines One is already a Canadian citizen, while the 3 have permanent residents and 3 others applied for P.R.

Nature of Domestic Job:

Cleaning: 6 informants
Babysitting: 3 informants
Laundry: 4 informants
Cooking: 7 informants
Menu prep: 7 informants

Recommendations to LCP and fellow Filipinos under the program:

"More socialization and [to get more] involve with the Canadian cultures"

"By not spending beyond [the caregiver's] means"

"Learn to speak French"

"Study"

"Be optimistic"

"Support or social group available/accessible online to newcomers so that it would lessen the loneliness of women being far away from their family"

Russia-West Trade: An Instrument of National Power? Explaining variations in Russia-West political and trade relations, 2005-2015

Gérald Sigrist

In *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,* written at the end of the Second World War, Albert Hirschman developed an argument about the conditions under which international trade can be used effectively as an instrument of state power. While few scholars of international relations today would deny that trade plays at least some role in a state's position of power, Hirschman's particular approach to this relationship has been unduly neglected since. Although he drew mainly on the particular case of the German trade offensive in southeastern Europe in the 1930s, I argue in this paper that his conclusions are still valid today and can indeed help us understand contemporary issues of trade and international relations, such as variations in West-Russia political and commercial relations over the last decade.

In the first part, I will explain Hirschman's argument and the general theoretical implications that can be drawn from it, modelling them into a decision tree about the interaction of political and commercial relations between two states. His main point is that, depending on the quality of bilateral political relations, trade patterns change and trade flows can be altered or even interrupted to play the role of political instruments employed against a trading partner.

In the second part, the body of this paper, I will look at variations in West-Russia political and commercial relations since 2005 to test the validity of Hirschman's argument applied to this contemporary case. An observation of the key phases and turning points in US-Russia and EU-Russia political relations over this period allows me to formulate hypotheses, or "expectations", which I will confront with an analysis of the changes in commercial relations between these actors. In a third and concluding part, I will show that each case –that of US-

Russia relations as well as EU-Russia ones – corresponds to a particular path on the decision tree previously introduced, confirming the model inspired from Hirschman's work.

PART I – HIRSCHMAN'S ARGUMENT AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

From trade imbalance to power imbalance

Hirschman starts his argument by referring to earlier schools of thought, citing the Mercantilist premise that trade can work to the disproportionate benefit of one or a few trading nations[1]. While he acknowledges that the Mercantilists' strict balance of trade theory was discredited by economists like David Hume and Adam Smith, who demonstrated that trade can be mutually beneficial, Hirschman explains that the principle, according to which there can be a disequilibrium in the advantages that trading partners find in their commercial relationships, remains valid, even when bilateral balances of trade appear to be in equilibrium. To demonstrate that, he distinguishes *objective* gains from trade (the physical surplus of goods in the balance of trade) from *subjective* ones (how much a nation needs or values what it imports or exports). A country can gain more or less than the face value of its imports from and exports to another country (in quantity or monetary value), depending, for example, on the existence of alternative sources of imports and outlets for exports. Beyond the trading partners' economic welfare, foreign trade also affects their position of power. Hirschman distinguishes two ways in which this takes place[2]: the *supply effect* (providing resources enhancing a nation's military potential) and the *influence effect* (the relationship of dependence and influence with trading partners). He emphasizes the latter as the main source of the "power effect of trade", which derives from the fact that trading with country A is worth something for country B, which would therefore consent to grant Some advantages to keep trading with it. Thus, a disequilibrium in advantages from trade (due to the distinction between objective and subjective gains) can translate into a disequilibrium in the "power effect" of this commercial relationship.

Activating the "power effect" of trade

The next step is to determine how this "power effect" can be activated. Having the power to keep trading with a country that benefits more than oneself from this commercial relationship also means having the power to interrupt this relationship. Thus, a country trying to make the most out of its strategic position in terms of trade will create the conditions for the interruption of trade to hurt its partners more than itself, just like war implies a cost on the initiator too, which hopes to inflict higher costs on the target country. In trade interruption as in war, it is often the threat of it that serves better than its actual use. Hirschman then goes on to define the conditions under which trade interruption becomes costlier to the target country, and thus more effective for the initiating country. He notes that short-term losses from trade interruption are greater than long-term ones, because adjustment to the new conditions and resource reallocation has not happened yet (due to the time needed to find new sources of imports and outlets for exports)[3], and points to the mobility of resources and sectorial or regional

concentration of export-dependent activities as aggravating factors[4]. We will see that other, additional factors can also be cited, making the costs of trade interruption (and its counterpart, the subjective gains from trade continuation) higher. The share of government revenues coming from particular sectors of the economy can be one example, combined with the absence or limited number of alternative trading partners due to the specificities of these sectors.

Figure 1



Theoretical Implications and Modelization

We can build a simple model of the interaction of political and commercial relations between two countries by inferring the following from Hirschman's points: (1) as long as the political relationship between two nations remains predominantly harmonious, commercial relations should not be expected to follow any other pattern than the maximization of economic gains; (2) as bilateral political relations deteriorate, trade flows can be expected to focus increasingly on those economic sectors that represent the highest subjective gains to the target country ('target sectors'); (3) as conflict becomes predominant in the countries' political relations, an interruption of trade can be expected, affecting only those sectors where the target country has the highest subjective gains, that is, where trade interruption is the most costly for the target country; (4) trade interruption will be effective at altering the target country's behaviour in the direction hoped for by the initiating country only if previous commercial relations have created sufficiently strong vested interests that can be hurt by trade interruption, so that the costs of trade interruption to the target country outweigh the benefits of policy continuation. The decision tree on the following page summarizes this model.

PART II – THE CASE OF WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE 2005

In this part, I look at variations in political relations between the West (understood as the US and the European Union (EU)) and Russia since 2005, formulate hypotheses, or "expectations", about the corresponding changes in commercial relations we could expect based on the model presented in part I, and then test them by analysing West-Russia commercial relations over the same period. As we will see, variations in commercial relations largely correspond to the predictions that can be made based on our model and on observations of the changes in political relations.

West-Russia political relations since 2005

At the level of detail needed to fill the "political relations" part of our model, which requires us to define the general quality of the political relationship between the two nations studied (whether a situation where "harmony predominates", one between "harmony" and "some conflict", or one where "conflict predominates"), the two components of the West – the US and the EU –fairly similar patterns of relations with Russia. Relevant nuances will still be noted, and their expected consequences in terms of corresponding variations in commercial relations will be assessed. Over the last decade, we can distinguish three periods in West-Russia political relations: 2005-8, in which there is "some conflict" but "harmony predominates"; 2008-13, a period also characterized by a mixture of "conflict" and "harmony", but where West-Russia relations changed in nature due to the first turning point of the 2008 Georgian crisis; and the year 2014, which represents the second and major turning point of the decade in West-Russia relations, after which "conflict predominates". Let us now explain why these periods can be characterized as such.

Using quantitative data is one possible approach to study variations in the quality of political relations between two countries. While assessing

interactions where the human factor plays an important part, using exclusively quantitative data, is necessarily incomplete, and should therefore be complemented with a qualitative analysis of these interactions, the quantitative approach does present the advantage of "scientific" precision. I will therefore combine the two approaches, and use the quantitative one to confirm or infirm my qualitative observations.

West-Russia political relations: qualitative observations

The records of West-Russia political relations over the last decade are starkly contrasted. The beginning of the 2005-2008 period was influenced by a legacy of intense cooperation and projects of further cooperation, during which "harmony" predominated. In US-Russia relations, hopes of more harmonious relations reached their apex at the 2003 Camp David summit, where they were so high that many influential Kremlin advisers advocated for of a full alliance with the US, in which Russia would help building the liberal democratic world order in line with the Bush doctrine and assist the US in resolving international issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Korean nuclear standoff[5]. In EU-Russia relations, Russia's skepticism with the EU as an organization translated into Moscow emphasizing mainly bilateral relations with individual European states[6]. With many of them, harmony and cooperation predominated, in particular with Germany and Italy. Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, conscious of "Berlin's fundamental interest in close relations with Russia", emphasized "*Wandel durch Verpflichtung",* that is "change through engagement"[7].

Several negative developments have since harmed these harmonious relations. First, a series of revolutions, referred to as the "coloured revolutions", toppled pro-Russian governments in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), creating lasting suspicion from Russian authorities vis-à-vis the West, as it gave the Kremlin the impression that these events were closely orchestrated by the West and had the objective of consolidating its "victory" after the end of the Cold War by incorporating large parts of the former Soviet Bloc and even former Soviet republics in its sphere of influence[8]. A number of scandals involving spying activities on both sides (Russian and Western agents) did little to alleviate mutual suspicion[9]. In Europe, the eastward enlargements of the EU, but even more so of NATO, antagonized Russia. The three Baltic republics, for example, which had been fully integrated in Russia's sphere of influence as parts of the Soviet Union, joined the American-led military alliance in 2004 along with other East European countries[10]. The American plan to set up a new missile defence system in Central Europe created further tensions with Russia, with President Putin declaring in 2007 that it posed a 'direct threat' to his country's interests[11].

Still, these tensions should not be overstated, as they can be counterbalanced by some positive facts. Over the 2005-8 period, Russia's cooperation with the US and European countries in Afghanistan continuously produced positive effects for West-Russia relations, which helped for example appease tensions arising from Russia's opposition to the American intervention in Iraq in 2003[12]. Furthermore, despite frictions over EU and NATO enlargements, the situation of EU-Russia relations before the Georgian crisis had

become relatively positive and cooperative: in 2007, the two parties' diplomatic agendas for bilateral relations emphasized, respectively, "cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the environment [...] and stepping up cooperation with Russia in the Southern Caucasus" (European Commission's priorities towards Russia[13]) and "improved bilateral relations with Germany, France, Spain and Italy as priorities [and] the creation of a special French-German-Russian 'trilateral political dialogue'" (Russia's 2007 Foreign Policy Review[14]).

Looking at the 2008-2013 period and comparing it with the 2005-8 one, one could be tempted to say that West-Russia relations have been generally mixed in a similar fashion, with as many conflictual as more harmonious aspects. Yet a distinction can be made between the two periods, at the center of which lies the episode of the 2008 Georgian crisis. After 2008, West-Russia political relations did present a mixture of conflict and cooperation similar to that of the preceding period, but the Georgian crisis changed deeply the nature of these relations inasmuch as it proved to the West that Russia did not only wish to defend what it considered its legitimate sphere of influence around its borders, but was once again willing to use large-scale military force against a sovereign state to do so, even at high economic and diplomatic cost[15]. For one thing, the circumstances of the Russian intervention shocked Western public opinion. While the conflict appeared to have been initiated by the Georgians, who first launched an offensive on the capital of their South Ossetian breakaway region[16], the Russian "counter-offensive" killed more than 600 people (mostly civilians, according to Amnesty International[17]), at times allegedly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures deliberately[18], and by advancing deeply into Georgian territory – up to the point of threatening the Georgian capital Tbilisi – it went far beyond merely repulsing the Georgian army out of South Ossetia, provoking vigorous protests from the West[19]. Moreover, even after a ceasefire was signed on August 16, Russian troops stayed in Georgia throughout the autumn in violation of Moscow's commitment[20]. Tensions between Russia and the West had never been this high in decades, to the point that some in the West seriously feared the possibility of the breakout of a new Cold War[21]. Therefore, the more lasting effect of the Georgian crisis was to severely harm West-Russia trust and cooperation, as it largely contributed to the West's perception that President Putin was "bent on aggressively promoting [Russia's] exclusive interests at the expense of partnership and cooperation with the West[22]".

While interpretations diverge, I argue that this event deeply changed Western attitudes towards Russia, despite later instances of US-Russia and EU-Russia de-escalation attempts and even renewed cooperation. Such instances include the Obama-Medvedev "reset" after 2009, which improved US-Russia relations temporarily by providing Russia increased international recognition and allowing bilateral cooperation to expand[23]. In return, Russia accepted to renounce the idea of installing missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave[24], and President Obama eventually abandoned the plan to locate anti-missile defences in the Czech Republic and Poland, opening the way to a new arms reduction treaty taking effect in 2010[25]. Later positive developments in EU-Russia relations include the 2010 EU-Russia "partnership for modernization" aimed at achieving political rapprochement through deeper economic interdependence[26]. On the other hand, initiatives such as the EU's "Eastern Partnership", which aimed at

deepening the Union's interactions with several post-Soviet states to prepare them for eventual membership, were negatively perceived by Russia, which considered the project an attempt to create a sphere of influence at its expense[27].

If between 2008 and 2013, as I argue, West-Russia relations, apparently mixed between harmony and conflict, in fact changed in character with the creation of a lasting Western suspicion towards Russia, the main turning point of the 2005-15 decade was still the year 2014. From early 2014 on, few would deny that West-Russia relations became characterized predominantly by conflict. The immediate roots of the events in early 2014 are to be found in the decision of the pro-Russian Yanukovych government of Ukraine to abandon the project of an association agreement with the EU in November 2013, supposedly under Russian pressure, which provoked large-scale protests in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities[28]. In February 2014, after tens of protestors were killed by police, President Yanukovych fled to Russia[29]. As pro-Russian demonstrations mounted in Ukraine's Eastern provinces and in the Crimean Peninsula, news emerged of military troops in unmarked uniforms resembling Russian uniforms taking control of airports and other strategic locations in Crimea[30]. The following Russia-backed referendum in March, resulting in a declaration of independence of the Peninsula, which then joined the Russian Federation, was condemned by the US and the EU as illegal and illegitimate[31], and marked the beginning of the "biggest East-West showdown since the Cold War"[32]. From April 2014 on, the seizure of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists prompted military intervention from the Ukrainian government, and in July, West-Russia (even more so EU-Russia) relations worsened further as a commercial Malaysian airliner was shot down in separatist-held territory, killing all 298 people on board, most of them Europeans[33]. This situation of civil war did not stop in 2015, when the decade we are looking at ends, and reports by NATO of Russian troops and heavy equipment entering eastern Ukraine in support of the separatists have only aggravated West-Russia political relations[34].

West-Russia political relations: quantitative assessment

There are few quantitative methods available to assess the quality of political relations between two countries. I will be using the following two in order to verify the qualitative observations previously made: vote coincidence at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between the US and Russia, and public opinion polls assessing perceptions that Russians have of foreign countries and, conversely, that US citizens have of Russia.

We can expect a quantitative evaluation of US-Russia vote coincidence at the UN to reflect the real quality of bilateral political relations on a regular basis, giving us an idea of the actual level of inter-governmental cooperation beyond official postures and statements. UNGA vote coincidence is preferable to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote coincidence for our purposes, since controversy in the latter tends to be resolved before a vote, and votes are consequently mostly consensual[35]. Data available on vote coincidence at the UNGA concerns mainly the US, which is why I will be looking at US-Russia vote coincidence, and not EU-Russia. As we see on *Figure 2* , neither the yearly account of "votes only" nor that of "votes + consensus"[36] from 2005 to 2014 seem to support our qualitative observations. According to this data, US-Russia

political relations would have improved almost uniformly from 2005 to 2011, with a small dip in 2007, and then remained stable at a higher level from 2012 to 2014. This is obviously contradicted by the political developments observed in the preceding part; in particular, it does not seem to take into account neither the sharp disagreement following the 2008 Georgian crisis (in fact, vote coincidence rises significantly after 2008) nor the even more serious crisis following the 2014 annexation of Crimea (vote coincidence, even for "votes only", remained stable that year). But we cannot simply discard this piece of evidence without proposing a credible explanation. One possible reason for the stable rise in vote coincidence, at the same time as bilateral political relations were mixed at best, if not openly conflictual, could be that US-Russia cooperation was easier at the UN on various issues, most of them not concerning directly the core interests of either nation, than on contentious issues directly relating to US-Russia relations, so that diplomats of both countries tended to cooperate more where they could to compensate for the degradation of political relations in other, more crucial fields. Concessions by Russia on random UNGA resolutions, for example, could improve somewhat its relations with the US, or at least give the impression of a more balanced relationship at a time when confrontation increased over Georgia or Ukraine.

Figure 2[37]



Data from the *Levada Center*[38] gives us another opportunity to assess quantitatively the variations in West-Russia political relations over the last decade, this time from the Russian population's perspective. Citizens' perceptions of their country's friends and foes in the world is of course an imperfect reflection of the real quality of bilateral political relations[39], but it can be used to complement our other methods of assessment. As we see on *Figure 3* and *4*, variations in the perception that Russians have of their country's friends and foes largely correspond to the variations we observed in the previous, qualitative part. From 2005 to 2009, Germany, France and the US polled

relatively high as Russia's friends (taken as a whole, this is the 'best' period of the decade), but this score decreased, then fell significantly in 2008 and 2009 following the Georgian crisis. Regarding countries identified as "unfriendly" or "hostile" to Russia, Western Europe (here represented by the UK, Germany and France) polled very low (which means that they were infrequently mentioned as being hostile) until 2009, where, again, we see an increase reflecting the Georgian crisis. Poland and the US are higher, but it is notable that this period remains relatively 'good' for the US, compared with the end of the decade. From 2009-10 to 2013, perceptions of the US and EU countries varied, with ups and downs confirming our observations in the previous part, but still worsened progressively overall, as the West remained suspicious of Russia after the Georgian crisis. Finally, we see a sharp hostile turn in these perceptions in 2014-15, as Germany, France and the US tended to be mentioned less and less as Russia's top "friends" (below 5% of the time), and more and more as Russia's top "foes" (around 10-20% for Europeans, above 60% for the US).

As we see in Figure 3, US citizens had similar perceptions of Russia over the same period. From 2005 to 2008, favourable opinions remained more common than unfavourable ones; 2008 and 2009 then represent a significant dip in favourable opinions, and even after a period of improvement from 2010 to 2012 (with opinions still less favourable towards Russia than pre-2008 perceptions), favourable opinions diminished radically in 2013, 2014 and 2015, to hit unprecedented lows.

Figure 3[40]



By combining qualitative observations and a quantitative assessment of West-Russia political relations, we see that three periods can be distinguished over the last decade. From 2005 to 2008 and from 2009 to 2013, relations were mixed, with ups and downs, sources of conflict and of cooperation, but the 2008

Georgian episode marked a first turning point, by making the West durably suspicious of Russia. The year 2014 is the major turning point in the West-Russia relationship, as conflict very clearly comes to dominate political relations. Let us now determine which predictions can be made in terms of the changes in West-Russia commercial relations over the same period, based on these observations and on our model about the interaction of political and commercial relations introduced in part I.

Figure 4[41]



Figure 5[42]



Expectations of variations in West-Russia commercial relations

In part I of this paper, I proposed a simple theoretical model for the interaction between the political and commercial relations of two countries, based on the argument made by Albert Hirschman. Now that we have a better idea of the variations in West-Russia political relations since 2005, what can we expect to find in terms of corresponding changes in commercial relations according to this model? Three main hypotheses, or "expectations", can be formulated given the different character of each of the three periods we have identified over the last decade:

Expectation 1 (E1): from 2005 to 2008, West-Russia political relations are characterized by "some conflict" but "harmony predominates". Therefore, our model tells us that trade should be mostly unaffected by political factors, and mainly determined by economic factors, such as the search for economic maximization and global economic variations.

Expectation 2 (E2): 2008 was identified as a first turning point in West-Russia political relations, after which the West became durably suspicious of Russia. Thus, from 2008 to 2013, we should expect from our model to see commercial relations evolve so that trade is no longer unaffected by political factors, but instead grows in 'target sectors'. 'Target sectors' are the sectors of the target country[43]'s economy where the imbalance of subjective gains is highest: the target country is highly vulnerable to potential trade interruption, while its trading partner is largely shielded from any cost in case of trade interruption, because the latter's subjective gains are much lower compared to the former's.

Expectation 3 (E3): 2014 is the major turning point of the decade in West-Russia political relations, after which conflict clearly predominates. This is the point where our model tells us we could expect trade to be interrupted. But our model also allows us to have more precise 'sub-expectations': (E3a) trade should be interrupted "where it hurts most", that is in the 'target sectors', where high subjective gain imbalances expose the target country; (E3b) we should not see any trade interruption in 'non-target sectors', where there is no significant imbalance in subjective gains, including (E3b') sectors where the interrupting country has high subjective gains relative to the target country (and has therefore little interest in interrupting trade, since it would suffer high costs without activating much political leverage), (E3b") sectors where both trading partners have low subjective gains – a situation we can refer to as "normal" trade – (because trade interruption there would not activate much political leverage), and (E3b"') sectors where both trading partners have high mutual subjective gains (because trade interruption there would be too costly for the interrupting country); (E3c) we can expect to see a further negative alteration of specifically EU-Russia commercial relations after July 2014, because this is when the commercial Malaysian airliner crashed with many European citizens on board, worsening further EU-Russia political relations.

Variations in US-Russia commercial relations since 2005

Variations in the commercial relations of two countries can be considered from different perspectives. Detailed information about these variations is needed in order to fill the "trade" part of our model and determine if they correspond to

expectations based on the changes observed in the two countries' political relations. My analysis of West-Russia commercial relations will therefore include the following three parts: an analysis of the (recent) trade balance, to assess the overall importance of bilateral trade and determine which sectors represent subjective gains for which trading partner; a description of the fluctuations in bilateral trade flows from 2005 to 2013; and an analysis of the particular sectors affected by trade interruption in 2014. This will allow us to determine whether or not the expectations formulated above are met, and thus to test the hypotheses underlying the model.

US-Russia trade balance

A quick look at *Figure 6* should suffice to understand that general trade between the US and Russia is rather low, especially compared to Russia's other trading partners. Indeed, as the US Congressional Research Service says, "there is relatively little overall direct trade and investment between the United States and Russia"[44]. Regarding bilateral trade specifically, the US accounted for only 2.7% of Russia's exports of goods and 5.6% of its imports of goods in 2013. Thus, it will be difficult to argue that the US has created significant room for political leverage by means of general trade with Russia, although this only captures the state of trade balance at a certain point in time.

Despite a low level *overall*, trade with Russia might be more significant (in objective or subjective terms) when it comes to *specific* sectors. In fact, one sector – oil and natural gas extraction – matters particularly to the Russian government. Given the share that oil and natural gas exports account for in Russia's federal budget (50% in 2013[45]) and her total export revenues (68% in 2013[46]), this sector can easily be considered one of high objective and subjective gains for Russia (Russia not only exports a lot of oil and natural gas in absolute terms, but these exports also play a crucial role as a prime source of government revenues). One additional reason confirming this fact is that the Russian government seems to be very conscious of the importance of the oil and gas sector, which it controls in large parts[47]. Yet, even in this specific sector of high subjective gains, the US weighs little as a trading partner compared to Russia's other commercial partners: Russia's oil and natural gas exports go mainly to Europe, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Asia, and only some of its petroleum products (which represent only one of the categories of all oil and gas exports) go to North America[48].

There are nonetheless critical sectors in which trade with the US does matter for Russia, and in which the imbalance of subjective gains is particularly striking. The financial sector and payment systems are two examples where Russia's dependence on the US is high. The dollar has traditionally been used to settle oil transactions[49], which leaves Russia with few alternatives but to use American financial institutions. Moreover, American payment systems such as Visa and MasterCard are widely used in Russia, while the Russian market represents a modest share of these companies' total profits in the world. Two figures illustrate this imbalance: Russia accounts for only 2% of Visa and MasterCard's profits, but these companies provide payment services to 90% of the Russian market[50]. On the other hand, there are sectors where trade with Russia represents high subjective gains for the US, as in the aircraft and spacecraft industry. Key American civilian and military space launch programs

have relied on a Russian rocket engine[51], and Russia is also a major supplier of certain types of metals used in the aircraft industry, such as titanium[52].

Figure 6[53]



Variations in US-Russia trade

As we can see on *Figure 7*, US-Russia general trade has varied significantly over the last decade. Two periods can be distinguished: 2005-11, with small fluctuations, a dip in 2009, compensated by an increase in trade in 2010 and 2011; and 2011-2014, with a progressive but constant decrease in bilateral trade. To understand where these fluctuations come from, we need to compare them to global economic trends over the same period.

Figure 8 gives an idea of these trends. It shows clearly that 2008-9 corresponds to a sharp recession for all the economies considered (the US, Europe and Russia), in particular for the Russian economy, which explains the 2009 dip in bilateral US-Russia trade observed on *Figure 7*, as well as the simultaneous recovery of world economies and US-Russia trade in 2010 and 2011.

Figure 7[54]



Figure 8[55]



Thus, comparing variations in bilateral trade and global economic fluctuations, we can say that changes in general US-Russia trade from 2005 to 2011 seem to reflect global economic trends relatively closely, which confirms our first expectation (E1). This is more difficult to say for the 2012-14 period. There, general trade between the US and Russia declines steadily – both in imports and exports of goods – while the overall world economy recovers, in particular the American economy. How much of the decline in bilateral trade is imputable to the decline of the Russian economy, and how much to a possible attempt to increase pressure on Russia by means of trade in 2013-14? Observations of the trends in general trade are insufficient to answer this question.

An analysis of trade fluctuations in the specific sectors representing high subjective gains for Russia – the potential 'target sectors' – should complement these observations. As we see on *Figure 9*, fluctuations in American oil-related imports from Russia have closely followed the changes in global prices of oil until 2011. Confirming our observation of the changes in general US-Russia trade (all sectors included), it is over the period 2011-2014 that trade patterns start to diverge slightly from global economic trends. We see here that all US oil-related imports from Russia decrease at a faster pace than the price of oil, indicating a decrease in actual quantity imported. More importantly, imports of oil-related products from Russia increase significantly from 2009 to 2011 (that is, in the years following the Georgian crisis). Given the difficulty to discriminate between economic factors and political ones, these observations are insufficient to say with certainty that the US deliberately increased bilateral trade in a sector of high subjective gains for Russia, and then reduced it once it achieved more leverage as a politically motivated decision meant to put pressure on the economy of a country with which it had increasingly conflictual relations. Still, trade fluctuations from 2005 to 2014, whether in general trade or in specific 'target sectors', are consistent with expectations 1 and 2: they largely correspond to global economic fluctuations until 2008, increase in the 'target sectors' of the Russian economy after 2008, and decrease in these same sectors as political relations become predominantly conflictual in 2013-14.

Figure 9[56]



US-Russia trade interruption in 2014

To test expectations 3 (E3a, E3b' and E3b"), we now need to look at the specific sectors in which the US interrupted (or did not interrupt) trade with Russia after bilateral political relations became predominantly conflictual in 2014. First, the fact that trade was indeed partly interrupted between the US and Russia as

political relations worsened in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, is already a confirmation of our model. But which sectors of the Russian economy did the US economic sanctions target specifically? Confirming expectation 3a (E3a), the US interrupted trade in 'target sectors', where Russia was getting the highest subjective gains. In fact, the US government has forbidden its citizens and firms to export "goods, services, or technology in support of projects that have the potential to produce oil in Russia[57]"; it has also targeted specific Russian oil companies (among which Novatek, Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Transneft), limiting their access to US capital markets[58], as well as specific strategic activities within the energy sector, such as deepwater drilling and Artic offshore or shale projects, jeopardizing long-term investments by American companies in these promising activities of the Russian economy[59]. To be able to activate its trade leverage on Russia in these 'target sectors', the US has accepted costs on its own firms[60], although these costs are relatively modest (since 'target sectors' are precisely defined by an imbalance of subjective gains exposing mainly the target country, much less so the interrupting one). US sanctions have also affected the Visa and MasterCard payments systems, which represent high subjective gains for Russia[61], as we have seen previously.

Confirming expectation 3b' (E3b'), the US has not interrupted trade in sectors of the Russian economy where it receives important subjective gains from trade compared to Russia. As we see on *Figure 10*, the rise of US imports in the aircraft and spacecraft industry has not halted in 2014, and has instead has kept increasing. In fact, both Russian and US officials are aware of the American vulnerability to trade interruption with Russia in this particular sector, although in this case Russia has chosen not to retaliate[62]. Confirming expectation 3b" (E3b"), the US has not interrupted trade in most other sectors either, where there is no particular imbalance of subjective gains (the 'non-target sectors'): in fact, in many sectors, 2014 was a year of "business as usual" for US-Russia trade, with some presenting a steady rise from 2012 to 2014, some of them rising at an even faster pace in 2014. Particular types of goods, such as engine and engine parts, industrial machines, or automotive tires and tubes present this pattern, as *Figure 11* shows. Expectations E3b"' and E3c cannot be tested in the case of the US-Russia commercial relationship, since the former requires sectors of mutual high subjective gains, which do not exist in the US-Russia case, as we have seen previously, and the latter concerns the specific EU-Russia relationship after the Malaysian airliner crash.

Variations in EU-Russia commercial relations since 2005

EU-Russia trade balance

Unlike US-Russia trade, the general level of EU-Russia trade is high and significant. As *Figure* 6 shows**,** the EU and Russia receive high objective gains from trading with each other: in 2013, the EU accounted for 53.1% of Russia's total exports of goods, and 45.7% of its total imports. This means that the potential for strong political leverage in case of trade interruption should be higher, although we still need to analyse the type of trade taking place to determine how much each trading partner gains in subjective terms.

Figure 10[63]



Figure 11[64]

Variations in EU-Russia general trade

The fluctuations in EU-Russia general trade over the last decade are largely similar to those we observed in the US-Russia relationship, albeit with bigger sums involved. As we can see by comparing *Figure 12* and *Figure 8*, variations in EU-Russia general trade reflect global economic trends until 2012, notably with a

sharp temporary decrease in trade in 2009 (as the major global economic actors experienced negative growth), and a recovery of bilateral trade consistent with the higher growth rates of the EU, Russia, and other world economies in 2010 and 2011. This confirms expectation 1 (E1), as the EU-Russia commercial relationship seems to reflect largely global economic trends as long as political harmony predominates.

Figure 12[65]

An observation of the variations in general trade does not allow to test expectation 2 (E2), since E2 predicts that trade will increase after 2008 in 'target sectors' under the influence of political factors aimed at creating potential for political leverage. What we can note, however, is that there seems to be an inconsistency between EU growth and EU-Russia general trade in the 2012-14 period. Unlike in 2009 (when EU growth and EU-Russia trade decreased similarly), in 2012-14 EU growth improved just as EU general trade with Russia decreased (as visible on *Figure 12*). This opens the possibility for non-economic factors to have played a role in this inconsistency, although, just like for US-Russia trade in 2012-14, one cannot exclude that Russia's weakening growth over this period could be the main reason behind the decrease in bilateral trade.

EU-Russia energy trade: mutual high subjective gains

As we have seen in the part about US-Russia trade, the oil and gas sector is one of high subjective gains for Russia, given its importance as a source of revenue for the country as a whole and for the government in particular. But unlike the US, where few of Russia's oil-related exports (and none of its gas exports) go, the EU is a major market for Russian oil and gas. In 2014, Russia depended on Europe for absorbing 70% or its crude oil exports and almost 90% of its natural gas exports[66]. Yet this does not mean that the oil and gas sector can be considered a 'target sector' for the EU: in fact, oil and gas trade is no less crucial to the EU than it is to

Russia. *Figure 13* shows that Russia has remained consistently the first source of EU crude oil imports over the period considered, far ahead of other, non-EU sources, and at a very high level (fluctuating between 30 and 35% from 2005 to 2013). As we can see on *Figure 14*, Russia has also consistently been the first source of EU natural gas imports since 2005, with an even higher dependence of the EU compared to oil, accounting for around 40% of total EU gas imports (from non-EU sources). It is interesting to note that the EU's natural gas dependence on Russia did not decrease in 2013 (no data available for 2014), but instead jumped by 10 points.

Figure 13[67]



Figure 14[68]



Thus, we can say that the energy sector corresponds to one of high mutual subjective gains (as defined in expectation E3b'"). As we see on *Figure 15* and Figure *16*, EU oil and gas imports from Russia have been stable throughout the 2005-2014 period if considered in quantity (variations in import value just reflect changes in oil and gas prices, since quantities remain stable). They seem to have been relatively unaffected by the changing political conditions in 2014.

Figure 15[69]



Figure 16[70]



This confirms expectation 3b'" (E3b'"), since the energy sector (at least that of crude oil and natural gas, which concentrates the EU's highest subjective gains),

a sector of mutual high subjective gains for Russia and the EU, has not been subject to any meaningful trade interruption, even after conflict became predominant in EU-Russia political relations. On the other hand, if we look at particular parts of the energy sector that have different characteristics from the rest of the sector, with higher subjective gains for Russia and lower ones for the EU (that is, "sub-sectors" that are not quite sectors of high mutual gains, but come closer to potential "target sectors"), then we see that variations in trade over the 2005-14 period are very different. We have seen that the EU is very much dependent on Russia for its crude oil and natural gas imports. But Russia is much less crucial to the EU as a market for industrial equipment exports, since in this field, the EU can find a multitude of other potential candidates in the world to absorb its exports, and Russia is not a particularly leading, nor the only, industrializing country. Yet, Russia does rely very much on imports of foreign-made machinery and equipment for oil and gas extraction, which its industry cannot produce in sufficient quality nor quantity, especially when it comes to less accessible oil and gas fields (which require even more high-tech equipment)[71]. As we can see on *Figure 17* (below), variations in EU machinery and equipment exports to Russia from 2009 to 2014 correspond to expectation 2 (E2), since they increased after 2009[72], as if there had been an attempt to create leverage in this sub-field of the energy sector that corresponds to the characteristics of a "target sector". They then decreased in 2013 and even more sharply in 2014, as if the leverage acquired since 2009 had been activated as a result of the degradation of bilateral political relations. Refining our observation criteria, we see that the sub-category "civil engineering and contractors' plant and equipment" within the broader category of "machinery and equipment", which can be even more associated with oil and gas extraction, presents similar but even more marked variations (see the light green curve on *Figure 17*).

Figure 17[73]



EU-Russia trade interruption in 2014

An analysis of the specific sectors in which the EU interrupted trade with Russia in 2014 should allow us to test the other expectations from our model. As predicted by expectation 3a (E3a), trade interruption imposed by the EU on Russia has only affected those sectors where the imbalance in subjective gains is highest. It is difficult to talk about 'target sectors' here, since the EU has high subjective gains from trade with Russia in the energy sector. In fact, until July 2014, EU sanctions had not paralleled US sanctions, and it is only after the crash of the Malaysian airliner, which further aggravated EU-Russia political relations, that the EU started imposing more serious sanctions on Russia[74]. This confirms expectation 3c (E3c) that an ultimate degradation of political relations resulted in a change in commercial relations, in the form of more serious trade interruption. Even then, the sanctions eventually imposed by the EU were "carefully crafted to protect specific EU interests"[75], confirming expectation 3b' (E3b'). In fact, they banned the sale of only *specific* oil exploration equipment and technologies[76] (as we have seen, trade in this type of goods represents a higher imbalance of subjective gains in Russia's benefit), which also corroborates the observation we just made of decreasing EU exports of machinery and equipment to Russia in 2014. As in the case of American companies, the EU prohibited its companies from exporting products to Russia destined for artic, deepwater and shale oil exploration, thereby targeting the most strategic parts of Russia's energy sectors[77] (confirming expectation E3a). However, as predicted by expectation E3b'"(about the absence of trade interruption in sectors of mutual high subjective gains), such restrictions did not apply to Russian gas imports, where the EU has very high subjective gains[78], even after the Malaysian airliner crash. In addition, unlike US sanctions, EU restrictions affecting the export of oil-extraction equipment to Russia did not cover current contracts but only future ones[79], thereby minimizing the cost of trade interruption for EU firms. This makes sense given expectation E3b, since a country that suffers too high costs from trade interruption in certain sectors is unlikely to interrupt trade in these sectors, or likely to try and find ways to limit such costs while increasing the target country's costs.

PART III – CONCLUSION: THE WEST-RUSSIA CASE IN THE HIRSCHMAN-BASED MODEL

The analysis of US-Russia and EU-Russia political and commercial relations since 2005 in part II has allowed us to understand that the theoretical implications of the argument made by Albert Hirschman seventy years ago are still valid today and can indeed explain the interaction between the political and commercial relations of two countries (or groups of countries, in the case of the EU) in a contemporary setting. The three expectations and three sub-expectations we expressed based on the model, presented in part I, are met after close analysis of these relations. Between 2005 and 2008, when West-Russia political relations were a mix of "conflict" and "harmony" but predominantly harmonious, commercial relations were largely unaffected by political factors and mainly determined by economic ones, such as the search for economic competitiveness/maximization and global economic trends. From 2008 to 2014, as West-Russia political relations were still mixed but marked by the 2008

Georgian crisis (which made the West durably suspicious of Russia, as I argue), commercial relations started to change in a direction increasingly different from global economic trends, with trade increasing in "target sectors" where Russia receives higher subjective gains. While it is difficult to discriminate between potential economic and political explanations to the changes observed, these variations, in any case, correspond to our model's expectations. Finally, in 2014, as West-Russia political relations became clearly characterized by open conflict, the US and the EU did interrupt commercial relations, but only in "target sectors", where leverage had been created the most by previous trade engagements since 2008. Whether or not there was a deliberate political intention behind the 2008-9 to 2014 Western trade engagements with Russia (after the Georgia crisis) to create leverage in target sectors, with the intention to activate this economic leverage when politically needed, is of course difficult to determine. This is not the purpose of this paper and would require additional information from inside the US and EU decision-making apparatus which, for obvious reasons, would be difficult to obtain.

To conclude, let us summarize this paper's findings by indicating the paths taken by US-Russia and EU-Russia from 2005 to 2014 on the decision tree presented in part I. In both cases, political relations from 2005 to 2008 are located somewhere between "harmony predominates" and "some conflict". Trade flows are mainly determined by the search for economic maximization. As political relations deteriorate (after 2008), Western trade focuses increasingly on Russia's "target sectors" (oil and gas exports, oil and gas extraction machinery and equipment, financial and payment systems etc.), and it is precisely in these sectors that the US and the EU interrupt trade in early 2014 (when "conflict predominates"). Then, the US and EU paths on the decision tree diverge. US trade with Russia pre-interruption was neither significant in objective nor subjective terms. Thus, trade interruption, even "where it hurts most", does not hurt Russia much. The weakness of the vested interests affected by trade interruption explains the absence of incentives for Russia to shift policy. In the case of the EU, trade with Russia pre-interruption was significant both in objective and subjective terms, yet there were few perfect "target sectors" (sectors with a significant imbalance of subjective gains making Russia vulnerable to potential trade interruption). While the EU did interrupt trade in sectors that presented the characteristics of "target sectors" the most (such as oil-extraction equipment), the major part of the strong vested interests EU trade had created in the Russian economy were left unaffected (natural gas being the most striking example, as it was completely left out of EU sanctions, despite representing massive subjective interests for Russia and its government). The costs imposed on Russia by EU sanctions (that is, by a very limited trade interruption) proved to be as insufficient incentives for Russia to shift the course of its policies as did US sanctions.

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Gerald Sigrist graduated from McGill in 2015 with a B.A. in Political Science, German and Russian. Interested in European history and cultures, he came to specialize in the post-Soviet space and has consequently spent several months in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Enrolled in a War Studies M.A. at King's College London, he plans to combine his interests into a career in the security field.

[1] Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945), 4-5.
[2] Hirschman defines "national power" as the power of coercion of one nation on another, whether military or peaceful (Hirschman, *National Power,* 13).
[3] Hirschman, *National Power,* 26-27.
[4] Ibid., 28-29.
[5] Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics,* 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 109.
[6] Ibid., 143.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Stephen White, *Understanding Russian Politics*, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, April 2011.
280.
[9] For example, in January 2006, Russian authorities made public that four British diplomats had been engaged in espionage in Russia. On the other hand, the Kremlin was accused of having some form of responsibility for the assassination of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko by two other former agents in London in November 2006 (White, *Russian Politics,* 279).
[10] White, *Russian Politics,* 284.
[11] Ibid., 285.
[12] "Congress and the White House had expressed their gratitude for Russian aid in Afghanistan [...]. Because Russia did not seek to make trouble after the invasion [of Iraq] had begun, and because it continued to be helpful in Afghanistan (where Moscow was capable of playing a more substantive role), Washington found it fairly easy to forgive the Russians" (Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy,* 108).
[13] Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy,* 139.
[14] Ibid, 144.
[15] Ibid, 83.
[16] White, *Russian Politics,* 285.
[17] Ibid., 351.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy,* 1.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 26.
[22] Ibid., 32.
[23] Ibid., 87.
[24] White, *Russian Politics,* 286.
[25] Ibid., 287.
[26] Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy,* 139.
[27] Ibid., 149.
[28] BBC, "Ukraine profile – Timeline," *BBC*, October 27, 2015, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Harriet Salem and Shaun Walker, "Russian armoured vehicles on the move in Crimea," *The Guardian,* February 28, 2014, accessed December 14, 2015,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/28/gunmen-crimean-airports-ukraine.
[31] BBC, "Crimea referendum: Voters 'back Russia union'," *BBC*, March 16, 2014, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097.
[32] BBC, "Ukraine profile."
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, "Voting Practices in the United Nations 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014," accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm.
[36] A "consensus" decision corresponds to the majority of cases where the UNGA takes a decision at unanimity without need of any vote.
[37] The data I used to draw this graph comes from a collection of data from US Department of State reports about UN voting practices from 2005 to 2014 (see 'References', US Department of State).
[38] Levada Center, "Russia's Friends and Enemies," last modified June 22, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/eng/russia's-friends-and-enemies.
[39] There are instances of situations where two countries have had mutually hostile public opinions while intergovernmental relations were relatively good and cooperative (post-2001 US-Saudi relations, for example).
[40] Source: Levada Center, "Russia's Friends and Enemies."
[41] Ibid.
[42] Source: Gallup, "Russia," accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1642/russia.aspx.
[43] The 'target country' is the country that ends up being subject to trade interruption. Which country is the target country is just a matter of point of view. In our case, as we will see, it is the US and the EU that ended up interrupting trade with Russia in certain sectors in the form of sanctions, so we consider Russia the target country throughout the analysis. Russia did retaliate with its own set of sanctions, but those have not affected the West nearly as much as Western sanctions have affected Russia, and it is not the purpose of this case study to analyse Russian sanctions on the West.
[44] Rebecca M. Nelson, "US Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications," *Congressional Research Service,* February 4, 2015, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43895.pdf.
[45] Alexandra Metelitsa et al., "Oil and natural gas sales accounted for 68% of Russia's total export revenues in 2013," *Energy Information Administration*, July 23, 2014, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231.
[46] Ibid.
[47] The Russian government controls large parts of a concentrated oil sector: "Five firms, including their shares of joint venture production, account for more than 75% of total Russian oil production, and the Russian state directly controls more than 50% of Russian oil production." This is even more so the case for the gas sector: "The state-run Gazprom dominates Russia's upstream natural gas

sector, producing 73% of Russia's total natural gas output in 2013 [...] Furthermore, Gazprom's dominant upstream position is reinforced by its legal monopoly on pipeline gas exports." (Energy Information Administration., "Russia – international energy data and analysis," Last modified July 28, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS.)
[48] Metelitsa et al., "Oil and natural gas sales."
[49] Nelson, "US Sanctions on Russia."
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] "Boeing buys about 35% of the titanium it uses for commercial jetliners from VSMPO, a Russian titanium producer." (Nelson, "US Sanctions on Russia.")
[53] Source: Nelson, "US Sanctions on Russia."
[54] Source: United States Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Russia," accessed December 14, 2015, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html.
[55] Sources: Eurostat databank (Eurostat, "Real GDP growth rate," accessed December 14, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1.) and the World Bank databank. (World Bank, "GDP growth rate," accessed December 14, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/US-RU?display=graph.)
[56] Sources: the foreign trade databank of the US Census Bureau (United States Census Bureau, "US Imports from Russia by 5-digit En-Use Code 2005-2014," accessed December 14, 2015, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c4621.html.) and the website statista.com, for the fluctuations in the price of oil. (Statista, "WTI and Brent crude oil: average annual spot prices 1990-2014," accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.statista.com/statistics/209641/average-annual-spot-price-of-wti-and-brent-crude-oil/.)
[57] Nelson, "US Sanctions on Russia."
[58] Ibid.
[59] Energy Information Administration, "Russia."
[60] For example, US sanctions on Russia forced ExxonMobil to suspend its $700 million exploration in Russia's Kara Sea, a joint venture with Rosneft. (see Krauss, Clifford, "Exxon Halts Oil Drilling in Waters of Russia," *New York Times*, September 19, 2014, accessed December 14, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/exxon-suspending-700-million-drilling-operation-in-russian-waters.html.)
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En Route to Beirut: Discovering the Palestinian Refugee Paradox in Lebanon

Carol Stephan

The Syrian refugee crisis continues to uncover the ongoing challenges and obstacles that the refugees face. It is influencing millions of people around the world to further understand the human stories of these refugees. As such, it is of utmost importance to shed light on any laws that explicitly discriminate against refugees and to work towards improving them. Throughout the past century, the Middle East faced several major conflicts that generated refugee crises where citizens are forced to seek refuge mainly in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Syria (pre-crisis) and Lebanon. Lebanon hosts a large population of mainly Palestinian refugees, yet over the past few years it offered refuge to Syrians as well. There are nearly 455,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who fled their homes as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967[1]. In addition, over 50,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria have fled to Lebanon due to the current conflict in Syria. Nonetheless, the country tends to have overly restrictive laws for its refugees. After more than 60 years of exile, Palestinians living in Lebanon continue to be explicitly discriminated against in terms of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and liberties. It is of utmost importance to address these issues because many of those restrictions are considered to be in violation of human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They also created an environment with the absolute worst and most helpless level of poverty for Palestinian refugees, compared to all other Palestinian refugee communities in which they serve.

Since Lebanon's refugee law reflects the country's unwillingness to integrate refugees into its citizenry, this paper will attempt to analyze why Lebanon accepts so many refugees instead of initially denying them asylum. By focusing on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the paper argues that Lebanon's historical relations with the countries of its region, and its economic benefit from the refugees play a more powerful role, than the country's feeling of legal responsibility for granting these refugees asylum. The paper is divided into four sections: the first section assesses the role of Arab nationalism on Lebanon and how it contributed to having the country open its doors to refugees; the second section examines Lebanon's refugee law and its consequences on the living conditions of refugees in Lebanon; the third section evaluates that several

economic factors influenced Lebanon's acceptance of refugees and the final section provides a brief criticism to the main argument of the paper.

The Lebanese Blind Eye

This section argues that the factors that influence Lebanon's acceptance of refugees – despite the country's discriminatory laws – are caused more by Lebanon's historical relationship with the countries of its region than Lebanon's feeling of legal responsibility towards the refugees.

Arab Nationalism and/or other regional pressures

Lebanon could have been pressured to accept refugees due to its Arab identity and the notion of Pan-Arabism. Lebanese Arab policy remains a source of tension between the Arab nationalists and the Lebanese[2]. Yet, these tensions were overshadowed in the mid-1940s, when "the political doctrine of Arab nationalism is thought to have emerged in reaction to imperial dictatorship during the late Ottoman Empire.[3]" A measure of unity between the Arab states – including Lebanon – emerged, where they aimed to push towards the full independence of the Levant states[4]. As such, one of the main goals of Arab nationalism was the end of Western influence in the Arab world. It called for political union in the Arab world and recognized the linguistic, cultural and economic ties between them[5]. The creation of the Arab League in 1945, in addition to Lebanon being one of the first joiners, highlighted the collaboration and coordination between Lebanon and the other Arab member states in order to draw closer the relations between them[6]. In the 1950s Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, played an important role in the revival of Arab nationalism. He emphasized that the fight against Zionism and the liberation of Palestine should become a rallying point for Arab nationalism[7]. In the years 1948 and 1967, the Arab states moved against Israel with the aim of liberating Palestine. Lebanon's provision of support for the liberation of Palestine and its involvement in those wars emphasized the impact of Pan-Arabism on Lebanon. Lebanon's forces equaled that of other Arab states; it actively joined all aspects of the war, which included sending its army to the warfront and providing arms to the irregular Arab forces in Palestine[8].

The Lebanese Arab nationalist movement and some of Hezbollah's framing tactics are a greater reflection of the mentality that Arabs are one nation. For instance in 1958, General Fu'ad Shibab was elected as President; Shibab shifted the Lebanese National Pact from being a Lebanese endeavor leading to a Lebanese partnership into an arrangement between the Lebanese nationalists and the Arab regional power, represented by the Lebanese Arab nationalist[9]. Furthermore, Hezbollah in many instances framed their discourse within an Arab nationalistic context of fighting against foreign occupation[10]. Hezbollah's goal to liberate the 1948 borders of Palestine, and its struggle against Israel are considered the core beliefs and the central rationale of Hezbollah's existence. In 2005, a pro-Hezbollah Labor Minister, Trad Hamadeh, issued a decree that officially reduced the job restrictions imposed on Palestinian employment down to 25 occupations[11]. The bill passed in 2010, and created a few changes to the Palestinian refugees. Therefore, the impact of Pan-Arabism in Lebanon significantly contributed to the open doors that introduced the large influx of

refugees, their Palestinian brothers and sisters whom they were helping. It would have been hypocritical of Lebanon to deny these refugees asylum, especially since they share a border with Palestine. Lebanon's policies towards Arab Nationalism indeed shifted in later years, yet one cannot deny its presence and impact on Lebanon.

Lebanese Refugees and Legal Frameworks

This section finds that while Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the principle of legal complementarity holds it accountable to refugees through its ratification varied with recognition of several international conventions. These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lebanon's non-compliance to these laws results in the violations of the rights of refugees.

Legal Status of Refugees in Lebanese Law and its consequences on Refugees

Lebanese law does not have policies or laws addressing the status of its country's refugees or asylum claims; it is one of the member states that did not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees[1213]. The Refugee Convention and Protocol seek to protect anyone who is "unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.[14]" This protection is provided by granting the refugees some basic rights that include: the right to work, housing, education, public relief and assistance, access to courts, freedom of movement within the territory and the right to be issued identity and travel documents. Even though some parts of the Refugee Convention, notably *non-refoulement*[15] are considered customary international law, Lebanon does not respect these laws.

The most prominent actions taken by the Lebanese Government regarding refugees were creating the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs in 1950, and establishing the Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees as an office within the Ministry of Interior, renamed as the Department of Political Affairs and Refugees (DAPR), subsuming the Palestinian refugees with other refugees. The Committee and Department administer the refugee presence in Lebanon by maintaining records of those who live in camps such as their births and marriages. They also manage documents concerning refugees' movements and security clearances and liaise with international relief agencies in Lebanon, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to ensure basic services[16]. Despite the continued influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, the Lebanese government does not build any new refugee camps to accommodate the Syrians; they are instead forced to stay in the same refugee camps as the Palestinians[17]. The many restrictions of Lebanese laws emphasize that the Lebanese government is not responsible for providing any

basic services to its refugees; this, is in, turn reflected on the living conditions of refugees.

Inside refugee camps, refugees are living in extremely hostile environments. They face challenges including lack of access to adequate housing, food, education, clean water, healthcare and clothing. For instance, families live in overcrowded camps that were originally designed as 'temporary housing' and are forced to cope with open channels of sewage and rotting piles of garbage. This creates conditions necessary for the spread of disease, and the scant number of clinics available to treat the sick intensifies this problem. Additionally, refugees have minimal access to electricity. During an interview by Clancy Chassy, a correspondent for the Guardian based in Beirut, Samar, a Palestinian refugee living in the Shatila Camp, said: "There is never any electricity, last year we went nearly six months without electricity, we had to use candles at night and those who could afford to bought electricity from people with generators.[18]" Furthermore, young men in the camps describe how they are harassed and beaten by the Lebanese security services; "Sometimes guys are dragged off and beaten just because they have a certain family name," said Rabieh. These conditions create an environment where refugees cannot enjoy an adequate standard of living[19]. In fact, according to UNRWA, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have the highest rate of people living in 'abject poverty' of all the Palestinian refugee communities in which they serve.

Outside the refugee camps, refugees are *de jure* and *de facto* discriminated against in relation to other non-citizens; this is mainly emphasized in their right to work and social security services[20]. The Law pertaining to the Entry into, Residence in and Exit from Lebanon, created in 1962, placed the Palestinians as equivalents with all foreigners. Foreigners are only allowed to work in Lebanon when their country allows a Lebanese national to work there; however, this option is unavailable for the dispossessed Palestinians. In other words, this law rendered the foreigner in Lebanon better treated than the Palestinian[21]. Until 2010, obtaining a work permit was considered a hypothetical principle; before that, one could obtain a permit either by marrying a Lebanese national, one year after which a permit may be granted, or having a certain value in working capital and employing at least three Lebanese. This changed in 2010, when the labour laws were amended and granted Palestinian refugees work permits free of charge. Nevertheless, in the event that the refugees are able to obtain work permits, there are still many policies that deliberately exclude Palestinian refugees from working in 72 professions, including but not limited to law, medicine and engineering. For instance, in order to practice a legal profession in Lebanon, one needs to be firstly of Lebanese nationality for at least ten years, thus excluding the refugees from the profession[22]. Iqbal Al Assad, a Palestinian refugee born and raised in Bar Elias, a small village in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon – got enrolled at Weil Cornell Medical College in Qatar when she was just 14 years old and was set by The Guinness World Records as the youngest medicine student in the world. However, Iqbal cannot work in Lebanon due to her status as a Palestinian, and is considering working in Qatar *instead*[23]. Hence, emphasizing that Lebanese laws and policies are explicitly discriminating against Palestinian refugees.

While Lebanon is not a signatory to the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol it is still bound by the customary law principle of *non-refoulement* and by the obligations of the human rights treaties which it has signed, to at least provide temporary protection measures to ensure the safe admission of refugees, protect them against *refoulement* and respect their basic human rights[24]. In this way, the treatment of refugees by Lebanon is in violation of several international covenants that Lebanon is a signatory to. Amnesty International has sent memorandums to the Lebanese government and briefings to UN Committees detailing its concerns about the human rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Amnesty International claims that Lebanon has violated duties of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); ICESCR states that the right to housing should not be interpreted as "merely having a roof over one's head... rather it should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.[25]" Yet in Lebanon, a series of government policies have further worsened the poor housing conditions of the refugee camps. Some of these policies deny the right of refugees to improve or reconstruct their housing, by prohibiting the entry of building materials into refugee camps[26]. Moreover, Amnesty's claims of Lebanon's violation of the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), are based on their concerns on issues regarding the legislative provisions and policies that have a discriminatory effect on the Palestinian population compared with other non-citizens, as Palestinians were considered discriminated with regards to rights to own property, rights to work and the right to social security[27]. This is considered a breach, since the ICERD has clarified that states parties should "take measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in relation to working conditions and work requirements, including employment rules and practices with discriminatory effect or purpose.[28]"

Furthermore, under the ICESCR and ICERD, Lebanon is also obliged to ensure that everyone who works enjoys just and favorable conditions of work, irrespective of their status. Article 7 of the ICESCR states: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work[29]. Clause A(I) specifies: "Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work..." as both female and male refugees are not offered that, it could be claimed that the country is violating its obligations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Amnesty International also describes how the discriminatory state policies and practices in Lebanon highlight that Lebanon's noncompliance with its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child with respect to refugee children. Their concern particularly includes the limitations on the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to education, the right to be registered and the right to a name, and the right to social security. For example, under article 7(1) of the Convention, every child has the right to be registered immediately after birth and the right to have a name and to acquire a nationality. Yet, children born to non-ID Palestinian fathers (who do not possess recognized identity documents) are not registered with UNRWA and neither receive recognized identity documents from

the Lebanese state nor have the ability to acquire a nationality even if they have a Lebanese mother as, under the current Lebanese law, nationality can only be passed on by the father[30].

There are many other obstacles that refugee children face, such as limitations of access to education; Law No. 686 of 1998, which amended Article 49 of Decree No. 134/59 provides that "public education is free and compulsory in the primary phase and is right to every Lebanese in the primary education age" by only specifying that Lebanese children have a right to free primary education this law does not to comply with Lebanon's obligation under Article 28 of the Convention, to "make primary education compulsory and available free to all"[31]. This emphasizes how Lebanon fails to respect the rights of refugees through its non-compliance with several international laws.

Lebanese Seas and Borders

This section finds that in addition to Lebanon's historical relationship to the countries of its origin, several economic factors seem to have had more influence on Lebanon's acceptance of refugees, then, than Lebanon's feeling of legal responsibility towards the refugees.

Economic factors

Economic factors played an important role in influencing Lebanon's decision to grant refugees asylum. Amid the large influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948, before the work restriction policies have been imposed – Lebanon might have been welcoming to the refugees as it considered some of them, the middle class in particular, to be beneficial to the country. Several Palestinians managed to construct (or reconstruct) substantial business networks in Lebanon that extended to the rest of the Arab world and further abroad[32]. For example, Yusuf Baydas, a Palestinian set up Intra Bank, a Lebanese bank that was considered (until its collapse in 1966) the largest financial institution in the Middle East, with branches all over the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Americas. In addition, Hassib Sabbagh, whose family originally owned an extensive textile and dying business in Safad, Palestine, started 'Consolidated Contractors Company' with two other Palestinians in Lebanon. The firm became enormously successful and, by the late 1960s, it had overtaken the giant Lebanese Contracting and Trading Company. It started with an initial capital of $3 million, and in the 1970s, its turnover was measured in the hundreds of millions[33]. This, in turn, highlights that, historically, the Palestinian human capital has enriched the Lebanese economy as successful Palestinian business have prospered and become an invaluable part of the economic fabric of Lebanon, contributing to increasing employment (of both Lebanese and Palestinian people) and total investment and growth rates in the country.

Apart from the middle class, the majority of the refugees due to the employment restrictions are forced to work in the informal economy. According to an International Labour Organization study, these jobs often have exploitative working conditions for the Palestinians. Very few Palestinian workers are entitled to health coverage, and they are also overworked; they work 47 hours a week on average yet receive very low wages. "Palestinians are paid 20 per cent less than

Lebanese workers for performing the same work. Their average monthly income is below the Lebanese minimum wage of 675,000 LBP (US$ 450).[34]" The exploitation of the refugees benefits the Lebanese employers and consequently, the Lebanese economy. Additionally, unlike other non-Lebanese workers, Palestinian refugees consume and save inside Lebanon, thus positively contributing to the country's balance of payments and its gross domestic product (GDP). This is because their consumption patterns are comprehensive, especially those of food and medical services, which are the two main areas of expenditure. For example, in 2012, surveys estimated that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon contribute more than US$300 million a year to the Lebanese economy, with a particular effect in rural areas, where most Palestinians reside[35]. The refugees have been a vital source of demand for locally produced services in Lebanon, particularly because they are funded from their own savings and labor income, from remittances of families abroad and from international aid[36]. Moreover, the country receives large amounts of funds from international organizations, such as UNRWA, that are intended to provide health, education and social services. Such projects hire different Lebanese experts, specialists, social workers and programme officers, thusly mobilizing different sectors in the Lebanese economy.

A Lebanese History

This section highlights some criticism of the argument that Lebanon's historical relations with Palestine and the Arab states, and its economic benefit from the refugees play a more powerful role, than the country's feeling of legal responsibility for granting these refugees asylum.

Criticism

When examining Lebanon's stance towards its refugees, it is important to note that the Lebanese government did not initially aim to have laws that tend to discriminate against refugees. In fact, in 1969 Lebanon signed the Cairo Agreement, an agreement between Lebanese Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), brokered by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. This Agreement improved the situation of refugees in Lebanon substantially; it granted them residency, freedom of movement and labour rights. In addition to that, it granted the refugee camps autonomy and allowed the PLO to manage them, it also gave the Palestinians the right to carry out armed attacks against Israeli targets from Lebanese soil[37]. As such, Lebanon granted the PLO greater rights than any other Arab country had done. However, the PLO quickly became political, its attacks on Israel from Lebanon led to "Israeli retaliations against Palestinians and Lebanese, especially in the South, which in turn diminished Lebanese support for the Palestinians and their cause.[38]" This led to a civil war between them in 1975, resulting in Lebanon withdrawing from the Cairo Agreement, and imposing restrictive laws on refugees in order to protect its domestic issues.

Conclusion

Lebanon hosts over a million refugees but continues to have strict and discriminatory policies towards Palestinian asylum seekers. There are several factors that influence the country to open its doors to refugees; but Lebanon's historical relations with the Arab countries and its economic benefit from the refugees are more powerful than Lebanon's feeling of legal responsibility towards the refugees. This is portrayed in the country's treatment of refugees, which is in violation of several International Conventions and human rights. The current influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon and their desperate need for aid emphasizes the need to pressure Lebanon to resolve its legal challenges for refugees, and to respect the covenants and conventions that it has ratified and recognized. How can we expect the countries of the world to provide just treatment to the refugees when even a neighboring country cannot seem to provide them that?

About the Author

Carol Stephan is a fourth year student at McGill University, completing a double major degree in Political Science and Middle East Studies. Carol has worked with several NGOs; this past summer she worked with the Social Justice Connection in Montreal, where her work focused on researching and writing article reviews, social media posts and issues at a glance about topics related to human rights and social justice. She is currently volunteering with the International Community Action Network (ICAN) at McGill on raising funds to sponsor Syrian refugees to complete a Masters Degree at McGill University. Carol envisions herself working in the field of social justice, community development and human rights.

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Regional Rivalry In the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopia-Somalia Protracted Conflict Unpacked

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Interstate protracted conflicts pose a serious threat to the stability of the international system, as they increase the likelihood of violence. They are unique among conflicts as these hostile interactions among principal adversaries endure over a long period of time and often account for more crises than other conflicts.

The case of Ethiopia-Somalia begins on July 1, 1960 upon Somali independence and began with low-scale violence. This conflict has undergone three distinct phases. Phase I lasts from 1960-1988, and it is characterized by hostile and aggressive interactions among the principal adversaries. Phase II takes place between the 1990s-early 2000s, where there is a reduction in interstate tensions due to the Somali civil war. The third and present phase of this conflict begun in the early 2000s and represents the rising trend of Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and al-Shabaab. These groups have come to assume *de facto* control in Somalia and engage in hostilities with Ethiopia. This conflict, however, remains unresolved and has lasted over 55 years.

This paper will analyze the persistence of the protracted conflict according to the model presented by Michael Brecher (McGill University). In order to explain and provide full analysis of the Ethiopia-Somalia protracted conflict, the historical roots of the conflict will first be explored, discussing the Ogaden, which has been contested between the principle adversaries since the colonial era. Second, the causes will be identified and ordered in significance, which includes territory and identity. Following immediately will be a discussion on the perceptions of both Ethiopia and Somalia, with strong attention paid to identity among Somalis and the ways in which their irredentist claims have led to perceptual differences among the two states.

Fourth, the independent variables of discordant objectives will be identified –notably, territory, ideology and material benefits—and the relative military capabilities of the adversaries. Next, the intervening variables will be explored, including perceptions of the principal adversaries. An additional

component of the intervening variable includes a behavioral analysis, whereby the decision-makers, the decision-making process, and the strategic, tactical and implementing decisions of each adversary will be analyzed. Following this, the conflict sustaining acts will be categorized by violence, political hostility, and propaganda and verbal hostility. Then, examples of crisis and conflict management will be presented. Finally, this paper will provide a discussion on the failed attempts at resolution and present alternative scenarios for sustainable cooperation.

Uncovering the Historical Roots

In considering how a protracted conflict emerges, one must take a deep view into history, in order to provide the contextual background from which the protracted conflict emerged. For this reason, a detailed understanding of the relevant interactions between the principal adversaries must be outlined. Identifying early hostile events between the Somalis and Ethiopians helps to characterize their subsequent interactions, and can provide insight into the ways in which the protracted conflict develops and expands in the long-run (Brecher, Historical Roots 2015).

The historical event responsible for the contemporary protracted conflict was the advent of colonialism. During the Berlin Conference from 1884-85, the leading European powers divided the African continent into territorial sections that would be administered by European powers. In the case of Somalia, its division constituted French Somaliland in the Northwest, British Somaliland in the North, Italian Somaliland in the East, and Somali inhabited territory of Northern Kenya under British rule. This proved a significant moment in Somalia's history, whereby its autonomy was breached, its territory divided, and foreign European powers came to control and dominate their lands.

European powers were not the only states that colonized Somalia; Ethiopia also pursued an expansionist policy into Somali territories. Ethiopian leadership pursued expansionist policies in the region to promote Ethiopian unity. Ethiopia was driven by its desire to reclaim what they saw as their historical territories and principalities that had been settled or colonized by other African ethnic groups, including the Somalis (Getatchew, 1986). Ethiopia's expansion into the Horn of Africa region also made it a colonizing state, thus replacing Somalia's sovereignty with its own.

During this time, Ethiopia remained the only state in the African continent capable of protecting its sovereignty. In 1896 in the Battle of Adwa, Ethiopia's superior military capabilities were demonstrated to other European colonial powers as it was able to defend itself against the Italian military (Kendie, 2003). As a result, the colonizing states recognized Ethiopia as a strong entity that could not easily be conquered through brute force. In 1897, they proceeded to sign agreements with Ethiopia that recognized the territorial borders between them. Thus, Ethiopia's territorial borders were clearly demarcated between British Somaliland, French Somaliland, and the Italians in the North. It was during this period that the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was signed, granting the Ethiopians territorial rights over the disputed Ogaden region (Kendie, 2003).

The Somalis responded to the presence of Ethiopia in the Ogaden region with an armed resistance movement. The Somalis considered the Ogaden

to be Somali territory, not Ethiopian. This resistance movement was known as the Dervish Resistance and represented the first Somali anti-imperial group during the colonial period. In 1990, they engaged in their first militaristic dispute against the Ethiopians (Mohamoud, 2006). This resistance began with small successes, and the Ethiopians were forced to rely on British support to suppress it. It was not until 1920 that the Dervish resistance was quelled.

In 1935, under the new leadership of Benito Mussolini, Italy renewed its expansionist policies against Ethiopia (Brecher, 2008). Italy was initially successful against Ethiopia, which then led to a British military response. In March 1941 after British victory against Italy, the British administration reclaimed Ethiopia and took possession of Italian Somaliland (Mariam, 1964).

The idea of a united Somalia began to take root as common administrations began governing both North and South of the country. The idea of a "Greater Somalia" was created, which would reunite Somalis in one territory (Drysdale, 1964) However, Ethiopia was threatened by the growing sense of nationalism in Somalia, and as such did not want to cede its territory. Through strong pressures by Ethiopia, the British abandoned this idea of a unified Somalia.?

Under foreign pressures, the international super powers were determining how best to allow for Somali independence. During this period, there were pressures exerted from the two new rising superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of the Cold War, each actor had an interest in supporting one state over the other. The United States had been developing close ties with Ethiopia's leader, Haile Selassie, and so the United States supported British withdrawal from the Ogaden and its transfer of power to Ethiopia. In 1948 the British conceded to this request, which was a severe blow to the Somalis desires to reunite the territory into one Somali nation-state (Metz, 1992).

The Ethiopians did agree however, to allow the British to establish liaison officers in the region to ensure the protection of those Somali pastoralist who frequented the territory six months a year for herding purposes. Furthermore, in a decision taken at the United Nations in 1949, Somalia was placed under Italian Trusteeship administration. The Trusteeship agreement gave the Italians the responsibility to administer the territory in such a way as to develop political institutions that would lead to Somali independence by no later than 1960 (Tripodi, 1999). Thus, Somalia had yet to release itself from the control of foreign powers over its territory.

In 1954 the British liaison officers withdrew from the Haud and Reserved Area, ending their presence in the region. Upon withdrawal, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 was used as the source of the border demarcations (Brown, 1956). This effectively meant that the disputed region fell exclusively in the jurisdiction of Ethiopia, not Somalia. This important event serves to justify Ethiopia's legal claim over the contested territory. Upon public knowledge, Somali's broke out in protest against the agreement and frictions began along the border region between Ethiopians and Somalis.

In addition to these historical roots, it is equally important to identify what event changed the nature of the hostile relations into a full-fledged protracted conflict. Known as the *transformative event,* this period marks the

point at which a mere historical grievance passes the threshold and develops into an interstate protracted conflict.

This recognizable moment in history permanently shifts the engagement amongst adversaries to become locked in a new trajectory of escalated crises and conflict (Brecher, 2015).

The transformative event in this protracted conflict was Somali independence in 1960. British Somaliland and Somalia peacefully reunited on July 1, 1960. Upon independence, Somalia immediately began its irredentist policies. Somalia sought to reunify Somalis living in foreign territories within the ethnic regional boundaries that defined them. They rejected the current borders and laid claim to areas in French Somaliland, territory in the northeast of Kenya, and the Ogaden. Within six months of independence, clashes at the Somali-Ethiopian border began and continued with increasing severity (Ofcansky, 1991). The event of Somali independence provided the platform upon which Somalia would act as an aggressor and revisionist state.

Underlying Issues at Stake: Basic Causes

In order to understand what makes a conflict protracted, it is important to explore what conditions make it likely for such a conflict to occur in the first place. *Basic causes* are independent variables in Michael Brecher's model the outline the conditions under which conflicts emerge. This causal model uses *a priori* knowledge to identify the conditions necessary to produce the existence of the conflict (Brecher, Causes 2015). These basic causes have long run relevance and consequence, enduring through time. Furthermore, they have a profound influence on the consciousness of the people of the principal adversary's state.

The primary basic cause is that of territory, the object over which rivalry emerges for control over the same piece of land. Territory is seen as a precondition for survival, and when another state attempts to seize it, it is perceived as a threat to their livelihood. In addition, territory offers security to its inhabitants; any attack upon it is seen to put these peoples at risk. An intangible element of territory that there is an association between it and its inhabitants, whereby there is an integration that provides them with a sense of belonging to that land (Hensel, 1996). Thus in the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, territory is perceived as a multi-functional object over which a dispute erupted.

The contested territory is the Haud region, which includes the Ogaden. This is an arid region that is not geographically defined in the east of Ethiopia, with sparse population density principally consisting of nomadic pastoral peoples. However, desolate the region may be, its value is very high to the Somalis because it is viewed as occupied territory by the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopians claim that they have the right to exercise sovereignty over the region, as recognized by international law.

The border dispute can be traced back to the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, whereby a treaty was signed between Britain and Ethiopia recognizing Ethiopia's borders, including the Haud within them (Kebede, 1978). Due to the fact that the boundary line cut through the grazing lands of the Somali pastoral nomads in the region, the treaty also contained a provision that required Ethiopia to ensure that the Somali tribes have the right to continue to access their historical grazing grounds.

In 1908 the Italian-Ethiopian Treaty was signed that used the Shibeli River as the reference point to delimit the border (Drysdale, 1964). However, differences of interpretations fueled greater uncertainty over the border. The unresolved dispute was brought forth to the United Nations, whereby Ethiopia and Italy were tasked to define a precise method to mark the necessary sixty kilometer base to create suitable reference points (Oduntan, 2015). Such a demarcation was never fully produced, and upon the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the subsequent establishment of the British administration over Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland in 1941, there was once again a new opportunity to define this border.

In 1935 an additional Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was signed, upholding the border from the 1897 agreement, whereby the Haud once again fell into the jurisdiction of Ethiopia (Day, 1982). Similar to the previous agreement, Britain ensured that the Ethiopians guarantee the right to Somali pastoral nomads to be protected as they freely cross the border into their grazing grounds. When the last British liaison officers withdrew from the Ogaden and Reserved Areas in 1954, no changes had been made to the border and Ethiopia exercised its full sovereignty over the Haud.

It is through the long development of these treaties between Ethiopia and both Britain and Italy that Ethiopia makes its territorial claims. Ethiopia claims its legitimate right through international law, as derived from the 1987 and 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements (Kebede, 1978). Ethiopia accepts the inherited borders from the time of colonialism, thus seeing itself as having the exclusive right to exert its sovereignty over the territory.

By contrast, Somalia's territorial claims derive from the fact that they were silenced throughout the colonial period as a result of foreign occupation. They reject all treaties signed prior to their independence in 1960. They refuse to recognize the treaties signed by the imperial powers and do not consider themselves obligated to its provisions (Kebede, 1978). Somalis seek to regain what they consider to be their ancestral lands. According to the Somalis, prior to 1886, Ethiopian sovereignty had never been exercised in the Haud. Until that time, the Somali tribes constituted the primary peoples inhabiting the disputed region.

To best understand the Somali territorial claims, one must also understand the second *basic cause* concerning the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute: identity. Independent from territory, although closely related, identity politics offers an intangible explanatory variable for this protracted conflict. This psychological explanation recognizes that social identity motivates the actions of states. Both self-awareness and self-consciousness of a people create a unique bond that ties these individuals together, resulting in a universal aspiration to protect and promote their interests. Thus, identity serves to create linkages among those that share a historical and cultural heritage, and motivates individuals to promote the well being of the group.

Somalis have a long history as a people who have inhabited many parts of the Horn of Africa. They share a common heritage, tracing their lineage back from the Prophet Mohamed (Touval, 1963). They are an ethnically homogenous group, identifying with the same religion, language and race. The Somalis conversion to Islam promotes a religious unity among them and is reflected in their traditional practices. Approximately seventy percent of Somalis are nomadic pastoralists, thus the majority share a similar lifestyle and culture (Lewis,

2008). This also implies that they are not necessarily confined to one permanent geographic area, rather they have dispersed and diffused throughout the Horn region. These traits distinguish the Somalis from the neighboring peoples in the Horn region. Common traditions, history, and lineage unite Somalis, thus creating strong kin linkages.

The strong national identity of the Somalis is the foundation upon which the rivalry with Ethiopia was formed. The Somalis seek to reunite all Somalis in what they consider to be their historical territory. They view themselves as a natural nation and make claims for national unification in an independent Somali nation-state. According to Touval, "nations are supposed to have a common language, to be associated with a certain territory, and to have a common culture, history, and tradition." (Touval, 1963). The Somalis argue that these are all traits that they host; however, despite this, their nation is being prevented from unifying due to the imposition of Ethiopia, as it continues to exercises its sovereignty over the Somali people.

Since their independence, Somalis have unsuccessfully attempted to exercise their right to self-determination, as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. They believe that the Somalis living in the Ogaden region have the right to freely determine their political status. Ethiopia claimed that the right to self-determination was only applicable while colonial rule was imposed and could not be exercised against an independent state (Kebede, 1978). At a time of rapid decolonization, the Somali irredentist case –although distinct from other African cases due to its overwhelmingly homogenous population –was not given concessions due to the more pressing requirement of stability in Africa. Thus, Somali appeals to the Organization of African Union were dismissed under the organizations resolution expressing that member states are to respect colonial boundaries as they stood at the time of national independence (Kebede, 1978). Therefore, the Somalis claims of identity were unable to achieve results through the use of international law.

It must be noted that there is a third *c*ause that is useful in explaining the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict. Elements of *power rivalry* are present in this case, however not necessarily as an independent variable of the same degree or importance as territory and identity.

Power rivalry in this context is to be defined as a conflictual relationship whereby one adversary is contesting the relative balance of power among adversaries. In this sense, power rivalry is inherently built into the Somali claim of reunification of all Somalis into one state because in order for Somalia to achieve its objective, it requires the territorial acquisition of the Ogaden region. This implies a change in the distribution of control between Ethiopia and Somalia, and creates a power struggle over the contested territory. In this sense, the control over territory is seen as closely related to the exertion of power. Thus Somalia has less power and is acting as a revisionist state, seeking to change the current distribution of power by acquiring the Ogaden territory (Lewis, 2008). Whereas Ethiopia is attempting to defend its territory, thus maintaining its relative, regional hegemonic position (Drysdale, 1964). Therefore, the presence of power rivalry should be noted, however only to the extent that it is relevant because it is a requirement of the redistribution of power associated with territorial control.

These basic causes are the independent variables that serve to explain the conditions under which a protracted conflict is likely to emerge. By contrast, the *precipitating cause* acts as an intervening variable that triggers the onset of the conflict. It is a specific event or events that are the catalysts that make the conflict inevitable (Brecher, 2015). Without it, such a shift may have been avoidable. In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia there are two precipitating causes, a political and military cause.

The *political cause* is the independence of British Somaliland on June 26, 1960 and Italian Somalia four days later on July 1, 1960. Upon their independence these two entities unified to form the Somali Republic (Lewis, 2008). This marked a catalytic change in the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia because Somalia was able to exercise complete control over its domestic and foreign polices, thus providing it new opportunities to act in accordance with their goals and objectives. The primary objective was their irredentist policy, seeking the integration of all Somalis within Somalia. A second precipitating cause is a *military act*, whereby the Somali Republic actively supported guerilla movements led by ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden region (Ciment, 2007). These groups allowed Somalia to indirectly begin minor attacks on its adversary by encouraging, funding and supporting them. Ethiopians condemned these acts and responded militarily, which resulted in violent clashes. These acts of military aggression triggered the onset of the subsequent hostile interactions that followed in the protracted conflict.

Decision-Makers Attitudinal Prisms: The Power of Perceptions

The decisions that are made throughout the conflict can be assessed against the backdrop of principal adversaries' perceptions. These perceptions derive from what is referred to as the *attitudinal prism*. The prism is a psychological tool that allows decision-makers to filter specific events that take place in the operational environment through a frame of reference (Brecher, 2015). The prism is often derived from historical legacies and experiences, as they have accumulated over time among all individuals of adversaries' state. It is a universal human characteristic that does not easily change, neither through time nor leadership.

The attitudinal prism is an indispensable analytic link between the operational environment and the psychological environment. The operational environment consists of two independent variables: objectives and capabilities. These variables are external to the perceptions of decision-makers, and represent the setting in which they must base their assessments (Brecher, 2015). In this regard, the operational environment changes throughout the conflict, as the two variables change in respect to time. It is important to note however that the relative military capabilities change more frequently than the discordant objectives. This is due to the nature of the variables, specifically, both internal and external factors contribute to the more frequent access to or loss of military capability, whereas objectives are often long-standing goals that are deeply embedded and rarely change.

The psychological environment consists of the perceptions that derive from a process whereby elements of the operational environments are filtered through the attitudinal prism of the decision-makers. Perceptions of decision-makers result in specific inducements when choosing among policy options,

based upon the constraints and opportunities that flow from the prism (Brecher, 2015). Thus in order to understand and potentially predict what decisions are taken by the leadership, it is necessary to understand the perceptions of the principal adversaries.

In the case of Somalia, their attitudinal prism is based on their understanding of a homogenous and united Somali nation. The idea of *"Greater Somalia"* is based on the premise that Somali national identity is incongruent with the Somali state. One third of Somalis are said to be under foreign rule in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, creating the Pan-Somali ideology (Lewis, 2008). This idea is symbolized, for example, in the Somali Republics flag which contains five stars, representing the five states in which Somalis currently inhabit. Thus, the ideology based upon the desire that all fellow Somalis be united in one nation serves as a basis for the decision-makers' lens.

By contrast, Ethiopia's prism is founded upon the *maintenance of the unity of its state*. Ethiopia sees its right to maintain the integrity of their state and preserve the status quo as imperative (Drysdale, 1964). Ethiopia has historically been a multi-ethnic state composed of many minority groups and Ethiopian nationalism is assimilationist towards these groups and promotes a national identity among inhabitants (Touval, 1963). Somalia's revisionism causes fears among Ethiopians that any acceptance of the principle of readjustment would encourage other separatist movements and inevitably lead to the deterioration of the Ethiopian state. This ideology of national unity requires both internal political stability and territorial integrity and is thus crucial for the Ethiopian decision-makers.

As a result, the Somali decision-makers perceive their objective as the reincorporation of the ethnic Somalis presently residing in the Ogaden region into the Somali Republic. This objective has remained unchanged throughout the protracted conflict. The Somalis perceived the Ethiopians objective as maintaining its territorial boundaries and unwilling to secede what it views as its sovereign right over the Ogaden region (Drysdale, 1964). By contrast, the Ethiopians perceived the Somalis objectives as hostile, as they attempted to seize their territory. The Ethiopians perceived their objectives as justified through the treaties that grant them sovereignty. Consequently, both the Somali and Ethiopians decision-makers' are aware of their discordant objectives.

In order to explain the perceptions of relative military capabilities, it is important to understand the role external actors played in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Since the end of World War II, Ethiopia and the United States had formed close ties. Ethiopia was provided with more financial and military assistance from the US than any other sub-Saharan African state (Metaferia, 2009). At the time of Somali independence, Ethiopia's military capabilities included tanks, advanced weapons and the strongest air force in the region. As a result, the Ethiopians perceived themselves as a powerful state and able to defend its borders. In addition, they viewed their patrons as loyal because they had a mutually beneficial relationship that served both their interests. Whereas the Somalis perceived the external support given to Ethiopia as a threat to their objectives, because the Ethiopians had superior capacity to defend against any attacks.

This perception motivated Somali decision-makers to obtain a more competitive military edge against Ethiopia. In 1962 the Somali Republic accepted

a generous and open-ended Soviet arms commitment (Metaferia, 2009). Subsequently, Somalia was able to obtain its own military artillery, including tanks, bombers and combat planes. This shifted Somalia's self-perception; it now saw itself as able to compete with the Ethiopian armed forces. At the same time, it caused Ethiopia to perceive Somalia as a stronger adversary, who was now better equipped with the military capabilities necessary to achieve its objectives. Due to this perception the Ethiopian leadership approached the US requesting improved weapons, in an attempt tip the balance of military capability in their favour once again.

Therefore, it is clear that the discordant objectives between Ethiopia and Somalia, in conjunction to the changes in the relative military capabilities, are assessed through their distinct attitudinal prism and creates perceptions that motivate the actors to respond to specific threats. In the case of Somalia, their objective of the reunification of al Somalis in one nation and the obstruction initially caused by Ethiopia's military superiority was interpreted through their prism and led decision-makers to perceive a threat and thus seek out their own patron. By contrast, Ethiopia's objective of maintaining its territorial integrity, and the subsequent rise of Somalia's military strength, was perceived through their frame of reference as a new threat that required a responsive action.

Independent Variables: Discordant Objectives and Relative Balance of Capability

It is important to provide an assessment of the additional independent variables in the model, notably those contained within the operational environment. These variables include discordant objectives and the balance of adversaries' capabilities. In reference to discordant objectives, this implies that there is disagreement among the principle adversaries over some high-value objective (Brecher, Coursepack 2015). Thus, these contentious issues provide a source of contention that further perpetuates the conflict.

In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, *territory* has been the most important discordant objective, since its onset in 1960 until today. As previously mentioned the disagreement stems from the territorial dispute over the Ogaden region. The Somalis claim that these territories were taken from them during the colonial era and seek to regain what they consider to be their ancestral lands (Zartman, 1985). Presently, between one to three million Somalis are estimated to live in the Ogaden territory (Day, 1982). For many of the reasons previously mentioned, Somalis irredentist claims express that the frontiers of the Somali Republic should reach the furthest limits of their pastures, and consider Ethiopia's current boundary artificially imposed upon their natural jurisdiction (Drysdale, 1964).

By contrast, the Ethiopians seek to maintain their territorial integrity and claim that they have the right to exercise sovereignty over the region, as recognized by international law. Ethiopia accepts the inherited borders from the time of colonialism, thus seeing itself as having the exclusive right to exert its sovereignty over the territory. For these reasons, there is an ever-present discordance among the principle adversaries relating to the rightful possession of the Ogaden territory.

In Phase III of the conflict, a new discordant objective emerged that did not exist before, which is *ideology*. In the context of state collapse, there was a rise in Salafist insurgency groups who attained power and control over Mogadishu.

There was very strong disagreement between these groups and Ethiopia over what constitutes the optimal type of political system. The Islamic Courts Union and later al-Shabaab promoted a conservative application of Shari'a law and implemented it through coercive means (Mwangi, 2012). Furthermore, they called for the establishment of an Islamic state, not only in Somalia, but also in Greater Somalia – meaning any place in the Horn of Africa that ethnic Somalis inhabited (Vidino et al, 2010). Consequentially, Wahabbist ideology came to the fore in Somalia and Shari'a law dominated the political and social domestic environment.

This Islamic ideological fervor came in direct contradiction to Ethiopia's view on political systems. Because Ethiopia's population is composed of a range of ethnicities and religions, the Ethiopian government promotes a secular political system (Adejumobi, 2007). Ethiopia deemphasizes the role of religion in politics strategically, in order to minimize domestic instability. Additionally, Ethiopia specifically clashes with rising Islamic tendencies because of their geographic position in Africa. Ethiopia has been involved in a long-standing effort to minimize rising Islamic states because they feel encircled by other bordering Islamic states (Zartman, 1985). For this reason, Ethiopia has adopted the role of quelling Islamic threats as they emerge (Østebø and Desplat, 2013). Thus, there is a clear discordance between the Islamic ideology promoted and implemented in Somalia and Ethiopia's emphasis on secularism, and their long-standing phobia of Islam.

The third discordant objective is that of *material benefits*. This also arose in Phase III, due to the discovery of oil found in the Ogaden. According to Kendie, "an estimated 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 13.6 million barrels of associated liquids have been discovered." (Kendie, 2003) This represents a new source of competition between the adversaries, as they seek to profit from the revenues generated from this resource. Both Ethiopia and Somalia have weak economies relative to other African states; consequently, the discovery of oil represents profitable benefits that can increase their trade and better ensure their economic survival. Thus the material benefits associated this natural resource further fuels animosity and conflict, as both seek to control the territory that contains the natural gas and oil. Therefore, the three discordant objectives perpetuate the conflict, and another independent variable must also be analyzed.

The second independent variable is the *relative balance of capability* between the principle adversaries. This is important to discern because it can contribute to a better understanding of the military conditions under which the conflict proceeds. It is argued that a change in the relative balance of capability has a profound impact on the conflict (Brecher, 2015). In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, there was a relative equality in the balance of capability during Phase I of the conflict. Both adversaries were small military powers, but there was slight variation between them. At the time of Somali independence, Ethiopia's military capabilities included tanks, advanced weapons and the strongest air force in the region (Metaferia, 2009). Somalia subsequently sought patronage from the Soviet Union and was able to obtain its own military artillery, including tanks, bombers and combat planes (Metaferia, 2009). In Phase II and III, however, after the collapse of the state, Somalia was relatively weaker than Ethiopia. This was a result of the failed Somali state, and subsequent lack of any formal military. Consequently, there was upsurge of insurgency groups who had to resort to the

use of guerilla style attacks (Harnisch, 2010). Therefore, there has been a change in the relative balance of military capability between the two principle adversaries; despite but it has not led to a decrease in the use of violence.

The Psychological Environment and Perceptions

The impact of these two independent variables, discordant objectives and relative balance of military capability, are determined by an intervening variable: perceptions of the decision-makers. As indicated in the previously, the psychological environment consists of the perceptions that derive from a process in which elements of the operational environments are filtered through the attitudinal prism. Perceptions of decision-makers result in specific inducements when choosing among policy options, based upon the constraints and opportunities that flow from the prism (Brecher, Perceptions 2015). Somali decision-makers' attitudinal prism emphasizes its views of the creation of *"Greater Somalia"*, seeking to unite ethnic Somalis. Thus, they perceive Ethiopia as a hostile actor impeding that process. Conversely, Ethiopia's prism is founded upon the *maintenance of the unity of its state*. Ethiopia sees its right to maintain the integrity of their state and preserve the status quo as strategically imperative (Drysdale, 1964). Ethiopian decision-makers therefore perceive the Somalis objectives as hostile, as they attempted to seize their territory.

Decision-Makers and the Decision-Making Process; Strategic Decisions, Tactical Decisions, and Implementation

The perceptions of decision-makers affect the decisions that they select among perceived options of what can or cannot be done to meet a particular or general value threat. The strategic decisions leaders make to achieve policy goals must be analyzed against the backdrop of *behavioral analysis.* The behavior of the principal adversaries contains sub-components, including the decision-makers, the decision-making process, and strategic decisions. It is important to understand who made the key strategic decisions that perpetuated the conflict and how they were made.

A strategic decision is a fundamental policy act that is wide in its scope and long in duration, thus representing the general thrust of policy decisions (Brecher, Behavior 2015). Derivatives of these strategic decisions are tactical decisions, which are clusters of decisions that operationalize the policies of the strategic decision (Brecher, 2015). Thus, tactical decisions are narrower in scope and shorter in duration than strategic decisions. Finally, implementing decisions are choices on specific issues derived from strategic and tactical decisions. With this established, it becomes important to apply this behavioral model to each of the principal adversaries, divided by the distinct phases of the conflict.

In the case of Somalia, there have been many key *decision-makers* who have influenced the decisions taken over the course of the protracted conflict. In Phase I, there was some domestic instability, causing high turnover rates of the leadership at times. However, there are some notable individuals including Aden Abdullah Osman, the Somali President at the time the state was created in 1960, who remained in power until 1967 (Lewis, 2008). He was later succeeded by Adirashid Ali Shermarke and Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (Lewis,

2008). A third key figure in Phase I of this conflict was Said Barre, who was a former general who lead a coup d'état in 1969 and remained in power until 1991 after he was overthrown by popular uprisings. In Phase III of the conflict, there are two notable key decision-makers: Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the leader of the Islamic Courts Union and Ahmed Godane, the leader of al-Shabaab.

Since the onset of this protracted conflict, there have been three strategic decisions taken by Somali decision-makers. The first was its policy of *"Greater Somalia"* that emphasized its irredentist claims. This was a fundamental policy influencing all subsequent decisions, with its objective of reunifying all Somalis in one nation. This strategic decision led to tactical decisions, notably encouraging constant rebellions against Ethiopians and resisting their presence in the Ogaden (Adejumobi, 2007). Arming and supporting rebel groups such as the Western Somali Liberation Front implemented this tactical decision (Selassie, 1980). The policy was also implemented when Barre decided to invade Ethiopia in 1977 (Selassie, 1980).

The second strategic decision, towards *Retrenchment*, began in 1988. At this time there was a de-emphasis on conflict with Ethiopia because of high levels of domestic instability. Thus, the tactical decision that followed was Somali attempts towards accommodation of the Ethiopians (Lewis, 2008). This decision was implemented by the signing of an armistice agreement in 1988 (Yihun, 2014).

The third and final strategic decision took place during Phase III, in the context of a failed state and rise of insurgency groups. At this time, there was a strategic decision to *wage jihad against Ethiopia*. Starting in the early 2000s, this decision changed the policy to be more confrontational with Ethiopia under a religious rhetoric. This decision was implemented through increasingly violent clashes with Ethiopia, especially in Mogadishu (Marchal, 2009).

These decisions were taken at different stages in the conflict, under different leadership. It is thus important to analyze the *decision-making process* at the time these decisions were taken. At the time of Somali independence, the state had a parliamentary government with a Legislative Assembly and legislators were elected (Touval, 1963). The president was elected and held a significant amount of powers, including the appointment of the Prime Minister. However, in practice the system was largely clan-based, thus making the bureaucracy ineffective and high policy was in the hands of top-level decision-makers (Selassie, 1980). Thus decision-making was largely arbitrary and reflected the interests of those in power. After the military coup, Siad Barre was able to centralized power through a military authoritarian regime. He suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, and concentrated the state powers within his office (Yoh, 2010). Under the Barre regime, decision-making was highly centralized, decisive, and reflected the interests of the leader. In Phase III, al-Shabaab rose to power and this insurgency group was largely decentralized. There was minimal communication between leaders, and thus decision-making was quite uncoordinated, but direction was taken from the leader (Marchal, 2009). With this analysis of the Somali behavior in mind, it is important to consider that of the adversary.

Ethiopian politics have reflected a more consistent behavioral pattern. There are three key *decision-makers* that have been important leaders in Ethiopia. The first of which is Haile Selassie, who was the Emperor of Ethiopia for over thirty years, until 1974. Following Selassie was Colonial Mengistu Haile

Mariam, who became the head of state after the Revolution in 1977. He later became president and served in office until 1991 after being ousted by the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (Adejumobi, 2007). Meles Zenawi succeeded him as President, and he later became Prime Minister until 2012.

Similar to Somalia, there were three strategic decisions that were taken through the course of the protracted conflict. The first strategic decision was to *maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity and hegemony* in the Horn of Africa at virtually any cost. Ethiopia placed a high premium on ensuring that threats to revise its borders or compromise its power-position in the region would be countered. This led to the tactical decision to fight against Somalia if, and when necessary, to protect its borders (Drysdale, 1964). This decision was implemented by defending against insurgency groups that attempted to ensue violence at the borders (OAU, 1969). The second strategic decision was taken after the Ogaden War ended in 1978, whereby Ethiopian policy-makers decided to pursue a policy of *destabilization in Somalia's domestic politics* (Yihun, 2014). This policy was aimed at disturbing the volatile domestic situation in Somalia, in order to keep its adversary weak. This policy was implemented by supporting anti-Somali government rebel groups such as the Somali National Movements (Yihun, 2014). The final strategic policy was adopted in Phase III, whereby Ethiopia pursued a policy of *containment* (Bryden, 2003). This policy was intended to ensure that the new Islamic insurgency groups do not spread through the Horn region and they were confined in Somalia. This policy was implemented by Ethiopia's decision to invade Somalia in 2006 to quell the Islamic Courts Union, which controlled Mogadishu (Marchal, 2009).

Each of the three separate decision-makers are associated with a unique *decision-making process*. Under Emperor Selassie, there were several institutions including the Emperor's, parliament, a prime minister and a Council of Ministers (Cleote and Abebe, 2011). However, the Emperor exerted control over these by becoming closely involved in their oversight. Thus, the Emperor's office was the most powerful policymaking institution. When Mengistu came to power, the Dergue annulled the constitution, dissolved parliament, and established the Provisional Military Administrative Council (Cleote and Abebe, 2011). Consequently, the Dergue had control of both legislative and executive mandates and all policy decisions were made by a small group of Council members. After the overthrow of the Dergue, a newly elected democratic government was installed and a decentralization policy implemented. Despite this, the political process has become reduced and the Zenawi government had become increasingly omnipresent, with dictatorial tendencies coming to the fore (Østebø and Desplat, 2013). Thus, the decision-making process is still centralized, however to a lesser degree than in the past.

Categorizing Conflict-Sustaining Acts

Conflict-sustaining acts offers an entry point in understanding the changes that have occurred throughout the conflict. This additional intervening variable represents the manifestation of implementing decisions. There are four types of CSA's: violence, political hostility, propaganda-verbal hostility, and economic discrimination (Brecher, Coursepack 2015). These acts are a source of perpetuation of the protracted conflict that can often lead to crises, and

contribute to political instability and societal disruption Brecher, Coursepack 2015). It is clear that CSA's are important indicators to help understand why the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict has persisted.

Violence has been the most visible CSA, with the greatest impact, throughout this unresolved protracted conflict. In Phase I, the majority of the violence was through border clashes in the Ogaden. These clashes often took place between Ethiopian forces and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). After Somali independence in 1960, minor clashes began that led to small-scale actions between the principal adversaries along the border (Metz, 1992). In 1964, violent clashes escalated between the Ethiopian and Somali forces at the border once again. This time violence intensified to such a point that large-scale attacks ensued (OAU, 1969). This violence continued for one month, from February until March and ended in a cease-fire agreement (Zartman, 1985). In early 1976, the WSLF increased its guerilla activity by crossing into the Ogaden and attacked army convoys, police stations, and army bases for several months (Selassie, 1980). This violence continued to escalate tensions between the adversaries. Eventually this violence came to head when the regular Somali units launched a major offensive in the Ogaden, thus beginning the Ogaden War that lasted from 1977-78. This war ended in 1978 after the Somali forces withdrew because they were unable to sustain the war after the increased support given by the Soviets and the Cubans to Ethiopia (Mayall, 1978).

Despite the fact that the war ended, the WSLF continued a long-drawn-out guerilla war in the Ogaden for many years. In 1978, an operation against Ethiopian forces took place, with the participation of over 10,000 insurgents (Kendie, 2003). From June-August, 1982 there was another violent interaction after Ethiopian troops attacked Somali army units (Brecher and Wilkenfield, 1977). In 1987, an Ethiopian force of 9,000 troops supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front as it attacked multiple cities near the Ethio-Somali border (Kendie, 2003). More recently, there has been violence between Ethiopian forces and Islamic groups in power taking place between 2006-2009, during the Ethiopian invasion (Marchal, 2009). This violence was primarily through guerilla tactics taking place in Southern Somalia.

A second CSA is *political hostility*, which was the second most frequent CSA. In Phase I, Somalia would frequently present its case for self-determination at regional and international forums, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). Somalia would speak out against Ethiopia and attempt to legitimize their claims while denouncing Ethiopia as an aggressor (OAU, 1969). Due to their perceived threat of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense pact in 1964, which was renewed twice in 1980 and 1987 (Metz, 1992). This defense pact asserted that in the event of a Somali attack upon the parties, a coordinated armed response would follow. Both Somalia and Ethiopia sought out allies, in the context of the Cold War, to strengthen their position against their adversary. Initially Ethiopia had a strong alliance with the United States, but after the revolution in 1974 found its interests better suited with an alliance with the Soviets. By contrast, Somalia initially formed a formal alliance with the Soviets in 1974 through the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Mayall, 1978). However, the Soviets later abandoned the Somalis in favor of the Ethiopians and afterwards, subsequent US aid to Somalia was minimal. Later, Somalia also sought to form alliances with Arab partners, which

was perceived as a threat to Ethiopia. Despite the fact that Somalia is not Arab, they joined the Arab League in 1974 (Zartman, 1985).

During Phase III, Ethiopia increasingly took political steps that have increased hostility. During the civil war in Somalia, Ethiopia was actively supporting certain groups that it favored to rise to dominance, thus perpetuating the internal conflict (Mulugeta, 2009). Furthermore, Ethiopia has long supported the governments created at international forums. These governments lack effective legitimacy from the Somalis, however Ethiopia continues to embolden them because they have an alignment of interests. Lastly, Ethiopia has formed a strong alliance with the US to counter the Islamic groups that have consolidated power in Somalia, thus inciting new sources of hostility between the adversaries (Østebø and Desplat, 2013). Similarly, Somali Islamic groups also formed alliances that threatened Ethiopia. Eritrea, a long-time adversary of Ethiopia, developed ever-increasing relations with the Islamic groups that came to power (Lewis, 2008). Al-Shabaab also formed an alliance with al-Qaeda, thus representing their dedication to pursuing violent, transnational Islamic militancy, and signaling an intensified threat as perceived by Ethiopia (Harnisch, 2010).

A third source of CSA is *propaganda and verbal hostility*, frequently employed by both adversaries. The propaganda used included the dissemination of materials that would display contempt for the government of the other adversary, be critical of the conduct of the other government, express dissatisfaction of the actions of the adversary, and encourage hostile sentiments among the population towards the adversary (Ethiopian Government, 1969). Propaganda took many forms, including distribution of materials published by the state, broadcasts emanated through state-run institutions, and public speeches (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969). These were referred to as "campaigns of unfriendliness", and consequently created an atmosphere of hostility and animosity.

In addition, verbal hostility was also present in the conflict. This was a technique often used by the Somalis through the use of inflammatory statements against Ethiopia, both in early phases in the conflict and in more recent years. For example, in the mid-1960s, derogatory speeches were made against Ethiopia in the Somali Assembly, in addition to public statements reaffirming their commitment to self-determination (African Research Bulletin, 1969). More recently, the leadership of the Islamic Courts Union has publically pronounced to wage jihad against Ethiopia, thus signaling verbal hostility (Lewis, 2008). Lastly, each of the adversaries would make public threats, stating that in the event of continued hostility, there would be regrettable consequences (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1969). Contentious statements such as these provoke the adversary and increase suspicion and distrust. It must be noted that there is no clear evidence that the fourth CSA (economic discrimination) affected persistence in this protracted conflict. Therefore, the model of persistence includes independent and intervening variables to produce the dependent variable, persistence. The Ethiopia-Somalia conflict continues to persist, however it is important to analyze how this conflict has been managed and attempts to resolve it in the past.

Conflict Management: Maintaining Order and Control During Crises

Conflict management is designed to persuade the adversaries not to escalate a crisis any further. By managing specific interstate crisis as they occur, violence is either minimized or avoided. This does not imply a termination of the protracted conflict in its entirety; rather it is more limited in scope as it focuses on a particular issue of dispute (Brecher, Conflict Management and Resolution 2015). A conflict is shorter in duration and less difficult to resolve, as the issues at stake don't extend to the totality of the protracted conflict. Thus, it is important to identify all the crises that have erupted throughout the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, and take specific cases to explore which crisis management techniques were employed.

There have been eight crises that occurred throughout this protracted conflict. The first took place in December 1960, a few months after Somali independence, as border clashes between Ethiopian and Somali forces ensued in the Ogaden (Metz, 1992). This crisis ended a year later as violence decreased to lower levels. A second crisis occurred in 1964 at the Ogaden border; an in-depth study of this case will be presented below. A third crisis took place from July 1977- March 1978, taking form of a full-scale war between the adversaries over the Ogaden. Despite international and regional efforts to mediate this crisis, it terminated through the withdrawal of Somali forces after they could no longer sustain the level of violence required (Mayall, 1978). A fourth, non-violent, crisis occurred in December 1980 after an Ethiopian-Kenyan communiqué called on Somalia to publically renounce its irredentist claims (Day, 1982). Somalia claimed that this communiqué was synonymous to a declaration of war. This crisis was seen to have ended in 1981, after Somalia and Kenya signed a formal cooperative agreement (Brecher and Wilkenfield, 1977). In 1982, between June-August a violent crisis occurred after Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia. In response, Somalia called upon the OAU, UN and US for support and assistance (Brecher and Wilkenfield, 1977). A sixth crisis began in February 1987 when Ethiopia and insurgency groups it supported began attacking several Somali towns (Kendie, 2003). This crisis terminated in April with a cease-fire agreement between the adversaries. A final crisis took place in 2006 when Ethiopia invaded Somalia and occupied its territory until 2009; a case study will follow below.

In order to illustrate the effective use on conflict management techniques, two specific crises will be explored. The first case is the border dispute that began in February 1964 and ended in March of that same year. During this crisis, Ethiopian and Somali armed forces engaged in violence, and a state of emergency was called in both countries (Brecher and Wilkenfield, 1977). Immediately once this crisis began, mediation attempts were initiated through the OAU. An emergency session took place in February where both adversaries presented their case, and a resolution was passed calling upon the adversaries to enter negotiations for peaceful settlement of the dispute (OAU, 1969). A second meeting took place in February, also passing a resolution seeking for peaceful settlement. On March 30 the crisis terminated with a cease-fire agreement that was passed in Khartoum, and a joint border commission was established (Somali Government, 1969). Thus, this represents a case in which termination of the crisis was achieved through the use of regional mediation.

A second notable example of conflict management took place after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. Ethiopia decided to invade after it felt

threatened by the extremist Islamic groups rising to power. This led to a great upsurge in violence in the months that followed, but this violence continued as al-Shabaab rose to the fore (Marchal, 2009). The Somalis were fighting against Ethiopia to force them to withdraw, however Ethiopia was unwilling to do so until it suppressed the Islamic militia group. International attempts to mediate this crisis began, by attempting to find a solution that would satisfy Ethiopia to the extent that they would be willing to withdraw. The UN-sponsored Djibouti Peace Process took place in 2008, with the support of the international community including the UN, African Union, US, and European Union (AMISOM, 2015). One June 8th, the Djibouti Agreement was signed by the Transitional Federal Government (whom Ethiopia supports) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (a moderate Islamic group). This agreement stated that the Ethiopia would withdraw its troops from Somalia, which took place in January 2009, thus terminating this crisis.

(Failed) Attempts at Conflict Resolution

As opposed to conflict management, resolution requires more than simply putting an end to a specific crisis. Resolution implies the termination of open conflict between the principle adversaries and ending the use of violence (Brecher, Conflict Managment and Resolution 2015). This implies a fundamental change in the relationship between the adversaries after an agreement for the termination of the conflict has taken place. This agreement must take place at the leadership level, and affects neither the mass nor attentive public. Therefore, there is a conceptual distinction between resolution and conflict management, notably the duration of resolution is indefinite, and it often –but not necessarily— takes place after successful conflict management. According to the model, there are four basic causes of conflict resolution. The first is a collective feeling of either physical or psychological exhaustion (or both), second is a discernable qualitative change in the human and/or material balance of capability, third and fourth are domestic and international pressures favoring conflict termination (Brecher, Conflict Managment and Resolution 2015). In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, there have been some attempts at resolution, however none have been successful in terminating this protracted conflict.

The majority of all attempts at conflict resolution between Ethiopia-Somalia took place during Phase I. These attempts were all made through the OAU because at the time of decolonization, African states were attempting to resolve their disputes within the African–and not the international—context, because they felt that African problems should be met with African solutions (Fasehun, 1982). The conflict was brought forward in Cairo, in July 1964 where the OAU adopted a resolution stating the inviolability of state frontiers (Kendie, 2003). This represented a shift away from the plight of the Somalis claims to self-determination and impeded successful attempts at resolution in the future. Despite this, there were subsequent attempts to resolve the conflict between the principle adversaries through the OAU. After the signing of the Khartoum Agreement in March 1964, a subsequent resolution was signed by Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya in July 1964, in which each of the parties solemnly declared to respect existing borders (OAU, 1969). This was an attempt to propel the termination of the conflict in its totality after successful conflict management had

taken place. However, this resolution attempt failed as low-levels of violence continued afterwards.

In 1973 there was a renewed attempt to resolve the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, initiated by the OAU. The matter was placed on the agenda of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, whereby they established a Good Offices Committee, composed of eight states, to find a solution to the dispute (Fasehun, 1982). However, the recommendations made by this committee were unsatisfactory to both parties. Consequently, they were unable to produce a solution that would lead to the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, a new round of talks began in 1980 by the Good Offices Committee where they set out to settle the dispute once again. In June 1981 the Committee ruled in favor of Ethiopia and rejected Somalia's claim (Fasehun, 1982). Consequentially, Somalia did not accept this ruling and so the conflict continued.

One notable experience that indicated possible resolution took place in 1988, between Barre and Mengistu. Three Ethio-Somalia Joint *Ad hoc* Ministerial Committee sessions took place between 1986-88, each leading to deadlocked talks (Yihun, 2014). However, in their fourth session in April 1988, an agreement was signed to normalize relations between the adversaries. This agreement included principles such as noninterference in internal affairs, refraining from acts of destabilization, and acceptance of the 1964 Cairo Declaration (Yihun, 2014). This agreement represented a groundbreaking achievement between the adversaries, and was considered to be a diplomatic success in resolving the conflict. However, many scholars believe that this agreement was 'too little, too late' because it was signed at a time when the Barre regime was weak and there was a great deal of domestic turbulence in Somalia. For this reason, Barre was willing to make concessions to the Ethiopians so they would stop their destabilization policies in Somalia (Yihun, 2014). Nonetheless, the seeds for deposing Barre were already planted and growing and in 1991 his regime fell. Since that time, no one group in Somalia has been able to consolidate enough power to effectively renew a legitimate government.

In Phase III of the conflict, it is essential to understand the domestic situation in Somalia in order to understand the unique interstate conflict. Somalia is an anomaly in the international system because it is what is known as a 'failed state'. In 2008 it was ranked first in the world as being the most fragile state, measured by domestic stability and pressures they face (Fund for Peace, 2008). As such, domestic anarchy has ensued with complete state collapse, high levels of violence due to competing warlords, and a retreat to clan divisions. Consequently, the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate conflict has assumed a state-society character, whereby Ethiopia is involved in supporting certain groups that favor its interests and suppressing groups that it considers a threat.

Accordingly, there has been a great deal of international involvement in Somalia since 1991. However, international mediation attempts have taken the form of resolving the domestic situation and establishing stability in Somalia, rather than seeking to resolve the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate conflict directly. Since the Somali domestic conflict began, there have been 14 unsuccessful Peace Initiatives, which have included participation with the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)[1], the UN, African Union, the US, and the European Union (Mulugeta, 2009). The most recent peace initiative that took place in Djibouti has established a new Somali Federal Government, which is still

being monitored to assess to what extent it has been successful. The Djibouti Peace Agreement is important because it did, indirectly, deal with the Somali-Ethiopia interstate conflict because it called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. Furthermore, there is presently the AMISOM mission in Somalia being headed by the African Union with troops coming from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (African Union Mission in Somalia, 2015). It is important to highlight the supportive role Ethiopia is playing in terminating the Somali domestic conflict, which represents the uniqueness of the ongoing protracted conflict between these two adversaries.

Since this protracted conflict has assumed this uncommon dynamic, it is necessary to comprehend that the *de facto* government of al-Shabaab is perpetuating the interstate protracted conflict. Thus, the conflict continues not from the internationally-recognized government, but rather from the *de facto* regime that has assumed power since the early 2000s.

As such, one must explore the implications that this has on how such a unique protracted conflict can be resolved. The question must be asked: How do you mediate an interstate conflict amongst the domestic anarchy ensuing with one of the principle adversaries? It can be argued that despite the fact that one group may reflect the de facto government, it does not mean that they have the ability nor the legitimacy to act in the same manner as a formal government. Thus, a prerequisite to the termination of this protracted conflict will be the establishment of a government in Somalia that is seen as legitimate both domestically and internationally.

At present, the Federal Government of Somalia is internationally recognized, but still fails to be seen as the legitimate government domestically. Ethiopia supports the new Federal Government, and if one were to monitor the relations between the Federal Government of Somali and Ethiopia, one would assume that there is little, to no hostility remaining between the two (Mohamed, 2012). Presently, Ethiopia supports the Somali government financially, militarily, and politically (Shay, 2006). However, this does not represent a termination to the interstate protracted conflict because the Federal Government of Somalia is not yet effective enough to be seen as legitimate by the majority of Somalis.

Currently, al-Shabaab still maintains a great deal of power and domestic participation in its militia. Without speculating too greatly, one could argue that if the current Federal Government of Somalia was able to establish greater domestic legitimacy and become the primary state actor in Somalia, that this weak and dependent government would be amenable to end the protracted conflict with Ethiopia. However, so long as al-Shabaab –or any other violent group with high levels of power and control—remains as a countervailing power in Somalia, no such resolution will be possible.

It is still difficult to fully measure the impact of the basic causes of protracted conflict as outlined in Michael Brecher's model—although, it still provides immense analytical value. Somalia has undergone a civil war and violence since 1991, however only a brief period directly involved Ethiopia. For over twenty years the violence, crisis, and instability fell within the domestic, intrastate conflict. Therefore, contributing basic causes such as physical and psychological exhaustion, international, and domestic pressures are present but in the context to resolving Somalia's domestic conflict. Hence, yet again it

becomes clear that stability must be established in Somalia before any formal resolution of the protracted interstate conflict may be achieved.

The final stage of termination is *reconciliation,* whereby there is a fundamental transformation in the attitudes and behaviors of the decision-makers, the mass and attentive public towards the adversary from collective hostility towards acceptance and trust (Auerbach, 2009). Reconciliation is the most difficult to attain, and only takes place after a prolonged and gradual process. In practice conflict resolution precedes reconciliation, to allow for the possibility of building a different relationship with the adversary. Given the reality in the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, there is no evidence of reconciliation, neither between the leadership nor with wide segments of the population.

Conclusion

The Ethiopia-Somalia protracted conflict is best explained through the protracted conflict model presented by Michael Brecher. The historical roots of the colonial era serve as a basis upon which the context of the conflict emerged, and the independence of Somalia marked the precipitating event. It is clear that both territory and identity politics have shaped the power rivalry between these states. Lastly, each adversary's attitudinal prism affects how it perceives its national objectives and capabilities, and that of its opponent.

Furthermore, a systematic analysis of the Ethiopia-Somalia protracted conflict through the use of the Persistence Model is extremely useful to understand what variables were present that made this conflict sustain through time. Beginning with the independent variables: territory, ideology, and material benefits mark three important discordant objectives. As such, the balance of military power has undergone a significant shift in this conflict. An analysis of the behavior of both Somalia and Ethiopia was presented by identifying their decision-makers and the decision-making process, as well as indicating the strategic, tactical, and implementing decisions.

Following the model, the conflict sustaining acts were categorized between acts of violence, political hostility, and propaganda/verbal-hostility, whereby violence was identified as the most frequent and important conflict-sustaining act. The application of the evidence from the case study conforms to the model, as this helps to explain why this protracted conflict has persisted over time.

Additionally, a list of the crises that have occurred in this conflict was presented. Two specific case studies were analyzed to demonstrate the effective use of international mediation to manage these crises.

Finally, it was argued that under the present conditions in the Somali domestic context, a necessary condition for conflict resolution is an effective state government to be established with both domestic and intentional legitimacy. Therefore, despite the fact that this protracted conflict remains unresolved, there is potential for this case to take on a new form, and for the relationship between the principle adversaries to become less hostile, ultimately leading to a sustainable resolution.

[1] Members of IGAD include: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda

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Editor-in- Chief

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