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THE McGILL INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

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"I want to know how the world works [...] and I hope that I maybe one day can learn enough to make a difference."

— Kim Wall, Swedish journalist (1987-2017)

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Preface

In the Trump age, it is easy to feel like nothing in world politics will ever be the same. We seem to go back to dangerous nuclear confrontation, trade agreements are in shackles, and oceans keep rising as political leaders watch from the sidelines. Yet while there is indeed much cause for concern, even disarray, in current developments, we also know from decades of scholarship that global politics, despite its many twists and turns, remains fundamentally structured, in the longue durée, by certain institutions, norms and practices that have proven quite resilient and sometimes adaptive in the past. After all, change is all the more apparent that it takes place against a backdrop of continuity. What is more, challenging as they are, the current chaos and turmoil are far from unprecedented in human history. Of course, the journey ahead will be a rocky one, and there is no guarantee that the transformations currently underway in global governance will yield a better world to get through the Anthropocene. But as the articles gathered for this issue of the McGill International Review demonstrate, key issues of our age—from forced displacement to global drug trade to frozen ethnic conflicts—have to be approached through the right combination of innovative thinking and a proper understanding of the established patterns of political action with which humanity has hobbled around so far.

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Words From the Editor-in-Chief

Over the past year I have been honoured to lead the McGill International Review (MIR). This year was one of many changes for our organization; from implementing double-blind peer review to joining the Board of Directors of the International Relations Students' Association of McGill (IRSAM), and receiving a record number of article submissions, the MIR only kept going forward. However, what stayed constant is our commitment to excellence and our passion for high-level undergraduate academic work.

Over the past decade, the McGill International Review has strived to offer students from all disciplines the opportunity to engage in meaningful scholarly work on international relations. Through the journal, writers and editors have successfully bridged the gap between classroom knowledge and practical experience.

This issue presents a variety of topics, ranging from the refugee crisis to Canadian foreign policy to regional issues such as the Somalian Civil War, from the 2008 Georgian War and the Kurdish struggle to an examination of Kazakhstan's hybrid political regime. This wide range of articles is reflective of McGill students' keen interest towards the world that lays beyond Roddick Gates.

I hope that you will enjoy reading the 2018 McGill International Review as much as I enjoyed leading it! Thank you for your everlasting support and engagement with our publication.

With warmth,

Marie Lemieux,
Editor-in-Chief, 2018

The Religious Experience of Displacement

Ruth Gopin

Introduction

Driven from their homelands under stressful and traumatic conditions, forced migrants are faced with significant physical and psychological challenges as they undergo perilous journeys to seek safer homes for themselves and their dependents. Most forced migrants continue to confront overwhelming challenges throughout the process of resettlement and integration. Taking into consideration the difficult conditions that often frame pre-departure, the journey itself, and post-arrival, the ability for humans to survive the experience of displacement becomes almost miraculous. Indeed, this is how many forced migrants view their circumstances - as a miraculous gift from God.

Religiosity often plays a tremendous role in shaping forced migrants' conception of their experiences and coping strategies as they encounter new challenges at each stage of their journey. Yet, little research in the development field explores the phenomenon of exile as a spiritual and religious experience, and the practical implications of this journey. This paper will draw from interdisciplinary academic literature to argue that the experience of forced displacement often results in a strengthening of religious and spiritual resolve. Furthermore, I will argue further that religious fortification can be utilized as a source of resilience and effective coping strategy during the experience of displacement. However, increased dependency on religious expression can sometimes lead to greater challenges during the process of resettlement. Nonetheless, it is clear that relevant actors ought to give increased attention to understanding the constructive aspects of religious experiences of displacement, and integrating solutions that support rather than ignore or undermine this phenomenon.

Definitions

Before delving into the main findings of this paper I will first clarify some key terms. First, the term 'religion' as used in this paper includes various dimensions associated with religiosity such as spirituality, 'faith', everyday lived religion as a practice and routine, and broader socio-political interactions and networks. The term 'refugee' will be used where appropriate. However, this paper will focus on the broader category of forced migrants, to include the experiences of International Displaced Persons (IDP) and others who do not fit the international definition of 'refugee.'[1] In this paper, whenever the term 'migrant' is used, it will generally refer to *forced* migrants - persons who are displaced from their homes due to unlivable circumstances.[2]

Religious Fortification

Refugees and forced migrants often become increasingly religiously observant and/or spiritually connected as a result of their experience of displacement.[3] It is important to note that this certainly does not represent the experience of every forced migrant in every context. Many turn to religion during times of distress, but one Kurdish man who now lives in the United Kingdom (UK) expressed a personal distance from the "comfort" of religious practice, preferring to identify as "emotionally self-sufficient."[4] Others may find that an initial distancing from their religious identities pre-departure becomes a factor in their motivation to seek

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1 "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," UNHCR, last modified December 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.

2 "Migrant/Migration," UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international migration/glossary/migrant/.

3 J. B. Saunders, E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and S. Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration: Issues at the Global Crossroads* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

4 E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Y. M. Qasmiyeh, "Muslim Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: Negotiating Identity, Politics and Religion in the UK," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 23, no. 3 (2010): 295.

asylum in a secular country.[5] Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that both religion and forced migration are complex experiences, operating on larger social levels, but also on deeply personal levels. Therefore, it is unsurprising that no two migrants will ever experience their journeys in exactly the same way, nor will they have the same reactions for the same reasons.

However, multiple studies have found that religious fortification is a major part of the experience of displacement for many forced migrants.[6] There are a plethora of reasons that may explain this phenomenon, ranging from the mundane to the miraculous. Some refugees have expressed that they became more religious simply because they "had nothing else to do" or because of the "boredom" of being in detention or not allowed to work.[7] For some, religion became a source of empowerment in the form of an identifier other than 'refugee,' 'foreigner,' or worse. Some Muslim migrants adopted what they felt to be a much more empowering term – 'Muhajirim,' or "those who leave their homes in the cause of Allah," and voiced their explicit awareness that experiences of war and feelings of displacement had led them to place an increased importance regarding their religious identities.[8]

In response to the current political climate, many Muslim asylum-seekers expressed that they became invested in learning about their religion to defend themselves against ignorant attacks, and to teach their children to have a better understanding of their heritage.[9] Indeed, preservation of culture and heritage emerged across several studies as a key reason that people became more observant in the post-arrival stage.[10] Others became more religiously observant after being given support, or promises of support, from proselytizing missionaries.[11] One study also found that up to 75 percent of the Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees that were surveyed used prayer to relieve sadness, and many others have similarly expressed that they became more religious as a source of comfort during hard times.[12] Some turned to the structured aspects of religion to provide guidelines and order during turbulent times.[13] Others describe miraculous things that occurred during their journey, such as a Vietnamese man who claims that pirate attacks were thwarted with Buddhist prayer, which strengthened their religious commitment or even caused them to convert out of gratitude to the deity they believe had saved them.[14] Finally, some may be so impoverished, or in such a dire situation, that they feel they have nowhere else to turn but to faith in a higher power that will protect them.[15] When asked how they managed to

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5 Ibid., 300.

6 M. Shoeb, H.M. Weinstein, and J. Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space: Iraqi Refugees in Dearborn, Michigan." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20, no. 3, (2007): 441.

7 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, "Muslim Asylum-Seekers and Refugees", 295.

8 Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space", 442.

9 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, "Muslim Asylum-Seekers and Refugees", 295.

10 L. J. Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity: religion and the Vietnamese refugees," *Refugee Survey Quarterly 26,* no. 2 (2007): 57-68, see also J. McLellan, *Cambodian refugees in Ontario: Resettlement, religion, and identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), and C. McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place: Islam and the Everyday Life of Somali Women in Melbourne, Australia," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 15, no. 2 (2002): 171-188.

11 Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 493-512.

12 N. G. Khawaja et al., "Difficulties and coping strategies of Sudanese refugees: a qualitative approach," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 45 no. 3, (2008): 500.

13 Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 57-68, see also McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 171-188.

14 Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 57-68, see also Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration*.

15 E. M. Gozdziak, "Spiritual Emergency Room: The Role of Spirituality and Religion in the Resettlement of Kosovar Albanians," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 15, no. 2 (2002), 136-152, see also Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,

survive they will simply reply with "the help of God."[16]

These examples all suggest support for the claim that for many forced migrants' religiosity takes on a greater importance as a result of their journey. However, just as the reasons for religion's increased importance are not uniform, the ways that this increased religiosity is utilized before departure, during the journey itself, and during the process of resettlement are similarly varied. Ultimately, religion has the ability to be "simultaneously destructive and constructive in experiences of displacement."[17] I will now examine each in turn, beginning with the positive.

Constructive Aspects of Religious Fortification

There are many benefits that having a religious connection can cultivate for forced migrants, including access to services, information, and advocacy on their behalf, a social support network, a sense of stability, a coping mechanism for traumatic experiences, and potentially even a means by which integration into new countries might be eased.

Information, Material Benefits, and Advocacy

For some migrants, clergy members are their main source of information regarding the dangers and safest means of crossing international borders.[18] Places of worship at every stage of the journey can act as places where communal knowledge regarding employment and shelter can be shared from experienced members of the community who may have taken similar journeys themselves.[19] Many places of worship may also actively provide material benefits such as meals, clothing, medical care, financial resources, and support for legalization.[20] Religious organizations may also have the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people, to connect more easily with political actors, and to become advocates for the rights of refugees and forced migrants.[21] Indeed, religious communities have often been at the forefront of providing material assistance and advocacy for migrants.[22]

Social Support

"Religion is what pulls us together now."[23]

Another function that religious networks can provide is just that – a networking function, which can act as a protective shield against the psychological strain of

and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration*.

16   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder.

17   K. Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30, no. 3 (2017): 457.

18   D. G. Groody and G. Campese, *A promised land, a perilous journey: Theological perspectives on migration* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).

19   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and, Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration*.

20   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, see also A. E. A. Warren, R. M. Lerner, and E. Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth: Research Perspectives and Future Possibilities* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).

21   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration*.

22   A. E. A. Warren, R. M. Lerner, and E. Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth: Research Perspectives and Future Possibilities* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).

23   Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space," 451.

displacement.[24] Religious communities can enhance a sense of common identity, which in turn promotes in-group solidarity.[25] Research has shown that frequent religious involvement may be associated with better health due to the positive benefits of social support and a sense of belonging, both which come along with cultivating religious social centers.[26] This can be particularly important for those who travel alone, as it gives those individuals access to critical psychological support and networking abilities they might not otherwise have.[27] Many Muslim asylum seekers and refugees who settled in the UK spoke of the importance of the mosque and its potential for creating shared space and a sense of belonging.[28] Many Syrian Christian and Druze refugees also stated that socializing in Church or the homes of other refugees was very important to them.[29] Churches also served as a safe space for emotional expression in intervention programs for unaccompanied refugee children from South Sudan.[30] For many Cambodians, memorial relics are an important part of the New Year's celebration, but after coming to Canada they no longer had access to these relics and compensated for this loss by gathering with family members and friends to celebrate the New Year.[31] Here too, group solidarity was enhanced through a common identity and religious practice, which in turn helped to alleviate feelings of loss and isolation.

Stability

"To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul."[32]

Religious beliefs and practices also provide a cognitive structure that generates a sense of order and control over life events.[33] Many migrants already possess a set of structured beliefs and religious practices prior to departure that provide guidance on how they should behave.[34] These predictable rituals can serve as a framework for conducting normal daily life amid otherwise often unpredictable circumstances. Religion can also help cultivate a sense of continuity and spiritual anchoring that can be very empowering for migrants who are attempting to rebuild their lives in a new and potentially confusing setting.[35] Religious Somali women in Australia emphasized the importance of reciting verses from the Qur'an, and cited praying as a focal point around their entire lives revolved.[36] One woman, who had experienced firsthand the atrocities of war, said simply, "It is the way that has been chosen for me...I'm really grateful for what I've got now rather than what Allah hasn't given me yet. It would be really un-Islamic for me to cry out for things that I

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24   Khawaja et al., "Difficulties and coping strategies of Sudanese refugees," 489.

25   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447.

26   Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space," 441.

27   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration*.

28   Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, "Muslim Asylum-Seekers and Refugees," 312.

29   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 460.

30   B. Ojalehto and Q. Wang, "Children's spiritual development in forced displacement: a human rights perspective," *International Journal of Children's Spirituality* 13, no. 2 (2008): 130.

31   McLellan, *Cambodian refugees in Ontario*.

32   Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space," 443.

33   E. M. Gozdziak, "Spiritual Emergency Room: The Role of Spirituality and Religion in the Resettlement of Kosovar Albanians," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 15, no. 2 (2002): 137.

34   Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 57.

35   Warren, Lerner, and Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth*.

36   McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 172.

haven't got rather than thanking Allah for the things I have got."[37] She, like many others, relies heavily on piety and the routine practices of religiosity to keep her focused on the future. Religion provides her with a clear framework that she can utilize to make sense of her world, despite the deeply painful experiences she has lived through.[38]

Mental Health and Coping with Trauma

"A religious life is the only way to remain mentally balanced."[39]

"I pray to soothe my mind."[40]

Refugees resettled in Western countries are ten times more at risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than age-matched general populations of those countries.[41] Yet, a field study of the largest Cambodian refugee camp found that those involved in personal and formal religious activities were one-third as likely to have PTSD as respondents with little or no religious activities; a finding that supports results of similar studies.[42] Refugees often express that religious practice helps ease feelings of anxiety and loneliness, and cultivates the mental strength necessary to overcome obstacles. In a Kenyan IDP camp, many women and girls had experienced traumatic sexual violence.[43] However, due to lack of resources and cultural stigmas, these women and girls often did not have access to medical or mental health assistance.[44] Many turned to self-led prayer services and support groups as a resource to help overcome trauma. The women drew strength from biblical heroines, and used religious texts to improve self-esteem and a sense of empowerment in a society where their needs were not prioritized.[45] Many expressed that this had done more for their overall well-being than empty promises from the government.[46] Similarly, a Somali woman explained that when services were not available during the civil war, women who became depressed and could not function would be supported by other women who would "get together and talk to them, they would go to the mosque and verses of the Qur'an would be read."[47] These women responded to the mental health needs of their neighbors through social support and getting them to participate in normal daily routines - all framed through religiosity. The leadership and participatory roles within these communities can also provide individuals with a sense of self-worth in host countries where upward social mobility is otherwise limited.[48]

For all of the reasons outlined thus far, and more, it is unsurprising that religious beliefs have been

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37   Ibid., 186.

38   Ibid., 186.

39   Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 65.

40   McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 184.

41   N. G. Khawaja et al., "Difficulties and coping strategies of Sudanese refugees: a qualitative approach," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 45 no. 3, (2008): 490.

42   R. F. Mollica et al., "Science-based policy for psychosocial interventions in refugee camps: a Cambodian example," *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 190, no. 3 (2002), 158-66.

43   D. S. Parsitau, "The Role of Faith and Faith-Based Organizations among Internally Displaced Persons in Kenya," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 24, no. 3 (2011): 493.

44   Ibid., 500.

45   Ibid., 501.

46   Parsitau, 502.

47   McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 184.

48   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration.*

found to be positively associated with physical and mental health.[49] Strong beliefs can reduce emotional pain and stress associated with fear, anger and uncertainty; and prayer worship and meditation can reduce physiological and psychological stress.[50] In fact, meditative practice is associated with higher pre-frontal cortex activation during cognitive reappraisal.[51] This is significant because cognitive reappraisal is the practice of reinterpreting emotion-triggering events in ways that modulate their emotional impact, which in turn is associated with positive emotion in daily life and psychological well-being.[52] Religious expression that involves meditative practice may therefore be vital in reducing the emotional stress of displacement.

Integration

"Other Christians – not only us Syrians – can come together and try and be normal again."[53]

Religion can sometimes play a role in facilitating integration during resettlement. Studies have found that refugees who report holding a strong belief system have also been found to have higher educational achievement, better mastery of language, as well as reduced risk behaviors including substance abuse.[54] Interestingly, this seems to be particularly relevant for the children of migrants. Among second-generation adolescents religiosity has been linked

to higher school engagement, lower levels of violent behavior and fewer behavioral problems.[55] In a study of Vietnamese immigrants to America, there was a clear positive relationship found between religious participation and social adjustment, through – perhaps counter intuitively – the cultivation of a distinctive ethnic identity.[56] Overall, closer association with a minority religious or ethnic community was found to facilitate a more positive adjustment to the host society through increasing the probability that second generation migrants will do better in school and avoid risky or disruptive behavior patterns.[57] Religion plays an important role in simultaneously facilitating the development of a clear and purposeful identity while also serving as a pathway to acculturation, which allows children of immigrants to excel in their new homes above and beyond what their peers who do not participate in worship communities are able to achieve.[58]

One other interesting way in which religion might play a role in easing the integration process of migrants and refugees is that religion can have the effect of "transcending boundaries of space and time,"[59] and establishing a connection across nationalities and ethnicities. For example, Christian Syrian refugees in Jordan expressed that Church was a place where they were able to utilize the commonality of Christianity to connect with new circles.[60] In other instances, the

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49   Gozdziak, "Spiritual Emergency Room," 136.

50   Ibid., 137.

51   Warren, Lerner, and Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth.*

52   Warren, Lerner, and Phelps.

53   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 458.

54   Warren, Lerner, and Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth*, see also N. G. Khawaja et al., "Difficulties and coping strategies of Sudanese refugees," 492.

55   Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder, *Intersections of Religion and Migration.*

56   C.L Bankston III and M. Zhou, "The ethnic church, ethnic identification, and the social adjustment of Vietnamese adolescents," *Review of Religious Research*, (1996): 31.

57   Bankston and Zhou, 32.

58   Warren, Lerner, and Phelps, *Thriving and Spirituality among Youth*.

59   Ibid.

60   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447-67.

general public may become drawn to new and different teachings introduced by migrant communities. For example, Buddhist temples and religious teachings established and propagated by Vietnamese refugees in Canada eventually attracted many non-Asians, which gave the Vietnamese refugees a chance to establish connections and make an important contribution in their new home. [61] Indeed, to the extent that religion is perceived as a point of communal interest and connection it may serve to diminish feelings of isolation and estrangement from the host community that forced migrants often experience.[62]

Destructive Aspects of Religious Fortification

Despite the previous evidence that shows how religion can help ease integration, it is important not to forget that it can often also impede the ease of the resettlement process by emphasizing in-group mentalities and highlighting qualities of difference or 'otherness' from host societies. For instance, the Muslim refugee community in the UK expressed frustration at disconnect or even open hostility and racism between themselves and, not only the broader British community, but even the British Muslim community.[63] The established British Asian Muslim community and Middle Eastern Muslim asylum-seekers attend different masjids, sermons are delivered in different languages, and there is what one migrant described as a "rupture" between the two groups.[64]

Somali women in Australia noted that experiences of discrimination, such as Muslim schools receiving bomb threats and local mosques being defaced with racist graffiti, have been on the rise ever since 9/11.[65] However, hate, discrimination and isolation from host societies is an unfortunate reality that many migrants, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, have encountered since long before 9/11. In the late 1980s, Canada received an influx of Cambodian migrants and refugees.[66] These Cambodians recall frequent racist experiences involving white Canadians, such as people throwing snowballs and yelling discriminatory remarks.[67] These attacks are often explicitly linked to religion, such as when Canadian neighbors of a Cambodian Buddhist temple were openly hostile to its presence, and pressured the Cambodian refugees to hold smaller gatherings to "demonstrate their willingness for multicultural adaptation." [68] Political, social, and cultural boundaries at best, and overt racism and hatred at worst, are realities that cannot be ignored.[69] Furthermore, religious groups that are minorities even within their own societies, such as the Christians and Druze amongst Syrian refugees, might experience even greater isolation and stigmatization from many sources: the host society, fellow Syrians, and aid workers who might not understand or take into account the complexities of these religiously motivated dynamics.[70]

Another difficult issue arises when reliance on religious faith can involve maladaptive or even self-harming behaviors, such as refusal of medication or support.[71] Some refugees expressed that, due to experiences of

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61 Dorais, "Faith, hope and identity," 57-68.

62 Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447-67.

63 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, "Muslim Asylum-Seekers and Refugees," 294-314.

64 Ibid., 304.

65 McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 180.

66 McLellan, *Cambodian refugees in Ontario*.

67 Ibid., 43.

68 Ibid., 92.

69 McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 171-88.

70 Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447-67.

71 Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space," 441-60.

severe lack of support from institutions, they had come to rely on faith alone and were distrustful of any other form of support. One Muslim woman said, "If I'm sick…I just pray. Allah is the only one that I seek help from, the only one I can rely on."[72] This can pose a major challenge for medical professionals and aid workers who are trying to deliver assistance in the most efficient and effective way possible. Service providers may lack the sensitivity to develop a rapport of trust, creativity to adapt to religious needs, or time and resources to deal with the difficulties of negotiating such a clash of cultures.

Practical Implications

"Religion is…well, it's just not a priority for us."[73]

There has been a clear trend of secularization in humanitarianism, presumably to uphold the principles of neutrality and impartiality.[74] However, limited engagement on issues of religion and humanitarianism is arguably creating missed opportunities to leverage existing coping mechanisms and systems of support. Re-engaging with this issue would place a greater importance on the agency of refugees themselves, and potentially lead to innovative solutions that might be even more effective than had previously been possible.

Historically in development literature, particularly in Western development literature, the concept of 'well-being' has been limited to material and physical dimensions.[75] However, this fails to capture dimensions that refugees often link to their own

evaluations of health and well-being, including religious components.[76] The emphasis on physical and material needs found across United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports may restrict the ability to understand refugee experiences and needs.[77] It is important to take perceptions and assumptions held by refugees into account to ensure that misunderstandings between religious groups and humanitarian actors can be resolved.[78]

For many refugees, their religiosity is a major aspect of their lives, and to ignore that is to deny them their right to be fully recognized as individuals *with their own conceptions of their own identities*. For instance, one refugee said regarding the UNHCR staff, "I found it a bit odd when she didn't ask if I was Christian. It mattered to me."[79] Another problem with excluding religion in the name of neutrality is that it can lead to a lack of understanding and sensitivity regarding the dynamics of religious pluralism. This has the potential to become a source of conflict, and may even inadvertently exclude religious minorities from access to humanitarian services, security and protection.[80]

Another realm in which these issues are particularly pertinent is with regards to medical assistance, particularly by mental health professionals. It has been found that 56% of psychiatrists identify themselves as agnostic or atheist and have low levels of religious knowledge.[81] Very few are trained to understand or treat sympathetically religious beliefs, and the process of identifying and treating PTSD is

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72   McMichael, 183.

73   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 452.

74   E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, "Introduction: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 24, no. 3 (2011): 429.

75   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447-67.

76   McMichael, "Everywhere is Allah's Place," 171-88.

77   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 447-67.

78   E. M. Gozdziak, "Spiritual Emergency Room," 136-52.

79   Eghdamian, "Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement," 448.

80   Eghdamian, 500.

81   Gozdziak, "Spiritual Emergency Room," 136-52.

through a Western framework of structured clinical interviews and standardized symptom checklists.[82] It is highly individualized, and does not emphasize social or religious considerations; further, psychological treatment models rarely incorporate spiritual or religious dimensions.[83]

This propagates the idea of refugees as victims who have failed to cope with their circumstances,[84] and fails to grasp that some refugees may "address the problem of meaning by living in religious time and space."[85] Mental health professionals and medical professionals need to intensely engage with the sociocultural, moral, and indeed religious aspects of their patients' suffering. Through this engagement they can better respond to maladaptive spiritual and emotional responses to traumatic situations.[86] It is important for these providers of psychosocial interventions to incorporate a religious context not only to better understand their patients, but also to support where possible the capacity of refugees to utilize religion as a coping and surviving mechanism.

Conclusion

"I prayed and I fasted and asked God to give me the strength and peace I needed to leave my children. I prayed that my children would not cry when I left; they didn't. That was a sign from God that I could go."[87]

It is clear that for many forced migrants' religion frames every aspect of their journey; from the difficult decision to depart, to the mechanisms they utilize as they undertake the journey and deal with challenges, to the ways they might engage with the host society during the process of resettlement. This phenomenon

can manifest in constructive or destructive ways, and the precise relationship between forced migration and religious fortification is an area that has not yet been adequately analyzed by scholarly research. More extensive research across a wider range of disciplines and sample sizes is imperative. Further, the practical implications of this research must focus on ways in which humanitarian aid providers, medical and mental health professionals, and other stakeholders can understand and enhance existing support systems and coping mechanisms of forced migrants, including those provided by their daily, lived, religious experiences of displacement.

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82 Ibid., 150.

83 Ibid., 151.

84 Ibid., 152.

85 Shoeb, Weinstein, and Halpern, "Living in Religious Time and Space", 459.

86 Ibid., 460.

87 Groody, D. G., and G. Campese. *A promised land, a perilous journey: Theological perspectives on migration.* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).

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State Collapse and the Somali Civil War:
Grievance, Greed and How to Build Lasting Peace

Liam Kirkpatrick

Introduction

Protracted armed conflicts present incredibly complex problems for analysis, and there is a large body of work that attempts to explain their enduring nature. This debate has been dominated by the theory of grievance, where perceived inequalities and relative deprivation are considered to motivate groups to take up arms and fight for their rights. The alternative argument presented by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler re-oriented this debate in the early 2000s, as they introduced the theory of greed as the primary factor in perpetuating violence.[1] The latter suggests that poor economic conditions and limited opportunities for individuals creates abnormally low costs to initiating conflict, which then incentivize its continuation by making it profitable for belligerents. Within the body of literature on armed conflicts there is support, refutation, and synthesis of the greed and grievance debate. Syed Mansoob Murshed and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin put forth an argument in their 2008 article, "Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict", that while greed and grievance are important elements in explaining protracted armed conflict, neither are sufficient explanations. Instead, institutional collapse is a barrier to peace, and leads to civil war.[2]

It is this near total collapse of the central state that has been the critical element in the ongoing armed conflict in Somalia. While there is a wide array of polities with a varied degree of institutionalization and scope that have emerged in the period since the end of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the central Somali state remains incredibly weak outside of Mogadishu.[3] The Somali Civil War displays elements of both greed and grievance in its persistence; however, the intractability of the situation is primarily a product of near total state collapse. Without a central state, there is no institutional framework within which Somali leaders can restore order, address grievances, and reduce the incentives for groups to continue fighting. It also important to note how in Somalia, due to the intense clan hatred that developed prior to the outbreak of the civil war, grievances are especially intense, and are very much connected to the greed that continues to fuel the war. This paper will draw upon historical context to discuss the factors that perpetuate the Somali Civil War rather than those that lead to its outbreak. I will first turn to the issues of grievance and greed in relation to it, followed by a discussion of state failure and "the degradation of the social contract"[4] as a barrier to peace. Finally, I will suggest three resolutions to issues faced by the Somali state, which are critical to restoring peace and stability in the country.

Grievance and Greed: The Theory

As posited by Collier and Hoeffler, grievance is the motive of actors considering armed rebellion.[5] Murshed and Tadjoeddin present a summary of the grievance argument, breaking it into three theoretical elements, two that are relevant to the Somali case: horizontal inequality and polarization. Polarization refers to the "firmness of the social groups in the society," comprised of the homogeneity of singular groups, and the heterogeneity between groups.[6] Horizontal inequality refers to high degrees of inequality between two heterogeneous groups in society, in terms of resource

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1   Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563.

2   Syed Mansoob Murshed and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict," *Journal of International Development* 21, no. 1 (2009): 87.

3   Conor Seyle, "Making Somalia Work," Foreign Affairs, December 10, 2015.

4   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 87.

5   Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance," 564.

6   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 97.

distribution, policy preference, and control of assets.[7] All of these factors are intertwined, and they create motivation for collective action against a repressive force; in this case, the state, or those who control it. It is important to note that grievances are based on perceptions.[8] In Somalia, perceptions, not only of inequalities but also of polarization around the unit of the clan, are especially important in understanding the motivation behind armed conflict.[9]

The other side of understanding armed conflict is greed, which refers to the opportunity to not only initiate a rebellion or armed opposition movement, but also the lower cost of continuing to fight compared to making peace.[10] While Collier and Hoeffler focus on the outbreak of war, the principles of greed are relevant in explaining endurance of armed conflict as well. The key factors that lower the opportunity cost of conflict are financing, recruitment and geography.[11] Financing for armed rebellions comes primarily from resource extraction, foreign diasporas and governments. Recruitment is largely dependent on the availability of fighters in the society, and as well as on the costs to the individual; if there is widespread poverty and inequality, then the individual cost to take up arms is lower. Finally, geography can facilitate the emergence of armed opposition when it is obstructive to conventional military forces, or if the state has difficulty establishing control over rural areas. These elements not only reduce the cost of initiating armed conflict, but also contribute to their prolongation. Grievance and greed are presented as competing views, but, in

reality, elements of both can be seen. In the following pages, I will argue that the Somali case presents very clear motives and opportunities for armed militias to begin and continue fighting.[12]

It is important to note that motivation and opportunity are not static; both elements change over the course of a war. In her analysis, Elizabeth Wood discusses various elements that transform identity in war time.[13] She demonstrates that, as political opposition is militarized, violence becomes acceptable in society, and is the status quo in the maintenance of local order. Additionally, groups become more polarized, and as the state breaks down, there is a re-emergence of localized subsistence economies based on barter and trade. Elements of her theory can be seen in the Somali case, which has endured for over twenty years, and has gone through several transformations.

Clanship in Somalia

The most important factor in understanding the Somali Civil War is the strict clan identities that bind Somali society. Different clan identities in Somalia have not always been irreconcilable; prior to colonialism, a pastoral society existed, and was ordered by a set of rules and norms referred to as *Xeer*.[14] Clan and kinship ties gave order to society, and clans peacefully coexisted. Clanship in Somalia was transformed by the colonial experience, and the political and economic changes that accompanied integration into the global economy and state system. Clanship was fashioned

7   Ibid., 98.

8   Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance," 564.

9   Lidwien Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing in Somalia: the ruinous legacy of 1991* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 203.

10   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 89.

11   Ibid., 89.

12   Ibid., 102.

13   Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 540.

14   Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 04 (1992): 630.

into a political identity by colonial authorities adopting a divide and rule approach. Clan group identity was institutionalized through the colonial court system, and reinforced by collective punishment of entire clans for the misdeeds of individual members.[15] Economically, commercialization of the traditional pastoral economy resulted in disaccord over the appropriation of surpluses, which produced conflict and competition articulated through clanship.[16] The result was a transformed society with polarized clan identity, lacking traditional norms of social justice, and an economic system that created the foundational horizontal inequality.

After gaining independence, the transformation of clan identities worsened. Independence created a small political class in charge of the state and its riches, which was disconnected from the traditional pastoral society.[17] As economic growth stagnated, the state became the most valuable economic resource, as it controlled the distribution of aid. Politics in the new Somali state was inseparable from clan identity, and after the results of the 1969 election, nearly all members of the opposition crossed to the governmental side, hoping to procure a portion of the state's resources for their respective clan groups.[18] Shortly after the election, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated, and General Siad Barre took control of Somalia in the form of a military junta.[19] The Barre regime's legitimacy was constructed on a network of patron-client relations, dispersing wealth from foreign aid to various clan groups in exchange for support.

Resentment towards the Barre regime reached a critical juncture in 1978, when a military defeat in a conflict with a rival state greatly affected their legitimacy, rendering the government shameful and untrustworthy in the eyes of the Somali people.[20] Afterwards, there was room and opportunity for political opposition, based on clan identity, and opposition movements became militarized. Barre struck back at armed opposition, targeting entire civilian clans, in keeping with the colonial practice of collective punishment; this was intended to both divide opposition forces, and to raise the cost of armed opposition.[21] The government was not able to defeat the numerous rival groups, however, and it eventually lost control over the capital, Mogadishu, and the statehouse, Villa Somalia. These events militarized the already highly competitive clan groups in Somalia, laying the foundation of the conflict that endures to this day.

Grievance and Greed in Somalia

Grievances associated with clan identity have provided combatants with incentive in the ongoing Somali conflict. Clan based opposition groups "emerged as the result of the clan-based oppression, harassment, and dispossession of these civilians by the government."[22] In addition to being highly competitive, perceptions of horizontal inequalities were engrained in clan identity. Opposition leaders constructed clan-hate narratives to mobilize Somalis against the regime, constructing a clan identity with fictional origins that became associated with the Barre regime. The use of fictional clan-hate narratives and the construction of an identity, the Darod, has motivated the country's decades-long

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15 Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing*, 75.

16 Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society," 632.

17 Ibid., 633.

18 Ibid., 635.

19 Ibid., 636.

20 Ibid., 636.

21 Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing*, 194.

22 Ibid., 194.

violence. These clan-hate narratives frame a protagonist clan as pitted against others in a historical struggle.[23] Because clan identity underlays popular rebellion, militants targeted not just the regime, but Darod civilians, the clan associated with Barre and his closest allies.[24] After the regime fell, violence between clan militias continued as a fractured opposition fought to take control of the remaining state resources. Decades of violence and distrust have produced a fractured society, and reconciliation between clan groups has proved difficult. Social trust between clan groups remains low, and competition among clan leadership has led to a proliferation of parties; at the first round of peace negotiations, only six Somali factions were present. Two years later, at the second round of talks, the number increased to only fifteen participating parties.[25] Clan grievance perpetuates conflict because clans perceive each other as an existential threat, and "[see] the elimination of the clan enemy as the only assured remedy for such grievances."[26] This intense hatred and mistrust presents a considerable barrier to conflict resolution, and while there are a variety of polities and collective action initiatives that have emerged since the end of the conflict, there remains little inter-clan cooperation.[27]

The politics of clan hatred are based largely on constructed identities. Despite proclaiming to seek the destruction of the regime and of the Darod clan, the leadership of the primary opposition force in 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC), included Barre henchmen.[28] This inclusion of Darod in USC

leadership reveals that clan hatred was less of an ideology, and more a tool to mobilize armed militias. Where those who took up arms were largely motivated by grievance, it is opportunity and greed that explain the ongoing efforts of clan leaders in the armed conflict.

Greed literature suggests that it is the opportunity to fight and the economic interests developed as a result of protracted conflict that explain enduring conflict. [29] In Somalia, poor economic performance and a vast armoury created a situation where individuals had little to lose in terms of wealth, and could easily express frustration with violence. In the last decade of the Barre regime, the Somali economy became the private wealth of a small elite, and was devastated a civil war lasting decades.[30] Early in the conflict, leaders used the promise of conquering the riches of Mogadishu as incentive for their fighters. As a result, leaders did not need to pay combatants. Arms were readily available in Somalia because the Barre regime was a superpower client during the Cold War, and benefited from military assistance.[31] Because of the economic situation faced by Somalis, and because of the presence of a large number of weapons, the opportunity cost of armed conflict has been low throughout the civil war.

The geographic dispersion and regional clan identities have also contributed to the prolongation of the conflict. Somalia has a relatively small population that is dispersed, and has different clan identities based on region; as a result, it has been difficult for the central government to establish control throughout

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23   Ibid., 209.

24   Ibid., 135.

25   Warsan Cismaan Saalax and Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim, "Somali Peace Agreements," Conciliation Resources, 2010, accessed 2018.

26   Ibid., 209.

27   Seyle, "Making Somalia Work."

28   Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing*, 132.

29   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 98.

30   Ibid., 199.

31   Abdullah A. Mohamoud, *State collapse and post-conflict development in Africa: the case of Somalia (1960-2001)* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006), 106.

its territory.[32] Geographic concentration of kinship networks and clans has enabled the emergence of alternate authorities challenging the central state. There is considerable variation between the groups, that include warlords and militant groups, who maintain control through coercion, to semi-autonomous state governments.

Out of the chaos in Somalia, two semi-autonomous regions have emerged, uniting clan members around a polity that resembles a nation state. Puntland, the territory in Northeastern Somalia at the tip of the horn of Africa, has established government institutions following a constitutional conference in the late 1990s. The government was established by the former militant leader of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, Abdullahi Yuusuf, and other leaders in the region.[33] The government continues to enjoy popular support, and is an example of successful state-building in the context of civil war. Similarly, the self-declared independent state of Somaliland in the Northwest of Somalia has held elections considered 'relatively free and fair.'[34] It is important to note, however, that each of these semi-autonomous states are based around singular clan membership, and that these polities can sometimes behave in a predatory fashion.[35] The stability that these polities have brought to their regions is a positive development, and they are still profiting from a weak central government. Somaliland has particular interest in maintaining a weak central government, as the leadership continues to lobby the international community for recognition. These states have emerged in the context of a weak central state, and they benefit from the status quo. Their presence could make re-establishing central control throughout the country more challenging.

The worse alternative to these autonomous states is occupation of the territory by coercive forces. There remain many warlords active in Somalia, many of whom "[have] appeared to be after a piece of the cake, rather than intent on enforcing an agenda for change."[36] Many of them are only seeking profit, ruling small territories through coercion. Others, however, are motivated by ideology; one of the actors to receive the most international attention is the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab emerged in the 2000s as the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was a group that took control of Somalia briefly in 2006, though was thwarted by Ethiopian intervention. The armed wing continues to operate in the less stable southern part of the country, and has benefited from financial and military support from jihadist networks based nearby, in the Middle East.[37] Al-Shabaab claims that its goal is to implement strict sharia law across Somalia; however, the foundations of their organization are clan-based. There is variation in the types of political communities that exist in Somalia, and the level of public goods which they provide to civilians. It is important to acknowledge that they each profit from a weak central authority. If stability and peace are to be restored, then the interests of these actors will need to be eliminated or accommodated.[38]

Finally, it is important to acknowledge the gross transformations Somali society has undergone in the past century. The precolonial and stateless egalitarian society has been transformed into a highly militarized

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32   Seyle, "Making Somalia Work."

33   Roland Marchal, "Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007): 1098.

34   M. Walls, "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland," *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 371.

35   Roland, "Warlordism and terrorism," 1099.

36   Ibid., 1098.

37   Bronwyn Bruton, "In the Quicksands of Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov. & Dec. 2009, accessed March 26, 2017.

38   Ibid.

failed state, where clan competition dominates politics. While this transformation took place prior the outbreak of violence in 1991, twenty years of civil war has served to further entrench clan identity and militarization into Somali society. While there are examples of collective action in the absence of the state, they do not extend beyond small localities.[39] Local governments remain highly militarized, and it is often only temporary.[40] The result is a shifting battlefield and ever-changing relative power between actors. This creates an environment in which it is especially difficult to build a stable peace.

Grievance and greed explain why the conflict in Somalia has endured for more than twenty years; extreme inter-clan hatred and circumstances that make war profitable for actors has prevented the reestablishment of the central state. Greed and grievance are not sufficient explanations to understand why peace has not been made in Somalia, as they ignore the near total collapse of the state.

State Collapse

The consequences of state collapse are twofold: it results in a descent into anarchy, and it eliminates the framework necessary to restore order. According to Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "a viable social contract can be sufficient to restrain, if not eliminate, opportunistic behaviour [...] and the violent expression of grievance."[41] The authors suggest that the motivation to fight can be appeased, and the costs of violent opposition can be raised if measures ensure a satisfactory distribution of resources and accommodations for grievances within

a new state. This did not exist in Somalia in 1991. The Barre regime fell after a decade of increasingly repressive practices against its people, during which the state was transformed into the private property of an oligarchic class.[42] As armed opposition movements proliferated, the government was increasingly prone to meeting them with military force.[43]

The actions of the regime had two consequences that resulted in the failure of the state: first, it served to magnify violence, and second it led differential victimization, which in turn highlighted inequalities and divided its opposition.[44] First, as the Somali government increased its targeting of civilians, opposition groups proliferated, and the regime lost legitimacy. Second, the regime fractured its opposition so effectively along clan lines that after Barre lost control of Mogadishu, opposition groups turned on each other in an attempt to win the state for themselves.[45] The result was a period of widespread looting of state wealth in Mogadishu that was far more destructive than the armed conflict that preceded it.[46] Because of the ruinous legacy of the regime, when Barre fled Mogadishu on January 26, 1991, the state went with him, and it has not returned to full capacity since.[47]

A grave consequence of state collapse is that Somalia lacks the governance structure essential for returning to peace. There have been several efforts to reinstate the central government supported by the international community; however foreign actors have prioritized their own interests, not those of the Somali people, and there have been many missed opportunities.

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39   Seyle, "Making Somalia Work."

40   Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Saving Somalia (Again)," *Foreign Affairs*, June 23, 2015, accessed March 27, 2017.

41   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 102.

42   Mohamoud, *State collapse*, 129.

43   Ibid., 126.

44   Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing*, 194.

45   Ibid., 194.

46   Mohamoud, *State collapse*, 132.

47   Ibid., 132.

Foreign intervention came first in 1992, when the United Nations (UN) tried to broker a ceasefire. The productive efforts of Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative for Somalia, focused on ground up peace-building, incorporating a variety of local actors.[48] Slow progress and low commitment from the UN resulted in the plan's failure. Later in 1992, the UN gave permission for US military intervention in the conflict. *Operation Restore Hope* successfully prevented the looting of aid convoys by armed militias in Mogadishu, though there was a disagreement over the extensiveness of the mandate. The United States (US) only perceived the mandate as allowing for the opening of supply routes for aid relief, but the UN saw the mission as a longstanding effort to disarm fighters and restore stability to all of Somalia.[49] The operation ultimately failed, and withdrew after fighting intensified between USC fighters and UN forces in 1993.[50] Both the peace brokering and peacekeeping effort of the 1990s failed to bring an end to the violence and prevent continuation the ongoing civil war. The United Nations has not engaged in a military role in Somalia since 1995; however, there have been numerous attempts to rebuild the Somali state, though progress has been slow.

The first significant step at rebuilding Somalia came in 2000, when the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed at the Somalia National Peace Conference in Djibouti. The TNG achieved international recognition, but was opposed by the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), a group largely composed of regional warlords. The result was the failure of the TNG and its replacement in 2004 by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which reconciled the TNG and SRRC.[51] In 2006, the TFG faced a major challenge from the ICU who successfully captured Mogadishu. The TFG returned to power in 2007, when a US-backed Ethiopian force captured Mogadishu. The mission was successful; however, US support for the mission transformed Al-Shabaab from a fringe group of the ICU to a central player, as nationalist groups gravitated towards it in opposition to the foreign-backed TFG.[52] The TFG endured until 2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia was founded in 2012.[53]

Despite early optimism about the prospects for change, hope has diminished recently. The country is more stable than when Al-Shabaab was at its most powerful, though forces from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue to struggle to keep the Islamist group at bay.[54] The Somali state has made progress since attempts to reintroduce governance in 2000; however, it has faced considerable challenges in the process, and Somalia remains highly unstable. In recent years, external actors have been more concerned with minimizing terrorist activities than state building, when what is needed is assistance in demilitarizing the state, something that the central state cannot do alone.

Without a strong and effective central government, it will remain difficult to address grievances and initiate reconciliation, reduce incentives that make fighting profitable, and restore order to Somalia. Progress has been made, but Somalia still lacks the necessary institutions to create an enduring peace. According to Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "a feasible social contract favouring peace must give the rebels as much utility

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48 Ibid.. 138.

49 Ibid., 141.

50 Ibid., 146.

51 "Somali Peace Process," African Union Mission in Somalia, 2017, accessed March 30, 2017.

52 Bruton, "In the Quicksands of Somalia."

53 Mary Harper, "Somali Leaders Back New Constitution," *BBC News*, August 1, 2012, accessed March 30, 2017.

54 Felbab-Brown, "Saving Somalia (Again)."

via a credible transfer as they would get in the event of a probable overthrow of the state."[55] This refers to the conditions necessary for the outbreak of war. The same can be said for the establishment of peace; without a social contract to mediate the incentives rebels have to fight, and address their grievances, actors stand to benefit from enduring conflict than making peace.

Going Forward: Three Keys to Lasting Peace in Somalia

Thus far, this paper has argued that the prolongation of the Somali crisis is attributed to both the extreme grievances between groups, rooted in clanship, and the greed of leaders and communities that continue to profit from the weak central state. These drivers of conflict have operated in an environment without a functioning state, and so have permitted the violence to continue. I will now discuss three solutions that address the problems facing Somalia today, though no one solution will be sufficient to restore stability to Somalia.

Rebuilding State Capacity

A critical task in the Somali case is rebuilding state capacity. Once the central government is strengthened, it can engage with the factors that contribute to the perpetuation of violence. The first steps towards this are the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents, all of which are essential towards demilitarizing Somali society; successful completion of this process prevents subsequent disagreements in the peace process from flaring into hot war.[56] The current

government institutions in Somalia do not have the capacity to execute this on their own, however. Support from AMISOM and other peacekeeping forces is required to disarm the numerous armed groups that are still active in the state. US and AMISOM forces have been successful in driving Al-Shabaab out of cities since 2011, though there is still considerable progress to be made.[57] American and African Union (AU) interests have primarily focused on the militant group, and a broader focus will be necessary to bolster the position of the national forces which remain unable to establish control outside of Mogadishu.[58]

The historical record has shown that financial aid is not enough; the central government has a poor record of misappropriating funds from foreign donors. Furthermore, increasing the number of weapons in the country has the potential to contribute to further instability. Full military intervention is not an option; when Ethiopia invaded Somalia to unseat the ICU in 2006, Al-Shabaab was able to mobilize nationalist support from warlords and increase its relative strength.[59] Armed conflict between peacekeepers and militias presents a barrier to peace, and is what drove peacekeeping forces from Somalia in 1993.[60] The preferred alternative is to engage in military activity in conjunction with Somali national forces, and provide combat and human rights training to soldiers. The process of disarmament has numerous barriers, and requires long-term cooperation between international allies and the Somali government.

Addressing Greed

The government will also need to raise the costs of conflict to eliminate the profits that actors gain with

55   Murshed and Tadjoeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance," 104.

56   Mark Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (2004): 499.

57   Felbab-Brown, "Saving Somalia (Again)."

58   Ibid.

59   Bronwyn Bruton and J. Peter Pham, "How to End the Stalemate in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, September 30, 2011, accessed March 27, 2017.

60   Mohamoud, *State collapse*, 143.

prolonged violence. Raising the costs of conflict will incidentally help the state demilitarize society by encouraging militants to disarm themselves. One of the primary challenges to Somali stability since its independence has been poor economic performance. Because the state was the primary distributor of income for the entire country, it became the object of desire for competing clan groups. This undermined the Barre regime, and also perpetuated the conflict after the regime's fall as armed groups fought over the remainder of the state's wealth. Foreign aid remains an important resource for Somalis, but corruption remains rampant; according to a UN report from 2012, 70 percent of aid to the country was unaccounted for.[61] As a result of the longstanding violence, the Somali economy has been devastated; however, there are local initiatives undertaken in Somali communities, such as the development of electrification and communications infrastructure.[62] Here, the central government can play a role by investing in communities that are already undertaking collective action initiatives, and by helping them take advantage of economies of scale.

On the coast, the international community can take action by protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing. Piracy has become an important industry in the lawless land; it is important to recognize that it emerged as a result of armed fisherman boarding vessels in protest of illegal fishing. When the fisherman began to be paid to leave foreign vessels, they began to board them with the intention of extracting a ransom. By protecting its fisheries, Somalia could build up an industry around them.[63] If the Somali economy is restored, fighters can be transformed into workers, and will have their livelihoods to lose should violence re-emerge.

In addition to raising the costs of conflict, the Somali state will also need to address the interests of actors who profit from a Somalia riddled with conflict. These include the numerous warlords, Al-Shabaab, as well as the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Different types of actors will have different interests, and may be more or less willing to reintegrate into the Somali state. Puntland has not made efforts to secede from Somalia, while Somaliland has sought recognition from the international community as an independent state since 1991.[64] The central government will need to regain the support of these polities as they rebuild the state. There are lessons to be learned from the way these polities have negotiated a stable, institutionalized system in a hybrid political order, and their stability can offer the foundations of a renewed Somali society and economy.[65]

The creation of the TFG signified an important step in rebuilding the Somali state, because the federal structure it adopted enabled different regional clan groups to have some autonomy within the central government. The government will need to address the interests of the warlords who control portions of Southern Somalia in an attempt to bring those areas under the control of the government. As the state re-emerges, it will become more influential, and more successful in its campaign against Al-Shabaab, a group unlikely to ever accept the authority of the central government.

Addressing Grievances

One of the most challenging tasks that the Somali state faces is addressing the inter-clan grievances, which

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61 Harper, "Somali Leaders Back New Constitution."

62 *Somalia: The Forgotten Story*, dir. Hamza Ashrif, Somalia: The Forgotten Story, November 2, 2016, accessed March 20, 2017.

63 Ibid.

64 Sarah G. Phillips, "When less was more: external assistance and the political settlement in Somaliland," *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (2016): 629.

65 Marleen Renders and Ulf Terlinden, "Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland," *Development and Change* 41, no. 4 (2010): 723.

have perpetuated violence. Prior to state collapse, clan competition manifested itself in terms of gaining access to political power, and now this competition must be contained within a stable political system. As the Somali state repairs its institutions, it must establish a system that ensures balanced access to political power across clan groups, which will ensure the equitable distribution of state resources. The legislative model adopted in 2012 includes a speaker, president, and two houses of parliament, all chosen through a complex semi-democratic process. Locals are consulted through a complex system structured around traditional local authorities. The process is based on consensus building at the community level, instead of casting ballots.[66] While the process is intended to replicate the effects of democracy in an environment where universal suffrage is institutionally impossible, there are fears the system is vulnerable to seat buying.[67] In the future, Somalia will require universal suffrage and a strong electoral oversight commission to ensure that Somalis have confidence in their national government.

Post-conflict state building has been accomplished in equally challenging environments and Somalia can learn from these examples. In Lebanon, a power sharing arrangement exists to ensure the representation of the three major religious groups.[68] While consociational power sharing is not without criticism, there are several examples of governments that have successfully balanced ethnic groups in conflict with one another. In the future, Somalia will likely require a similar arrangement to ensure balanced power. The choice in 2004 to establish a federal state was a positive step towards legitimization.[69] If regional groups are allowed some autonomy, they will be more likely to accept the central government.

Finally, Somali society faces a long and difficult reconciliation. In 2012, a truth and reconciliation commission was established when the term of the transitional government ended.[70] As of 2015, the reconciliation process has not been initiated, and there is considerable mistrust in the system from local leaders, who see the truth and reconciliation process as a western imposition.[71] If the restorative justice process is to have any meaningful impact, it is important that the local leaders partake in it as well as recognize the legitimacy of the process. An alternative solution is having the government promote a renaissance of *Xeer*, the traditional institutions of pre-colonial society that safeguarded security and communal justice.[72] Regardless of the direction peacebuilders take, the road to reconciliation will be long in Somalia.

Conclusion

The twin factors of grievance and greed that motivate conflict are complex and intertwined, and cannot be addressed without the presence of a strong state apparatus. In Somalia, both greed and grievance perpetuate violence through intense clan mistrust and the presence of actors who profit from a weak central state. Without the presence of a strong central state, grievance and greed have been permitted to fuel a civil war that has lasted more than two decades. As much as both are responsible for the continued violence in Somalia, the current situation in the state is best attributed to the weak central state and failures in efforts to rebuild. To bring an end to the violence, the Somali state must be rebuilt: the society must demilitarize, the

66   Mary Harper, "Somalia's Rocky Road to Democracy," *BBC World Service News*, October 19, 2016, , accessed March 30, 2017.

67   Ibid.

68   Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 96.

69   African Union, 2017.

70   Harper, "Somali Leaders Back New Constitution."

71   Marcin Buzanski, "Turning Somalia Around," *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Fall 2015, 93.

72   Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society,"630.

profits actors make from violence must be addressed, and, finally, a process of national reconciliation must take place to heal wounds created by a century of clan competition. Somalis once enjoyed a peaceful and prosperous way of life, and there is much work to be done before they may again.

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Smoke and Mirrors:
The use of Canadian National Branding in International Trade Policy

Christopher Ciafro

Introduction

In 2013, Stephen Harper's conservative government tabled the *Global Markets Action Plan* (GMAP), which the media deemed to be a "historic shift in Canada's approach to the world."[1] The plan rested upon the premise that Canada has long stood as a trading nation. However, given the economic challenges created by the global recession of 2008-2009, Canadian foreign and trade policy would have to adapt to a now shaky and hesitant international market.[2] In response, the government saw the need to reform the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), updating its mandate to face the challenges of a globalized world.[3] Many analysts saw this as heresy, as Harper's seemingly trade-focused and realist approach to appeared as a betrayal of Canadian's foreign policy pillars. As one official put it, Harper's message to Canadian diplomats was "take off your tweed jacket, buy a business suit and land us a deal."[4] Thus, the election of Justin Trudeau in 2015 was hailed by many as a return to form for Canadian foreign policy. According to media pundits, Canada under Trudeau has reasserted its commitments to multilateralism.[5]

However, on issues of free trade and economic diplomacy, Harper and Trudeau differ largely in style rather than substance. For example, the Trudeau government saw through the arms deal with Saudi Arabia initially negotiated by the Harper administration.[6] Nonetheless, the Trudeau government's tone on foreign policy has stood in stark contrast with its predecessor, appearing more open to cooperation and multilateralism. I will argue that Canadian foreign policy has largely focused on issues of international trade, which will be demonstrated by analyzing the foreign policies of four Canadian Prime Ministers since the signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.

Moreover, I will show that Canadian foreign policy has been focused on trade-related issues since the premiership of Jean Chrétien, a trend inherited by his successor, Paul Martin as well as Harper. Where Harper differed, however, was in his willingness to employ public diplomacy as a foreign relations tool. However, Harper's government doubted the effectiveness of public diplomacy. It will be argued that it is this change that has informed much of the media's criticism of Harper's foreign policy. The primary difference between Harper and Trudeau's approaches to foreign policy stem from their willingness to employ public diplomacy as a political tool.

Defining Public Diplomacy: Origins and Dynamics in a Canadian Context

The term "public diplomacy" was coined in the 1970s by American diplomats. This was to replace the term previously used for the practice, "propaganda", which was often negatively perceived.[7] Public diplomacy is defined as the way in which government officials "influence public or elite opinion of another nation for the purpose of turning the policy of the target nation

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1 Christopher Pike, "Tories' new foreign-affairs vision shifts focus to 'economic diplomacy'," The Globe and Mail, March 25, 2017, accessed October 21, 2017, https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tories-new-foreign-affairs-vision-shifts-focus-to-economic-diplomacy/article15624653/?ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theglobeandmail.com&.

2 *Global Markets Action Plan* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 2013), 6.

3 Ibid., 11.

4 Christopher Pike, "Tories' new foreign-affairs vision shifts focus to 'economic diplomacy'".

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6 Dario Balca, "Canada's arms deal with Saudi Arabia: What to know," CTVNews, April 13, 2016, accessed October 11, 2017, http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-s-arms-deal-with-saudi-arabia-what-to-know-1.2858230.

7 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 2008): 275, doi:10.1177/0002716207311723.

to advantage."[8] In achieving this, diplomats allow themselves the ability to "set public agendas, influence discourse in civil society and build consent" in foreign states.[9]

Although public diplomacy traces its origins to the 20th century, globalization has increased its importance. Prior to globalization, states and state actors were the primary vehicles and targets of diplomacy. Diplomats depended on these actors and were limited in the communication technologies available to them.[10] Globalization, however, has blurred the role of the state. What was once considered the sole purview of the state has now been delegated to private organizations or international organizations.[11] Furthermore, with globalization reducing the importance of borders, diplomacy is no longer limited to the relationship between foreign service officers and government representatives. Rather, civil society becomes a target for foreign influence.[12] Furthermore, the globalization of media creates a world where information is abundant. Therefore, public diplomacy is not so much about spreading information as it is about competing with other states for attention in a crowded public and media space.[13]

In practice, public diplomats engage with their audience and compete for this attention in three different time frames, which are all employed by Canadian public diplomats. Long-term engagement is understood as diplomats building relationships with contacts, solidifying these linkages over time.[14] Extended engagement sponsors goodwill, and allows diplomats to rely on long-standing connections at critical moments.[15] Second, public diplomats engage with intended audiences in "medium-range campaigns on high-value policies".[16] For example, the Canadian government had diplomats lobbying local politicians and civil society groups to support a new Windsor-Detroit bridge.[17] The border crossing between these two cites is one of the most economically valuable projects for Canada-US trade, with 25% of all binational trade crossing the bridge.[18] When the existence of the project was threatened by a public referendum in Michigan, Canadian outreach increased.[19] This resulted in several public consultations, as well as then-Consul General Roy Norton appearing in popular American media.[20] These efforts to sway public opinion were successful, and the Canadian bridge project is currently underway.

The final time frame under which public diplomacy operates is consistent day-to-day media outreach,[21] a

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8 Evan Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy," *International Journal* 58, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 46, doi:10.2307/40203812.

9 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," 276.

10 Ibid., 282.

11 Ibid., 283.

12 Ibid., 284.

13 Ibid., 283.

14 Ibid., 276.

15 Evan Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy," 46.

16 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," 276.

17 Bloomberg News, "Canada's latest Keystone headache - a spat with diplomats that could hurt lobbying efforts," Financial Post, April 25, 2013, accessed November 4, 2017, http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/keystone-xl-lobbying.

18 Mary Baxter, "Ambassador Bridge transformed Canada-U.S. trade - constructconnect.com," Daily Commercial News, December 04, 2017, accessed March 09, 2018, https://canada.constructconnect.com/dcn/news/projects/2017/03/ambassador-bridge-transformed-canada-us-trade-1022558w.

19 Luiza Savage, "Canada's battle for a new cross-border bridge," Macleans.ca, May 25, 2015, accessed November 20, 2017, http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/land-of-the-freeloaders-the-battle-for-a-new-cross-border-bridge/

20 Ibid.

21 Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," 276.

front where Canada has historically struggled. Rarely registering in global media or in public consciousness, Canada has often struggled to strip the stereotype of being a resource-based economy.[22] This has changed since the start of Prime Minister Trudeau's tenure as he has become a public diplomat in his own right, acting in many ways as a symbol for Canada. For example, he has appeared in many American cultural publications – such as *Vogue,*[23] *Vox,*[24] and *BuzzFeed,*[25] thus promoting a positive image of Canada to those who may not be close followers of current events.

Public diplomacy is an important tool for any state, but it is particularly important for Canada. With a limited ability to project hard power, coupled with a relatively small internal market, the importance of Canada being well-perceived globally is heightened. Therefore, failure to capture public attention through effective public diplomacy can lead to states losing their "informational edge". This leads to states fading from public consciousness, and therefore losing out on crucial economic opportunities.[26] More so, cultivating a strong national brand can serve as a competitive advantage in saturated global markets.[27] Therefore, effective public diplomacy and the importance of cultivating

a good international persona is necessary to attract foreign investment, to export goods and services, and to attract skilled new immigrants.[28] Thus, strong public diplomacy and international branding is "not a luxury but an obligation."[29] Public diplomacy is used as a tool to promote Canada's economic interests. Furthermore, globalization, and the subsequent reliance on global markets have made foreign policy inseparable from economic concerns.[30] Canadian business and trade promotion is one of the most important facets of the nation's public diplomacy.[31] Continued outreach in key markets is essential, as it maintains Canada's image as an attractive destination to do business.[32]

However, although public diplomacy is effective as a foreign policy tool, some scholars have pointed to the difficulty of reconciling a nation's international personal and domestic perceptions.[33] For example, some have noted that Canada has been "coasting" on its good international reputation. In the words of one Canadian diplomat, "liberal internationalism, honest brokerage, environmental activism, [and] generous aid giving" have been enshrined in the rhetoric of Canadian foreign policy, with little grounding in reality.[34] Nonetheless, this narrative has been an effective tool

22 Evan Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy," 57.

23 John Powers, "Justin Trudeau Is the New Young Face of Canadian Politics," Vogue, December 9, 2015, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.vogue.com/article/justin-trudeau-prime-minister-canada.

24 Liz Plank, "Prime Minister Trudeau talks politics, fatherhood, and feminism with Vox," Vox, March 25, 2016, accessed November 10, 2017, https://www.vox.com/2016/3/25/11304336/justin-trudeau-canada-feminism-fatherhood.

25 BuzzFeedVideo, YouTube, September 20, 2016, accessed November 16, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LjVuv4p-TJM.

26 Evan H. Potter, "Introduction: Canada's Warm but Fuzzy International Image," in *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy*, ed. Evan H. Potter (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008), 3.

27 Jason Bouzanis, "The Economic Face of Public Diplomacy: International Business Promotion and Tourism," in *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy*, ed. Evan H. Potter (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008), 174.

28 Evan H. Potter, "Introduction: Canada's Warm but Fuzzy International Image," 6.

29 Ibid., 8.

30 Bouzanis, "The Economic Face of Public Diplomacy," 177.

31 Ibid., 174.

32 Ibid., 185.

33 Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March 2008): 58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097994.

34 Potter, "Canada's Warm but Fuzzy International Image," 15.

for Canadian public diplomacy, branding Canada as an inclusive and welcoming society.[35] Thus, while many aspects of Canada's national brand are based on myths, these stories have been useful tools for public diplomacy, and therefore, economic benefit.

Public diplomacy is an essential soft power tool for nations like Canada to advance their interests. Successful use of public diplomacy allows states to influence the opinions of elites or the public within a nation, leading to more favourable policies within the target nation. In the era of globalization, where trade is often the primary focus of foreign policy, public diplomacy is employed to advance the economic interests of nations. The following section will discuss how economics have intersected with Canadian public diplomacy since the premiership of Jean Chrétien. This will demonstrate that the concept of "economic diplomacy" in Canada originated not with Stephen Harper, but with his predecessors.

Origins of Canadian Economic Diplomacy

Canada's focus on foreign trade policy is not a new phenomenon. According to scholar Jason Bouzanis, Canada's emphasis on economic diplomacy traces its origins to the end of the Cold War. Thus, the end of geopolitical competition over ideology paved the way for geoeconomic competition. The end of the Western ideological bloc allowed for increased economic competition between capitalist democracies. This increased the importance of Canadian public diplomacy and international branding.[36] The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

further solidified Canada's place in, and reliance on, global economic markets.[37]

Canadian foreign policy has since largely focused on issues of trade, with public diplomacy used strategically to support an economic realist and self-interested foreign policy. For example, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canadian foreign policy was guided by the 1995 white paper, *Canada in the World.* This policy paper set business development and trade promotion as the primary agenda of Foreign Affairs Canada.[38] Thus, during the Chrétien era, public diplomacy was used largely to promote Canada as an attractive business destination.[39] As Prime Minister, Chrétien showed little interest in foreign policy concerns other than those that directly impacted Canada's economy. Although he would rhetorically support Canada's international commitments, Chrétien's primary concern was always trade promotion.[40]

Chrétien demonstrated his preference for trade over other aspects of foreign policy in cabinet appointments. Initially, Chrétien had selected André Ouellet as his Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, despite Ouellet's appointment as Foreign Minister, he spent most of his time on domestic concerns, campaigning for the "no" side during Quebec's 1995 independence referendum. Thus, by having his Foreign Minister focus largely on domestic issues, Chrétien "reinforced the view that the most significant foreign policy post, in the Prime Minister's view, was Trade".[41] More so, despite running on a platform where he promised to renegotiate NAFTA, Chrétien's chose Roy MacLaren, a strong advocate for free trade, as Minister

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35 Ibid.

36 Bouzanis, "The Economic Face of Public Diplomacy," 178-179.

37 Ibid., 179.

38 Ibid., 179.

39 Ibid., 192.

40 Tom Keating, "A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy," in *The Chrétien Legacy*, ed. Louis Harder and Steve Patten (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 124-125.

41 Ibid., 128.

of International Trade, this demonstrating a clear reneging on this promise. Chrétien ensured that the Canadian government would continue to fall in line with global trends towards trade liberalization.[42]

Chrétien did not shy away from the use of public diplomacy to promote Canadian interests abroad. Throughout his time as Prime Minister, cultural and educational exchange programs, described as "traditional tools of public diplomacy" were used as means to promote Canada as a valuable trading partner.[43] In 1995, the Chrétien government launched a series of trade missions known as *Team Canada*. The team was led by Chrétien, who was joined by several provincial premiers and prominent Canadian business people.[44] Public diplomacy was employed throughout the Chrétien era to promote trade and business development.

Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chrétien in 2003, briefly serving as Prime Minister until 2006. Martin, however, initially adopted a different approach to economic diplomacy than his predecessor. In his first month in office, Martin sought to create a new Department of International Trade, that would act independently from the Department of Foreign Affairs. This move was criticized and the bill that would have enacted the division of the two departments was voted down in 2005.[45] According to author Louis Bélanger, Martin's proposal was voted down because in a globalized world, trade and foreign policy are inseparable.[46]

Bélanger argues that there are two models on which nations organize their international trade policy: the *Low Politics Model*, where trade policy is technocratic, and executed by bureaucrats, and the *High Politics Model*, which describes foreign policy as politicized, and therefore defended by elected politicians on the international stage. Bélanger argues that the *Low Politics Model* is incompatible with a globalized trading system, as multilateral trade agreements often affect the domestic regulatory systems of states.[47] Thus, Martin's proposal to separate the two departments was a move towards the *Low Politics Model* of foreign policy, and would limit Canada's ability to engage in public diplomacy.[48] Parliament voting against Martin demonstrated how intertwined the two fields were.

In 2005, the Martin Government released the *International Policy Statement* (IPS), a revision of Chrétien's *Canada in the World*. The IPS prescribed active promotion of Canadian interests abroad as a means of "ensuring the prosperity and security of Canadians."[49] Furthermore, the IPS underlined the necessity of promoting Canada's economic security, charging diplomats with the responsibility of advertising Canada as "an attractive gateway" to the North American market.[50] Therefore, according to authors Leuprecht and Hataley, the foreign policy goals of Martin's government post-2005 remained aligned with those of Chrétien's.[51] Martin's foreign policy would also espouse economic diplomacy as key to Canada's interests.

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42 Ibid., 134.

43 Bouzanis, "The Economic Face of Public Diplomacy," 192.

44 Keating, "A Passive Internationalist: Jean Chrétien and Canadian Foreign Policy," 134.

45 Louis Bélanger, "Trade, Commerce, or Diplomacy? Canada and the New Politics of International Trade," in Canada Among Nations, 2005, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 225.

46 Ibid., 226.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 227.

49 Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, "Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy?" in The World in Canada, ed. David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 127.

50 Ibid., 132.

51 Ibid., 127.

During Martin's tenure as Prime Minister, foreign aid was also used to promote Canadian economic interests, deviating from the perceived norm that Canadian foreign assistance had largely been an altruistic endeavor.[52] For example, between the years of 2003-2004, the largest recipients of Canadian development assistance were Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. These nations were far from substantial Canadian trading partners. Rather, Canadian foreign aid to these countries spiked at the same time as the United States was increasing its contributions to those states.[53] Thus, the authors argue that Canada matching its aid contributions with those of the United States "[enhanced] Canada's economic security by playing strongly to the foreign-aid priorities of its largest trading partner".[54] Moreover, Canada gave the impression that its interest were aligned with those of its Southern neighbor despite the fact that Martin and then-President George Bush often differed greatly on issues of foreign policy.[55] Rather, foreign aid was used as part of a "larger strategy in maintaining economic ties with the United States."[56] Therefore, foreign aid was used as a public diplomacy tool, promoting Canada as a reliable ally in order to reinforce Canada's trade relations with the United States.

This section has demonstrated how the governments of Martin and Chrétien employed public diplomacy, regularly using it as a tool to enhance Canadian international trade and business. Although the Martin government showed some initial resistance to this trend, by the time the IPS was released, the government had fully embraced economic diplomacy. Furthermore, in

using foreign aid to bolster economic relations with the United States, the Martin government violated the long-held Canadian narrative that Canadian actions abroad were fundamentally altruistic. Therefore, economic diplomacy has been the focus of Canadian foreign policy since the turn of the 21st century, and public diplomacy its primary promotion tool.

The Case of Harper: Economic Diplomacy and Failed Public Diplomacy

Given that economic diplomacy has been the *status quo* since at least Jean Chrétien's time in office, it seems unlikely that Harper's approach to foreign policy was cause for a "historic shift" in Canada's relations with the world.[57] Nonetheless, media critics have often accused Harper's foreign policy of being fundamentally un-Canadian. However, many of these critiques have relied on stereotypes. For example, one author described Canada's international image before Harper as "responsible, earnest, if somewhat boring" and as a "global Boy Scout, reliably providing moral leadership".[58] However, as shown above, Canada's foreign policy has been economically self-interested as any other nation. This therefore begs the question, as to why Harper's foreign policy was held to such scrutiny.

During Harper's time in office, Canadian diplomacy adopted a conservative tone. This reflected the values of the Conservative party at the time, which had been born out of the neo-conservatism of the 1980s.[59] For example, Harper's government increased military

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52   Ibid., 134.

53   Ibid., 135.

54   Ibid., 140.

55   Ibid., 139-140.

56   Ibid. 140.

57   Christopher Pike, "Tories' new foreign-affairs vision shifts focus to 'economic diplomacy'".

58   Andrew Nikiforuk, "Opening Gambit: Oh, Canada," *Foreign Policy*, no. 201 (July & aug. 2013): 18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24575959.

59   Jordan Michael Smith , "Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper's Conservative Revolution," *World Affairs* 174, no. 6 (March & april 2012): 26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23210457.

spending to levels unseen since the Second World War.[60] Harper also showed disdain for multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN). This was seen as uncharacteristic of a Canadian government, as the country had historically thrived in these settings. With strong rules and norms, institutions allowed middle powers like Canada to project influence without the hard power to back it up.[61] Harper also adopted a firm pro-Israel stance, whereas the traditional position of the Canadian government had been staunch neutrality.[62]

Harper's government was openly focused on economic diplomacy. In 2013, the government released the GMAP, a new set of principles that would guide Canada's foreign strategy. In the words of then-International Trade Minister Ed Fast, the GMAP would "ensure that all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada are harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors."[63] Thus, throughout his time in office, Harper's government would negotiate several trade deals, such as the one with Peru in 2009, followed by the ones with Columbia, Panama, and Honduras throughout the 2010s. Trade talks were also initiated with several other Latin American countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Outside of Latin America, the Conservative government engaged with the Dominican Republic, Caribbean Community, Turkey, the Philippines, and Thailand.[64] Furthermore,

one of the crowning achievements of Harper's economic diplomacy was the agreement in principle with the European Union, which would eventually lead to the creation of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).[65]

During Harper's time in government, conservative values came dominate several aspects of Canadian foreign policy; however, on issues of economic diplomacy, Harper differed little from his predecessors. [66] This is echoed by McKercher and Sarson, who argue that the critique that Harper was overly focused on economic diplomacy "could be levelled against previous liberal governments" while the previous liberal governments, unlike Harper's, undertook "a variety of diplomatic initiatives" to promote Canada abroad.[67] Therefore, despite promoting a foreign policy based on trade and business promotion, the Harper government failed to see the value in public diplomacy.

Thus, public diplomacy played a limited role in the foreign policy of the Harper era. In fact, the government at the time actively opposed outreach activities.[68] This was exacerbated by the fact that diplomats were restricted in the scope of their messaging, as Ottawa exerted direct control on all government communications. This limited the ability of foreign representatives to engage in public outreach.[69] Moreover, budget cuts to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade often targeted foreign

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60   Ibid., 22.

61   Ibid., 23-24.

62   Ibid., 24-25.

63   Asa Mckercher and Leah Sarson, "Dollars and sense? The Harper government, economic diplomacy, and Canadian foreign policy," International Journal: Canadas Journal of Global Policy Analysis 71, no. 3 (2016): 352, doi:10.1177/0020702016662794.

64   Ibid., 356.

65   Ibid.

66   Bouzanis, "The Economic Face of Public Diplomacy," 178-179.

67   Mckercher and Sarson, "Dollars and sense?", 369.

68   Adam Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 149, doi:10.1177/002070201206700110.

69   Haroon Siddiqui, "Prime Minister Harper muzzles diplomats and foreign agencies," The Toronto Star, April 07, 2012, accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/04/07/prime_minister_harper_muzzles_diplomats_and_foreign_agencies.html.

missions' ability to engage in public diplomacy.[70] Furthermore, the emphasis on trade often shifted the power within missions away from political officers, charged with public relations, to trade commissioners.[71] According to Chapnick, part of the Conservatives' opposition to public diplomacy had to do with the fact that its benefits were not apparent, whereas the initial costs were easily quantifiable. As it failed to produce tangible results immediately, Harper's government saw little use in public diplomacy.[72]

Therefore, it is true that several aspects of Stephen Harper's foreign policy were unprecedented, but economic approach to foreign policy followed in the steps of his predecessors. More so, economic diplomacy has been the primary focus of Canadian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, a more accurate critique of Harper's foreign policy would be his government's inability to see the value of public diplomacy. As discussed in the theory section, public diplomacy is necessary in a globalized economy for states to be noticed in a crowded market. In limiting the ability of the foreign service to properly conduct outreach, Harper cut his government off from one of the most effective tools of economic diplomacy.

The Case of Trudeau: Public Diplomacy and NAFTA Outreach

Public and Economic Diplomacy in the Trudeau Era

Like his three predecessors, Justin Trudeau's government has also focused heavily on economic diplomacy. In a speech to the House of Commons on June 6th, 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland outlined Canada's foreign policy priorities. In this speech, she echoed the rhetoric of the Harper's GMAP, emphasizing the importance of multilateral trade and reemphasizing Canada's place in the world as "a trading nation".[73] Thus, in many respects, Trudeau picked up from where Harper left off. In October 2016, the Trudeau government finalized the CETA trade agreement.[74] Trudeau also followed through on some of the more controversial aspects of Harper's trade-only approach to foreign policy. The Trudeau government signed-off on a 15-billion-dollar arms deal with Saudi Arabia, initially negotiated during by the Conservatives.[75]

However, since the election of President Donald Trump, the renegotiation of NAFTA has been the top priority of Canada's economic diplomacy. Triggered by Trump's anti-free trade agenda, negotiations to modernize NAFTA began on August 16th, 2017. A second round of negotiations occurred in Mexico

70   Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11," 149.

71   Mckercher and Sarson, "Dollars and sense?", 355.

72   Chapnick, "A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11," 149-150.

73   Global Affairs Canada, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities," Canada.ca, June 12, 2017, accessed November 2, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.

74   Mike Blanchfield, "CETA: Canada-EU trade deal signed by Justin Trudeau, EU officials," Global News, October 30, 2016, accessed November 2, 2017, https://globalnews.ca/news/3034212/ceta-justin-trudeau-lands-in-belgium-to-sign-canada-eu-trade-deal/.

75   Mckercher and Sarson, "Dollars and sense?", 369.

City in early September.[76] Negotiations have since proceeded at a "hectic pace" with Canada attempting assert its interests while keeping NAFTA afloat. Furthermore, Trump's vision for NAFTA has proven divisive, with some American negotiators "seemingly uncomfortable with the demands they are presenting."[77] This division is reflected in the general American population. A recent Pew Research Center study showed that 56 percent of Americans believe NAFTA is good for the United States.[78] Tapping into this division, the Trudeau government launched a public relations campaign within the United States to promote the importance of NAFTA. In one of his first acts as Prime Minister, Trudeau loosened Ottawa's controls over diplomats. This allowed for Canadian foreign missions to engage more actively in public diplomacy again.[79] Thus, although aligned with his predecessor's government in his approach to economic diplomacy, Trudeau contrasts with Harper by re-introducing public diplomacy as a tool to advance Canadian interests abroad.

Thus, throughout the summer of 2017, Canada attempted to brand itself in the United States prior to the start of NAFTA negotiations. Throughout this process, the Canadian government relied heavily on its consular network across the United States to organize Ministers' visits, as several Canadian Ministers visited key states across America in anticipation of NAFTA negotiations in an attempt to influence public opinion on NAFTA. These Canadian officials met with political and business leaders in different US states, in an attempt to sway public opinion surrounding NAFTA. By targeting local governments, the federal government sought to side-step the Trump administration. It has since been revealed that the Trudeau government hopes that through its local outreach, Canadian officials will meet with every member of Congress, and every state governor.[80] Thus, Canada has operationalized public diplomacy.

The first Minister to visit the United States during the summer of 2017 was Navdeep Bains, Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development. During his visit to Los Angeles, the Minister met with his counterpart in the American cabinet, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross. According to an official government press release, the Minister spent his meeting with Ross discussing the economic benefits derived from the integration of the Canadian and American markets. Bains emphasized that 9 million American jobs rely on Canadian trade and investment. Bains stated that Canada is the United States' biggest customer, buying more from American businesses than any other state. Finally, Bains advocated Canada's view that "the thickening of the border would have a negative impact on jobs in both countries."[81] Similar talking points would be echoed by all Ministers that subsequently visited the United States, indicating the degree that the Trudeau administration had planned

76   David Alire and Michael O'Boyle, "NAFTA negotiations: Timeline of rocky negotiations of the world's largest free trade area," Global News, September 01, 2017, accessed November 17, 2017, https://globalnews.ca/news/3713116/nafta-negotiations-timeline/.

77   Katie Simpson, "NAFTA rounds to last longer, plans in the works to negotiate past new year deadline, source says," CBCnews, October 17, 2017, accessed November 1, 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-talks-stretch-into-2018-1.4357474.

78   Alec Tyson, "Americans generally positive about NAFTA, but most Republicans say it benefits Mexico more than U.S.," Pew Research Center, November 13, 2017, accessed November 15, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/13/americans-generally-positive-about-nafta-but-most-republicans-say-it-benefits-mexico-more-than-u-s/.

79   Mike Blanchfield, "Trudeau tells Canadian diplomats he relies on their judgment," *The Toronto Star*, November 05, 2015, accessed October 11, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/11/05/trudeau-tells-canadian-diplomats-he-relies-on-their-judgment.html.

80   Katie Simpson, "Liberals to step up D.C. charm offensive in September after start of NAFTA talks," CBC News, August 03, 2017, , accessed March 10, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-nafta-washington-us-trade-renegotiations-1.4232349.

81   Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, "Canada's Innovation Minister holds first face-to-face meeting with U.S. Commerce Secretary," Canada.ca, May 02, 2017, accessed November 7, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2017/05/canada_s_innovationministerholdsfirstface-to-facemeetingwithusco.html.

its outreach activities. For example, Kirsty Duncan, Minister of Science, visited Washington D.C. shortly after Bains' visit. In a speech to the United States National Academy of Sciences, the Minister was clear to emphasize the importance of international cooperation in the sciences between the United States and Canada.[82] Therefore, although the minister spoke about scientific cooperation, her argument was similar to Bain's. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, academic and cultural exchanges are a way of conducting public diplomacy.

Other Ministers would follow in Bains's footsteps. In May, Bardish Chagger, Minister of Small Business and Tourism, visited Toledo and Chicago. During her visit to Toledo, Ohio, the Minister met with the Mayor of the city and several local business elites. [83] Chagger also gave an interview to the local newspaper, *The Toledo Blade.* During her interview, the Minister argued that the economies of Canada and the United States are inseparable: "If you talk about Canada, you're talking about America as well."[84] In Chicago, the minister met with the Deputy Governor of Illinois and the Mayor of Chicago. She also appeared on two radio shows in the city, where she continued to promote the importance of Canada-US trade.[85]

Appealing to the local press of wherever they visited was another common strategy employed by Canadian Ministers. In his visit to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

Transport Minister Marc Garneau's meeting with the mayor of the city was covered by *the New York Times* (NYT). The article provided good press for Canada, where the NYT stated that "Canada [...] has an opportunity provide significant leadership" on issues of trade and climate change.[86] Furthermore, Minister of International Trade Philippe Champagne would also receive extensive press coverage throughout his visit to Cincinnati, Ohio, being following by a journalist from *Reuters* throughout his day there.[87] The Minister also received coverage in several sport publications, after meeting with Joey Votto, the star player of Cincinnati's local baseball team and a Canadian expatriate.[88] In making appearances in the local media, Ministers in effect attempted to sway public opinion on free trade and thus practiced public diplomacy.

Therefore, the visits described above were an effective use of public diplomacy. As been discussed, the goal of public diplomacy is to influence both elite and public opinion. Thus, the whole of civil society can serve as a target for nations wishing to promote themselves. In meeting with key politicians and business leaders, the government has sought to influence elite opinion on NAFTA, and hopefully affect change on the political level. More so, by being covered by popular media sources, Canada has sought to influence public opinion, and brand itself as a valuable trading partner. Finally, the government's outreach throughout the

82   Chris Armes, "A whirlwind tour of Washington D.C.," Queen's Gazette, May 5, 2017, accessed November 8, 2017, http://www.queensu.ca/gazette/stories/whirlwind-tour-washington-dc.

83   Tyrel Linkhorn, "Key Canada official touts Ohio trade in Toledo," The Blade, May 22, 2017, accessed November 10, 2017, http://www.toledoblade.com/Economy/2017/05/23/Key-Canada-official-touts-Ohio-trade-talks-NAFTA-in-Toledo.html.

84   Ibid.

85   Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, "Minister Chagger concludes successful visit to the United States," Canada.ca, May 23, 2017, , accessed November 10, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2017/05/minister_chaggerconcludessuccessfulvisittotheunitedstates.html?wbdisable=true.

86   Ian Austen, "Canada's Strategy on Climate Change: Work With American States," The New York Times, June 07, 2017, accessed November 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/canada/canadas-strategy-on-climate-change-work-with-american-states.html.

87   David Ljunggren, "'Hammer, hammer, hammer': Canada lobbies U.S. before NAFTA talks," Reuters, June 29, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-canada-outreach/hammer-hammer-hammer-canada-lobbies-u-s-before-nafta-talks-idUSKBN19K0GE

88   AP, "Wood stays unbeaten, Dodgers beat Reds again 3-1 (Jun 16, 2017)," FOX Sports, June 16, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/wood-stays-unbeaten-dodgers-beat-reds-again-3-1-061617.

summer demonstrated how economic diplomacy and public diplomacy are linked, with the former being used as a tool to promote Canada's economic interests in the United States.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that economic diplomacy has been a key part of Canada's foreign policy agenda since the turn of the century. With geopolitical tensions making way for economic tensions, governments had to find a way to make their voices heard in ever-expanding global markets. Public diplomacy was used by Jean Chrétien's government to promote Canada as a valuable trading partner. Paul Martin followed in Chrétien's footsteps, and also adopted an economic approach to Canada's foreign policy. More so, Martin coopted Canada's foreign aid program and used it as a branding tool to improve relations with the United States. Under Harper's administration, however, economic diplomacy became the only concern of Canada's foreign policy. Cuts to public diplomacy programs, coupled with a conservative approach to international relations, led to many in the mass media becoming critical of Harper's foreign policy. However, seeing few benefits to its use, the Harper government restricted the ability of foreign missions to employ public diplomacy. Trudeau's foreign policy has also largely focused on matters of trade and commerce, largely picking up from where Harper left off. Rhetorically, however, the two leaders' approaches have been in stark contrast. Moreover, Trudeau lifted the Harper-era restrictions on foreign missions, allowing for public diplomacy to flourish again. This has been demonstrated by Canada's outreach in the United States, during the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. Each Minister that visited preached a similar message to the business and political elites they would meet. This, along with positive local press coverage, has been in an effort to sway public opinion on NAFTA, with the end goal of enacting political change.

In analyzing the foreign policies of Chrétien,

Martin, Harper, and Trudeau, it has become clear that economic diplomacy has become the primary concern of Canadian international relations. Although restricted during the Harper administration, public diplomacy has been used to varying degrees to promote and brand Canada internationally. Thus, the two concepts are interlinked, with public diplomacy being used as a tool to further Canada's economic diplomacy goals. In maintaining a stable international reputation, Canadian politicians seek to ensure the economic stability of their nation for years to come.

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Self-Determination vs. State Sovereignty: The Struggle for an Independent Kurdistan

Andrea Gyimah

Introduction

One of the fundamental principles of international law is the concept of territorial integrity, which is a *jus cogens* principle, meaning that it is immutable and universally respected.[1] However, the competing right of self-determination has increasingly become popular in the last century, leading to successful anticolonial revolutions in Africa and Asia.[2] Often, the struggle for independence has led to civil wars, where the central government committed crimes under the guise of "defending the country's territorial integrity".[3] Kurdish people have a distinct language, culture, traditions, and a shared history different from Iraq's non-Kurdish peoples.[4] This sense of 'otherness' has politicized their identity; Kurds are faced with the prospect of assimilating into mainstream society in order to find success, thus giving up their distinct identity.[5]

Moreover, the otherization of Kurds has led to class conflict within Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, as they have little representation in the political, economic, and military institutions of these states.[6] The Kurds' sense of discontentment has led to burgeoning Kurdish nationalist movements in the region, which have faced mitigated success. However, Iraq Kurds enjoy regional autonomy in the northern part of the state.[7] Historically, Kurdish nationalists were a symbol of Iraqi strength and stability in times of weak central governments. However, lack of international support and the legacy of civil war in Kurdistan imply that the prospects of a successful independent state are dim.

Historical Factors of Nationalism

The factors leading to the modern-day Kurdish nationalist movement originate in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was made between the United Kingdom (UK) and France to establish separate spheres of influence in the "Asia minor" where modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq now exist.[8] This agreement failed to take into account that the Ottoman policy of autonomy and self-governance for the empire's many religious groups had led to a burgeoning Kurdish nationalist movement. Kurdish nationalism did not accommodate other nationalisms, such as Turkish or Arab and Iraqi nationalism, as these majority groups were not part of the Kurdish "imagined community"; Kurds saw themselves as Kurds above any other forms of identification.[9] Moreover, centuries of separation between different national Kurdish groups led to large differences in religion, language, and culture within the group. Thus, the trajectories of "Kurdish nationalism" within different states has varied.

Meanwhile, other nationalist movements, such as the Young Turks, promoted a pan-Turk ideology which led minority groups, such as the Kurds, to feeling excluded from the wider community.[10] The Treaty of Sèvres

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1 Abdelhamid El Ouali, *Territorial integrity in a globalizing world: International law and states' quest for survival* (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 5.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 David Romano, *The Kurdish nationalist movement: Opportunity, mobilization, and identity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

5 Ibid., 10.

6 Ibid., 11.

7 Denise Natali, "The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 6 (2007): 1111.

8 Ofra Bengio, *Kurdish awakening: Nation building in a fragmented homeland* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2014), 16.

9 Ibid.

10 Ofra Bengio, *Kurdish awakening: Nation building in a fragmented homeland*, 17.

was meant to remedy this by creating an independent Kurdish state.[11] Ataturk, foreseeing Turkey's potential territorial losses upon the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, started and won the Turkish War of Independence to prevent this loss.[12] One of the provisions for this victory was returning Kurdistan's proposed territory to Turkey.[13]

Tensions in Iraq over the Arab hegemony of the new Iraqi state led to conflict between the UK and Iraqi Kurds, resulting in the establishment of a short-lived Kingdom of Kurdistan, which existed without international recognition from 1922-1924.[14] In 1932, Britain granted Iraqi independence and the newly formed country was invited to join the League of Nations under the condition that they recognize the civil and political rights of Kurds.[15] Under King Faisal, religious and language rights granted by Britain were half-heartedly respected. His death in 1933 led to new hope for Iraqi Kurds and their rights in the Iraq.[16]

However, subsequent Iraqi governments continued to persecute Iraqi Kurds, leading to anger and discontent, which fuelled early Kurdish nationalism. After the overthrow of the Hashemite regime by General Qasim in 1958, many Kurds believed that the "new" Iraq would bring about an era of better Arab-Kurd relations. However, tensions quickly began to rise again due to the Iraqi army's unwillingness to legitimately recognize Kurdish authority and due to divisions between the

Kurdish people over support of the new government.[17] Some believed that the limited autonomy and goodwill offered by the government was good, while others – including Mahmud Barzani and his party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, who had just returned from a decade in exile – opposed the government.[18] These early divisions in Kurdish nationalism would come to create a divide between moderates and extremists.

During the Ba'ath regime, tensions continued to escalate as Saddam Hussein passed a multitude of laws giving Kurdish Iraqis autonomy without providing legitimate benefits. A Barzani-proposed mandate signed in March 1970 was supposed to cement Kurdish involvement in Iraqi government as well as establish the Kurdish language as one of the national languages of Iraq.[19] These promises were also present in 1974's Autonomy Law, which was seeked to establish Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.[20] However, this 'autonomy' was circumvented by a series of laws and restrictions. Furthermore, the so-called autonomous Kurdish region only encompassed half of Iraq's actual Kurdish regions.[21]

During this time, Kurdistan's former ally, the Soviet Union, established diplomatic relations with Iraq, leading Iraqi Kurds to turn to Iran and the United States for support. This backfired in 1975 when Iran withdrew support for the Kurds after negotiating a ceasefire on their behalf.[22] In retaliation, the Iraqi

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11   Kerim Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq: The past, present and future* (London: Pluto, 2007), 11.

12   Ibid., 12.

13   Ibid.

14   Ibid., 13.

15   Ibid., 14.

16   Ibid.

17   Ibid., 17.

18   Ibid.

19   Ibid., 19-20.

20   Ibid.

21   Ibid., 22.

22   Ibid., 23

government massacred thousands of peshmergas and civilians, and destroyed over 1500 Kurdish villages.[23] In addition, Arabs had now outnumbered Kurds in formerly Kurd-majority areas. This led to a transitional period in the Kurdish nationalist movement, as the retirement and death of Barzani led to a power vacuum in the Kurdish political system.[24] His son, Massoud, gained control of the KDP. However, a new political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, had also been established by Jalal Talabami in an effort to introduce left-wing politics to Iraqi Kurds.[25]

In another attack on Iraqi Kurds, Hussein began the 'al-anfal' campaign against Kurdish citizens by using chemical weapons on Kurdish villages. The majority of al-anfal campaigns were targeted at areas with mostly PUK supporters rather than KDP.[26] Thousands of Kurdish refugees escaped into neighbouring Iran and Turkey to avoid persecution and death. Even after he officially ended the campaign, Hussein continued to raze Kurdish villages and accuse Iraqi Kurds of 'collusion' with Iran.[27]

In recent history, the al-anfal genocide served as the watershed moment for Kurdish nationalism. First, it showed the international apathy towards the Kurdish plight. Only months after the al-anfal, the United States government approved a billion-dollar aid grant to Baghdad.[28] Kurdish nationalists saw that the global community was unwilling or unable to help in their plight and thus, to avoid extermination, they would have to fight for their own rights.[29] At this point, Kurdish and Arab ethnic identity had become highly politicized. Kurds in modern-day Iraq had a shared history, a shared struggle, and a shared oppressor; Arabs. This was compounded by Hussein's policy of Arabization in which Arab Iraqis moved into settlements formerly populated by Kurds.[30] This renewed form of Kurd nationalism lead to the Kurdish uprisings in 1991 that resulted in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government.[31]

In sum, the roots of Kurdish nationalism lie in the sense of distinctness and exclusion Kurds feel in their respective countries. This is compounded by government discrimination and violence towards Kurdish citizens. In some cases, the persecution Kurds face encourages them to believe that they will never be considered equal in an Arab society, and thus reaffirms the importance of a Kurdish state. The importance of 'territorial integrity' in international law means that Kurds have very little recourse.[32] The lack of international intervention on behalf of Iraqi Kurds also encourages a cultural framework of oppression among Kurds.[33] The Kurds view their autonomous region and government as a necessary means to their goal of an independent Kurdistan.

By analyzing the case of Iranian Kurds, the main cause of Kurdish nationalism is found; the feeling of shared persecution and distinctness. While there is a burgeoning Iranian-Kurdish national movement, the

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23   Ibid.

24   Ibid., 24.

25   Ibid., 24.

26   Ibid., 29-30.

27   Ibid.

28   David Romano, *The Kurdish nationalist movement: Opportunity, mobilization, and identity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 202.

29   Ibid., 202-204.

30   Ibid.

31   Ibid., 206-210.

32   Abdelhamid El Ouali, *Territorial integrity in a globalizing world: International law and states' quest for survival*, 216.

33   Ibid.

autonomy-based form of Kurdish nationalism seen in Iraq has failed.[34] This has largely been attributed to the differing Kurdish opinions; unlike in Iraq, Iranian Kurds no not have a cohesive imagined community.[35] This is, unlike in Iraq and Turkey where the Kurds served as a very distinct group from the majority Arabs or Turks, Iran has over six large ethnic groups – thus, processes like "Persianization" failed to take hold.[36] Furthermore, the Kurds have less political and social power in Iran as an ethnic group and have less leverage vis-à-vis the Iranian government; they focus on working with the Iranian government rather than against it, often promoting autonomy rather than total sovereignty.[37]

Kurdistan Regional Government – The Politics of Nationalism

Another very important factor for the success of current Iraqi Kurd nationalism is the international recognition garnered by the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, paving the way for a future Kurdish federation.[38] Iraqi Kurds took advantage of Iraq's instability during the Gulf War of 1991 to wage war on the central government. In the aftermath of al-anfal, tensions between Arab and Kurdish Iraqis remained high, particularly since Iraqi Kurds had received very little international aid outside of Iran and Turkey.[39] When Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, straining diplomatic relations with the United States, Kurds viewed this as an opportunity structure to regain "Arabized" Kurdish regions.[40] However, the international perception of the Kurds soon soured as they gained control of the oil-rich region of Kirkuk and the Iraqi government resumed their reign of terror against Kurdish citizens.[41] The United Nations Security Council passed *Resolution 688* to establish a "safe zone" for Kurdish Iraqis and to protect them from repression and persecution from the Iraqi government in the aftermath of the 1991 uprisings.[42] Kurdish nationalists seized on the resolution and established their own autonomous regional government (KRG), which first held "free and fair elections" in 1992 and established a PUK-KDP coalition.[43]

Despite this move towards autonomy, internal conflicts within the Kurdish political system soon led to tensions between PUK and KDP members. The Barzani/KDP supporting north was viewed as 'primitive' by the Talabani/PUK supporting south, who were in turn seen as 'unmanly' and 'arrogant'.[44] Partisan tensions between the two groups grew as the question of who "truly" controlled the government – and, thus, Iraqi Kurdistan – was raised despite the power-sharing agreement.[45] Small clashes burgeoned into a full-blown Kurdish civil war as the government disintegrated.

Early attempts at reintegration involved establishing KRG "bureaus" in New York and Brussels as well as easing UN sanctions on the Kurdish region of Iraq.

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34   David Romano, *The Kurdish nationalist movement: Opportunity, mobilization, and identity*, 223.

35   Ibid.

36   Ibid., 226.

37   Ibid., 238-241.

38   Michael Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq," *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 2(1996): 2

39   Mohammed Ahmed, *Iraqi Kurds and nation-building* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 7.

40   Ibid.

41   Ibid., 9.

42   United Nations Security Council resolution 688 (4 April 1991).

43   Mohammed Ahmed, *Iraqi Kurds and nation-building*, 225.

44   Michael Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq": 229.

45   Ibid., 230.

However, Turkey opposed this as it deemed this as essentially establishing an independent Kurdish state, as Iraqi Kurdistan would be treated differently from the rest of Iraq.[46] This would set a precedent for other Kurds, including the Turkish PKK, which was also engaged in clashes against the government. Attempts by the United States to mediate also largely failed. The conflict ended when the PKK-backed PUK attacked KDP forces. Turkey, who now had personal interest in the matter, renewed negotiations between the two parties.[47] While both PUK and KDP members claim to be working together in the wake of the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, this legacy of conflict and the factionalism within the peshmerga and the greater Kurdish community leaves doubts about the prospects of a future successful Kurdistan. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Civil War reflects the international interests of several countries, including Turkey, Iran, and the United States, and thus the possible domino effects of a free Iraqi Kurdistan.

Kurdistan and The Rise of ISIS

The next opportunity for Iraqi Kurd nationalism came with the American 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent instability, particularly as it pertains to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the months and years preceding the Iraq war, the American government funneled millions of dollars into anti-Saddam Hussein Iraqi groups; however, it was made clear that the greatest spoils for Iraqi Kurds would not be secession or sovereignty, but rather some autonomy within the single Iraqi homeland.[48] Within days of the invasion, peshmergas had recaptured Kirkuk and Mosul from the Iraqi army, leading to a general sense of celebration and optimism among Kurdish nationalists. Kurds began the process of 'de-Arabizing' these cities in a process that often involved looting and violence which was later denounced by Barzani.[49]

The capture of Kirkuk was of particular importance to Kurds because of its large oil reserves as well as central location in Iraq. When Iraqi Kurds briefly gained control of the city during the 1991 uprisings, the international community feared that access to the oil money would lead the way to a legitimate claim for sovereignty.[50] In addition, Kirkuk lays at the border of northern and central Iraq and is an economic/trade and military strategic stronghold for access to Iran, Turkey, and Arab Iraq.[51]

The instability in Iraq following 2003, compounded with the protests in neighbouring Arab countries in 2011, led to the emergence of ISIS as an influential actor in worldwide terrorism.[52] Since the American army retreat from Iraq in 2011, factionalism between Shia and Sunni caused tensions between the two groups as Sunnis were largely excluded from sources of political and economic power.[53] ISIS took advantage of the Iraqi army's failure at nation-building and offered Sunni Iraqis the opportunity to create a Sunni caliphate.[54]

Iraqi Kurds, although divided into Sunni and Shia and PUK and KDP, had a vested interest in stopping ISIS who, because of fears of an Sunni Arab-Iraqi hegemony and a sense of kinship with Syrian Kurds,

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46   Ibid., 234.

47   Ibid., 238.

48   Mohammed Ahmed, *Iraqi Kurds and nation-building*, 12.

49   Kerim Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq: The past, present and future*, 113.

50   Ibid., 204-206.

51   Ibid.

52   Charles Lister, *The Islamic State: a brief introduction* (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 12.

53   Ibid., 29-30.

54   Ibid.

were also battling ISIS as well as Assad's army in northern Syria.[55] In addition, ISIS forces penetrated Mosul and other oil-rich northern Iraqi cities.[56] This was particularly dangerous for Kurds because of the proximity to the Kurdistan autonomous region.[57]

In the wake of the Iraqi army's failure to maintain control of Mosul against the insurgents, the KRG organized peshmergas to defend Iraqi Kurdistan and expand the territory of the region by liberating northern Iraqi cities from ISIS.[58] This has led to a 40 percent increase in Kurd-held Iraq since 2014, increasing their power vis-à-vis a relatively weak Iraq.[59] Although the peshmergas are ostensibly allies with the Iraqi army against ISIS, peshmergas have used their reputation for military prowess to display to the international community their competence.[60] The United States, although opposed to ending Iraq's territorial integrity by directly supporting Kurdish sovereignty, have praised Kurds fighting in Iraq and Syria.[61] The successful fight against ISIS has given more momentum to Kurdish nationalists.

Kurdish nationalists hope to leverage their newfound importance in the international community to promote the idea of an independent Kurdish state. Iraqi Kurds are proud that Kurdish peshmergas succeeded where the Iraqi army failed; this can serve as an opportunity structure to utilize Iraq's distraction and weakness to build their own state. This is further compounded by the Kurds taking Kirkuk again in 2013, although the

Iraqi army has once again recently reclaimed the city.[62] The KRG believed that these successes would increase their credibility in the international community, who would then be more likely to recognize Kurdistan.

Prospects for A Successful Nation

The Iraqi Kurd Referendum of 2017 was the culmination of multiple factors: the nationalist forces of distinctness and persecution by Arab Iraqis, the establishment of the KRG, and the momentum caused by the successes of the peshmergas against ISIS. This was compounded by various opportunities caused by a weak Iraqi central government, similar to the 1991 uprisings, the 2003 alliance with Americans against Saddam Hussein, and current difficulties faced by the Iraqi army in defending major cities like Mosul. However, the prospects for a successful independent Kurdish state are limited due to a variety of internal and external/politico-economic forces.

Firstly, internal divisions between the PUK and KDP in the past set a worrying precedent for the ability of the KRG to form a lasting stable government. In the KRG, the civil-military relations between the political and military sphere show the level of influence the peshmergas have over civil society.[63] Furthermore, the fact that the peshmergas are separated into factions

55 Michael Gunter, "Iraq, Syria, ISIS, and the Kurds: Geostrategic concerns for the U.S. and Turkey."

56 Ray Sanchez, et al, "ISIS in the crosshairs: Battle for Mosul begins," *CNN*, 17 October 2016, Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/16/middleeast/mosul-isis-operation-begins-iraq/index.html

57 Behnam Ben Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu, "Kurd Your Enthusiasm: The U.S. Needs to Talk About Its Favorite Allies," *Foreign Affairs*, 8 November 2017, Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-08/kurd-your-enthusiasm

58 Matthew Franklin Cancian and Kristin Fabbe, "What Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga Believe?" *Foreign Affairs*, 22 November 2017, Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-08-25/what-iraqs-kurdish-peshmerga-believe

59 Ibid.

60 Behnam Ben Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu, "Kurd Your Enthusiasm: The U.S. Needs to Talk About Its Favorite Allies."

61 Ibid.

62 David Zucchino, "Iraqi Forces Sweep into Kirkuk, Checking Kurdish Independence Drive." *The New York Times,* 16 October 2007, Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/middleeast/kirkuk-iraq-kurds.html

63 Wladimir Van Wilgenburg and Mario Fumerton, *Kurdistan's political armies: The challenge of unifying the peshmerga forces,* Carnegie Middle East Center. 16 December 2015. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/16/kurdistan-

based on their alliance with either the PUK or KDP with the KDP maintaining little control over the PUK-controlled factions and vice versa.[64]

This division has also led to neo-patrimonial or patron-client relationships between leaders and their respective factions; this form of corruption does not bode well for a successful, sovereign country due to leaders choosing officials based on party or tribal lines rather than merit.[65] Without a strong civil government, Kurdistan will not be able to build successful institutions and will reproduce the inequality and corruption seen in many post-colonial African nations.[66] For the independent Kurdish state to be successful, both KDP and PUK leaders must take an active stance in promoting non-partisanship and unity within the military forces.[67] Rather than advocating solutions that benefit their own party, the primary goal should be to benefit all Iraqi Kurds regardless of political affiliation.

The second problem regarding the independent Kurdish state is international recognition and legitimacy. While Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed an increasingly positive reputation due to their tenacious fight against ISIS, allies like the United States, United Nations, and European Union still refuse to accept the possibility of a sovereign state for the Kurds amid fears

that it will cause more instability in the area, especially with Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments.[68] Furthermore, they have pursued legal avenues to void the referendum results; this has been successful and the Supreme Court of Iraq has ruled the referendum as invalid and unconstitutional.[69]

These fears are not unfounded considering the reactions of Turkey and Iraq's leaders. Turkey's president warned nationalists that the referendum would result in retaliatory actions from the state.[70] Erdogan, who faces a Turk Kurdish independence movement, called the referendum a "grave mistake", which he plans to rectify in an attack that will devastate Iraqi Kurds and their economy.[71] This will involve a food blockade as well as sanctions against northern Kurd-controlled Iraq. This will have a particularly negative effect on Kurdistan's economy; the Iraqi army's recent successes have led to them recapturing land that had recently been controlled by Kurds. This includes the oil-rich city of Kirkuk which was recently recaptured by the Iraqis in October 2017.[72] Kurdistan's economy is 90% based on oil exports.[73] Thus, the loss of Kirkuk, as well as the possible sanctions by Turkey, given that the KRG has a natural gas pipeline through Ankara, has many ramifications on the potential economy of Kurdistan.[74]

s-political-armies-challenge-of-unifying-peshmerga-forces-pub-61917.

64   Ibid.

65   Ibid.

66   Ibid.

67   Ibid.

68   Behnam Ben Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu, "Kurd Your Enthusiasm: The U.S. Needs to Talk About Its Favorite Allies.".

69   Reuters Staff, "Iraqi Kurd prime minister: court voided referendum without KRG input," *Reuters*. 20 November 2017, Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-barzani/iraqi-kurd-prime-minister-court-voided-referendum-without-krg-input-idUSKBN1DK19F

70   France 24, EXCLUSIVE - Erdogan warns Kurds, 2017, YouTube, Film, Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jNoBYrdcPs

71   Al Jazeera, Turkey calls Kurdish referendum a 'grave mistake', 2017, YouTube, Film, Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4oj5nH6Nu0

72   Zucchino *supra* note 65.

73   Alex Dziadosz, "The Economic Case Against an Independent Kurdistan," *The Atlantic*, 26 September 2017, Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/kurdistan-barzani-iraq-turkey-blockade-oil/541149/

74   Ibid.

Iraq's Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, has condemned the referendum as unconstitutional and has pledged to prevent Kurdistan's secession.[75] He has attempted to do so by isolating Kurdish Iraq by suspending flights from Kurdish cities, recapturing oil fields formerly held by the Kurds, and cooperating with Iran and Turkey along the northern Iraqi border to prepare for a military attack.[76] Iran has deployed soldiers along the Iran-Iraq border and is working with Iraqi and Turkish forces.[77] Furthermore, the central government has planned to pursue legal avenues to oppose the referendum, such as the Supreme Court.[78]

The Iranian and Turkish leaders are invested in the failure of the sovereign Kurdish state due to the fear that a successful claim for sovereignty would lead to other minority groups claiming independence. Turkish Kurds have drawn inspiration from their Iraqi counterparts, an act which Erdogan argues is against Turkey's territorial integrity.[79]

Another possible source of problems for the success of the Kurdish nation is its relationship with Israel. Israel remains the only state that has supported the Kurdish peoples' desire for self-determination. This overt support by Israel has been criticized by the official Iraqi government as well as its neighbours, Turkey and Iran.[80] An independent Kurdistan would be one of the few countries in the region that has diplomatic relations with Israel, which has ramifications on the reactions of other Middle Eastern countries regarding the possible sovereignty of the Kurdish state.[81] If Kurdistan accepts Israel's support—which Barzani has—ties with Arab

League member countries will be fraught. While Kurds enjoy maintaining their separation from Arabs, this could lead to sanctions by their neighbours, which would have negative implications for the Kurdish economy, as 80 percent of products are imported from other countries, such as Turkey.[82]

Conclusion

The 2017 Iraqi Kurd independence movement was primarily caused by Kurds taking advantage of Iraq's instability in the wake of ISIS. Historically, Kurds were persecuted in Iraq and neighbouring countries, resulting in the Kurd identity being politicized. Kurdish nationalism was born out of a desire to defend Kurdish interests and to create a country where Kurdish history, tradition, and culture would be respected. However, until the Kurdish autonomous region becomes stable and gains international recognition, prospects for a successful sovereign state are dim.

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75   Ahmed Rasheed and Raya Jalabi, "Baghdad piles pressure on Iraqi Kurds to reverse overwhelming independence vote," *Reuters*, 26 September 2017, Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-referendum/baghdad-piles-pressure-on-iraqi-kurds-to-reverse-overwhelming-independence-vote-idUSKCN1C1127

76   Ibid.

77   Ahmed Rasheed and Raya Jalabi, "Baghdad piles pressure on Iraqi Kurds to reverse overwhelming independence vote."

78   Reuters Staff, "Iraqi Kurd prime minister: court voided referendum without KRG input."

79   Ibid.

80   Ian Lee, "Why Israel supports an independent Iraqi Kurdistan," *CNN*, 2 October 2017, Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/02/middleeast/iraqi-kurdistan-israel-support/index.html

81   Ibid.

82   Alex Dziadosz, "The Economic Case Against an Independent Kurdistan."

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From Frozen to Thawed Conflict: The Unsustainability of Equilibrium Systems in Post-Soviet Ethnic Tensions

Marko Stambolic

Introduction

The delineation of state territory, when supplanting ethno-territorial conceptions of land ownership, has a tendency to produce ethnic "winners," dominant or titular groups, and "losers," subjugated or resistant groups. The proliferation of these unequal dynamics of governmental control result in inherently fragile states defined by persistent tension between the central government/nationality and minority groups on the ethnic periphery. These environments of tension are at constant risk of escalating into full-fledged ethnic conflict; recent history, especially in the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe, has shown that the possibility for the eruption of highly destructive and recurring ethnic violence in multi-national states is frighteningly real. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies, political science literature has sought to understand which internal and external factors may lead to the mitigation or exacerbation of ethnic conflict in post-Soviet states. To put it another way: which factors may increase or decrease the relative "fragility" of fragile multi-ethnic states?

What follows is a refutation of "frozen" or equilibrium-based theories presented by writers such as Charles King, which posit that the creation of dual governmental and social institutions in multi-ethnic societies actually serve as peace-building mechanisms. Instead, I will argue that while split institutions and frozen political conflicts may provide a short-term mitigation of ethnic conflict, they are insufficient in producing long-term peaceable outcomes. In addition, when a frozen conflict system is ended by a return to violence, the institutions that maintained short-term peace can become weaponized, exacerbating the severity of the recently-renewed ethnic conflict. The dangers of these conflict systems will be illustrated through an analysis of the construction and subsequent collapse of Georgia's frozen conflict system, with particular focus on the vulnerability of frozen conflict situations to the intervention of a foreign power such as Russia, choosing to align itself with either the central government or the ethnic minority group(s).

Benefits of an Ethnic War Theory

Conventional logic would assume that the existence of a persistent internal ethnic conflict has a damaging effect on a state's stability, leading to weak governments and state institutions; crippled or absent central government control in hostile minority territories; and the constant threat of damaging emergences of civil-war style violence.[1] There exists, however, a noteworthy theoretical camp that argues against the conventional logic. Such thinkers propose that the fulfillment of certain circumstances in states containing winner/loser ethnic tensions will result in outcomes that, while not conciliatory, are peaceful, relatively stable, and self-preserving. We will focus on one such hypothesis: Charles King's Benefits of Ethnic War theory, outlined in his 2001 article "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States". King posits that, in situations where an ethnic war results in the military victory of the minority "loser" group but not the achievement of outright independence, the conflict becomes "frozen" into a state of equilibrium, where each of the factions becomes too powerful to accept compromise but too weak to overthrow or defeat their adversary.[2] Both sides then utilize the nominal but not physical continuation of conflict to expand political control and maintain popular electoral support. King concludes that, while the motivation behind these conflicts remain unsolved, the leveraged benefits of nominal conflict for both parties result in

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1   Pål Kolstø, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States" *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006): 726.

2   Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States" *World Politics* 53, no. 4 (July 2001): 525.

peace being "a public good, an outcome from which all groups might potentially benefit" and the mutual continuation of a system where "the threats posed by massive refugee flows or renewed fighting, say - is no longer a major concern."[3]

King's argument that the maintenance of a frozen conflict allows for the mutual accumulation of governmental advantages, and that those advantages are a strong enough incentive for the maintenance of peace between the adversaries contains a number of flaws. King's theory suffers from the recency fallacy: the belief that the most recent or only existing outcomes are the inevitable and repeatable product of a series of specific events. To be more specific - King's assertion that the creation of quasi-mobilized societies in frozen war systems serve as informal peace-building mechanisms and relegate the threat of conflict to being "no longer a major concern" is only applicable in the geopolitical context from the time it was written in 2001, when those systems had been largely untested. Instead, political events in the states of the former Soviet Union since 2001 have shown that, while these systems may be sustainable so long as equilibrium status is maintained, the occurrence of an event of major consequence that upsets this dynamic is likely to incentivize one or both parties to return to violence. Furthermore, since a byproduct of King's equilibrium is the strengthening of the adversarial governments and their respective military capabilities, the conclusion of a frozen state of conflict can have a rapid "thawing" effect as the subsequent military conflict is fought with more and better weapons by ideologically inflamed populaces. Lastly, since the adversaries in King's equilibrium have comparable military capabilities and exist in a fundamentally fragile peace structure,

they are highly vulnerable to the impact of a decisive intervention by a foreign power. I will now look at how the equilibrium system in Georgia helped create the conditions that, when combined with Russia's intervention in favor of the separatist republics, caused Georgia to return to ethnic conflict in 2008.

Georgian Equilibrium

The creation of an equilibrium system in Georgia was prompted by the defeat of the national government in two wars: The South Ossetian War (1991-1992) and The War in Abkhazia (1992-1993). In each of these conflicts, the separatist republics achieved victory over Georgia despite vastly inferior population levels, territory, and access to resources.[4] Crucial to separatist victory in both wars was the assistance of Russia; Moscow supported the separatist cause by supplying weapons and training to military units, maintaining a military presence in former Soviet bases in Georgia, diplomatically pressuring the government in Tbilisi to negotiate,[5] and mediating the subsequent cease-fire talks.[6] The resulting Sochi Agreements (1992-1993) established cease-fire areas and demanded military withdrawal from embattled areas, while calling for the organization of joint peace-keeping operations involving soldiers from all three parties alongside a unity government.[7] Each of the Sochi Agreements was violated before it could be fully implemented as separatist armies occupied their respective capitals and declared independence in the security vacuum caused by the retreat of Georgian forces; today, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are only recognized internationally by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and other non-recognized states.

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3   Ibid., 550.

4   Kolstø, *The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States*, 736.

5   Nikola Cvetkovski, *The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict* (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 1999).

6   Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *"Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict"* Human Rights Watch (March 1995), https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf.

7   E.A. Shevardnadze and B.N Yeltsin, *"Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict"* (June 24 1992), sourced from peacemaker.un.org.

Separatist victory in both wars prompted the creation of a frozen conflict system between each of the separatist republics and the Georgian state; indeed, King utilizes the Georgian situation as a major source of evidence to support his theory.[8] While internationally recognized as part of Georgia, the territories controlled by separatist groups quickly became de facto independent states which began to expand their own institutions of state control – while Tbilisi maintains governments in exile for both regions, it lacks the ability to implement policies in the breakaway regions.[9] The security situation entered a state of relative equilibrium: the separatist republics were economically devastated from their wars and could not materially compete with growing Georgian military capabilities, while Tbilisi was wary of the prospect of Russian intervention in favor of the separatists; neither side could afford the heavy commitment cost associated with formally breaking a cease-fire deal they had all agreed upon.[10] Finding a diplomatic solution has not yet been realized, as there are too many institutional disincentives on both sides. The separatist republics are diametrically opposed to the notion of reunification: as both Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence movements are rooted in ethno-territorial conceptions of legitimate sovereignty, neither will accept an agreement which results in their loss of state sovereignty;[11] the Georgian government, in turn, will not accept state sovereignty for areas that it perceives as rightful territories of Georgia.[12] In instances where Georgian leadership has appeared willing to compromise, their efforts have been stymied by domestic forces.

Such forces include businessmen and corrupt government officials who are profiting from the persistence of conflict and the weakness of the Georgian state,[13] as well as the prominent Apkhazeti faction, the Abkhazian government-in-exile which hold a constitutionally ordained number of seats in the Georgian Parliament. The Apkhazeti, seeing themselves as the rightful Abkhazian government, consistently oppose government initiatives to negotiate or grant greater powers to the separatist government; since granting devolutionary powers to the South Ossetian government would set a threatening precedent, the Apkhazeti oppose any and all attempts at reunification.[14] The end result is what King describes as "a dark version of Pareto efficiency": the development of parallel state institutions that has benefitted politicians and influential figures on both sides to such a degree that the opportunity costs associated with reunification are simply too high for a mutually acceptable agreement to be reached.[15] The consequence of this is the maintenance of a frozen conflict system that produces short-term benefits for officials on both sides while limiting incentives for all parties to come to a genuine peace agreement.

Flawed Frozen Equilibrium and Thawed Conflict

While King makes a number of reasonable arguments regarding how officials in both titular and separatist republics develop and exacerbate frozen conflict situations, his reasoning is weakened by its contestation that equilibrium-state frozen conflicts are inherently self-sustaining. A more refined approach is necessary.

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8   King, *The Benefits of Ethnic War*, 533-534.

9   Kolstø, *The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States*, 728.

10   Valery Tishkov, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no.5 (September 1999): 586.

11   Dov Lynch, "Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts" *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (October 2002): 834.

12   Ibid., 837.

13   King, *The Benefits of Ethnic War*, 535.

14   Ibid., 547.

15   Ibid., 525-526.

It is more accurate to consider the policy consequences of a conflict in equilibrium as short-term or weak mitigating factors against the resumption of violence. Short-term mitigating factors can be sufficient for the maintenance of an equilibrium system for years or even decades, yet they make the non-conflict status between titular and separatist republics inherently fragile and extremely vulnerable to the consequences of a major unbalance factor which upsets the power balance between the two groups. A major unbalance factor in this context is defined as an event which drastically increases or diminishes the state or military capacity of a titular or separatist republic vis-à-vis those of its opponent. Examples of potential major unbalance factors include but are not limited to: a change in one side's government through elections or popular protest; the onset of external war or a separate internal nationalist uprising; and the material support or military intervention of a foreign power. The impact of a lopsided power balance caused by the onset of a major unbalance factor is the thawing of a frozen conflict, as factors that once promoted the maintenance of a weak-peace solution are weakened or eclipsed by the new unbalance of relative power capabilities.

When a frozen conflict begins to thaw, the institutional and societal changes that are a byproduct of the equilibrium state can be weaponized, becoming dangerous tools which exacerbate a conflict. Separatist territories that possessed significant degrees of autonomy in the pre-thaw system, such as the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia allow separatist combatants to leverage the structural and societal products of autonomy for wartime gain. The institutions of autonomy – regional parliaments, courts, and administration; local control of education, services, and media/communications networks; separate police

and military forces loyal to the local government; and so on – are powerful tools in the control of a rebellious regional government. The existence of a local administration in control of well-established governmental structures such as a parliament confers legitimacy. The separatist republic, as the controller of codified institutions, provides a legal framework for the local validity of their decisions.[16] Control over such institutions also provide a separatist government with the ability to speed up the process of ethnic mobilization through usage of the education system and the proliferation of propaganda via mass media – influencing the attitudes of the local population and increasing the cohesion and willingness of local populations to act in favor of the separatist republic and against the titular government.[17] The existence of locally-recruited and trained soldiers and police forces allow separatist republics to ensure the loyalty of their security forces and prevent defections or disorganization from occurring once the conflict actually begins.[18]

Separatist republics that contain critical national infrastructure can be leveraged by the separatist republic in wartime to overcome the impacts of an economic blockade or ensure that a steady flow of equipment is available for troops. These capabilities, crafted by necessity in a frozen conflict system and utilized against the enemy after the thaw, allow separatist republics to mirror the mechanisms for economic, military, and societal mobilization that are inherent in independent states such as the titular republics they are in conflict with.[19] Mutual capabilities for war mobilization mean that thaw conflicts are fought by combatants who both possess capable legal institutions, trained and equipped military forces, resources and critical infrastructure allowing for conflict persistence, and mobilized

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16   Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective" *World Politics* 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 254.

17   Ibid., 252-253, 255.

18   Ibid., 266.

19   Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, "Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nation-Building in South Caucasian Quasi-States" *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 3 (May 2008): 506.

populations convinced of the necessity of victory and the persistent nature of conflict with their adversaries; in these regards, thaw conflicts more closely resemble inter-state conflicts rather than civil wars or regional insurrections.[20]

Finally, it is important to note that frozen conflict situations are highly susceptible to the threat of direct or indirect intervention from a foreign power. Inherent in the transition from a frozen to a thawed conflict situation is the disruption of a system of relatively balanced power capabilities by a major "imbalancing" factor, providing one of the adversaries with an exploitable capability advantage. While major "imbalancing" factors can be the result of random occurrences or of the uncontrolled congruence of societal forces, they can also be created by a crafty foreign power. A foreign power with an acute understanding of the balanced power dynamic within a frozen conflict situation can deploy intervention mechanisms to essentially "pick a winner": by choosing to support one of the adversaries, the foreign power can induce unbalance in the system, triggering the transition to a state of thaw conflict. In the subsequent conflict, the adversary which is receiving foreign support, the "winner" of the new power unbalance, has an inherent advantage over its relatively weaker rival. This means that the "winning" adversary has a greater capacity for achieving a victory in the thaw conflict and producing an outcome that is consistent with the geopolitical aims of the supporting foreign power. This tactic – the induction of a thaw conflict through the use of foreign intervention to create unbalance favoring one's ally – was utilized by the Russian Federation by means of material, political, and (later) direct military support for the Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist republics in 2008, leading to the collapse of Georgia's frozen conflict situation and the onset of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

Thawed Conflict on the Russian Border

The brief August 2008 conflict between Georgia, Russia, and the separatist republics is a primary example of the inherent fragility of frozen conflict systems, as well as how a foreign power can take advantage of this fragility in order to achieve a strategic advantage. By 2008, the Georgian frozen conflict system had persisted for 15 years, since the conclusion of the first series of separatist wars in 1993. The intervening years had allowed elites on both sides of the conflict to expand their respective economic and military capabilities while mobilizing local populations to their cause through nationalist and "anti-other" rhetoric.[21] Under the King model, such a frozen conflict would be considered self-sustaining, as leadership groups from both adversaries had accumulated systemic benefits from the equilibrium state that dwarfed the potential benefits of both war and a negotiated outcome to end the conflict entirely.[22] Yet the Georgian equilibrium was highly vulnerable to the possible impact of a major unbalancing factor – and trouble was brewing on the horizon.

Relations between the Saakashvili government in Tbilisi and the Medvedev-Putin government in Moscow had been declining precipitously since Saakashvili had come to power in the Rose Revolution of 2004. The Russian government was opposed to Saakashvili's pro-Western foreign policy as well as the Georgian government's aim to join NATO.[23] They were also concerned by Saakashvili's attempts to promote national conciliation through policies of "positive

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20   Lynch, *Sepratist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,* 834.

21   Julie A. George, "Minority Political Inclusion in Micheil Saakashvili's Georgia" *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 7 (September 2008): 1163.

22   Lynch, *Sepratist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,* 838.

23   James Rodgers, "Georgia's NATO bid irks Russia", *BBC World News,* November 28, 2006.

discrimination" and "integration" in ethnic minority regions and his offer to South Ossetian leadership of a peace settlement.[24] While the ethnic policies failed to induce national conciliation and the Ossetian peace deal was rejected by the separatist government,[25] the Georgian government committed to reconciliation represented a grave threat to Russian interests of maintaining influence in the Caucasus through support of the separatist republics. Therefore, Russia began to provide more overt support to the separatist republics, with the aim of instigating a major unbalancing factor and shifting the advantage to the separatists, scuppering Georgian plans of national reconciliation and maintaining Russian regional influence. In April 2008, Russia formally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia;[26] in May it increased the number of military "peacekeepers" in the separatist republics;[27] Russian Air Forces began to patrol separatist territory and attacked Georgian drones which it claimed to have crossed the ceasefire line.[28]

This increase in Russian support can be considered as the major factor of unbalance that triggered the thawing of the Georgian frozen conflict and provoked the 2008 War. Increased Russian troop presence, air power, and material aid emboldened the separatist republics, which began to behave with increasing aggression towards Georgia. The bolstering of nationalist sentiments that had been utilized by both adversaries in a frozen conflict situation caused tensions to increase further, as citizenry on both sides rallied around

their governments in anticipation of war.[29] By July, Georgia and the separatist republics were engaging in increasingly violent acts of guerilla warfare and reprisal against one another.[30] By this point, a return to conflict was inevitable, as Russia and the separatist republics were already planning to launch an offensive against the Georgians; a bombing attack on Georgian police forces, followed by Georgian reprisals against South Ossetian militias were merely the pretext for a prepared invasion.[31] The resulting war was a brief affair in which Russian-separatist military superiority quickly overcame Georgian opposition: the subsequent ceasefire deal led to the separatist republics gaining control over the last of their territories controlled by Georgia, and the establishment of Russian military bases in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, decisively strengthening Russian influence in the Caucasus.[32]

Conclusion

Herein lies the contradiction within King's assertion that frozen conflict situations serve as mechanisms for the mitigation of violence: his theory was formed too early in the life cycles of these frozen conflicts, and considers short-term outcomes as long-term solutions. Instead, frozen conflict scenarios should be seen as temporary tools for conflict mitigation with long-term consequences of increased war capabilities and "anti-other" sentiment among the adversaries. While such a system promotes short-term compliance, it is built upon a fragile balance of relative power that is susceptible

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24   George, *Minority Political Inclusion in Micheil Saakashvili's Georgia*, 1155.

25   Ibid., 1156.

26   Vladimir Socor, "Russia moves towards open annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia*" Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 74 (April 2008).

27   "Russia Gives Some Details on Troop Increase in Abkhazia" *Civil Georgia* online. Last modified May 8, 2008. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17786.

28   Peter Finn, "Russia's Moves Add to Strains With Georgia", *Washington Post,* May 1, 2008.

29   George, *Minority Political Inclusion in Micheil Saakashvili's Georgia*, 1164-1165.

30   Margarita Antidze, "Georgia plans operation to free detained soldiers", *Reuters*, July 8, 2008.

31   Luke Harding, "Georgia calls on EU for independent inquiry into war", *The Guardian*, November 19, 2008.

32   Luke Harding and Jenny Percival, "Russian troops to stay in Abkhazia and South Ossetia", *The Guardian*, September 9, 2008.

to the sudden introduction of a tertiary factor which fundamentally alters the existing power dynamic. In addition, a foreign power that understands the nature of this dynamic can "pick a winner" through support measures designed to increase the capability of one of the adversaries, deliberately triggering the transition from a frozen to a thawed conflict state. Such a tactic was utilized by Russia to break the Georgian equilibrium in 2008. Russian intervention was a decisive factor in providing Abkhazian and South Ossetian rebels with the means and direct military support to overcome the equilibrium of a frozen power situation and achieve a comparative advantage. This resulted in the thawing and collapse of the Georgian frozen conflict system, a return to ethno-territorial violence, and the achievement of Moscow's aim to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia deeper into Russia's orbit.

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Between Democracy and Autocracy: Kazakhstan's Hybrid Political Regime

Adrianna Lemieux

Introduction

Despite being one of the later countries to break away from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has emerged as a rapidly developing economic power in the global market. Under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan underwent a series of economic and political reforms ranging from the liberalization of the nation's market to the re-writing of the state's constitution, which shifted Kazakhstan towards a more democratic structure. Despite the success of these reforms, Kazakhstan remains a country of low political inclusivity, as President Nazarbayev utilized executive action and informal politics to expedite his reforms. Consequently, Kazakhstan has emerged as a partially reformed hybrid democratic regime that lies between a democratic and autocratic regime.

Political theorist Joel Hellman developed a theory that seeks to explain the different degrees of political reform in hybrid regimes such as Kazakhstan, known as "The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions". Through the examination of Kazakhstan's reforms, the following analysis will explore the merits and drawbacks of Hellman's theory to determine whether it applies to the manifestation of Kazakhstan's political and economic development.

Methodology

Through a comprehensive exploration of a state's political and economic reforms, Hellman's theory seeks to evaluate the level of political inclusivity based on several statistical markers throughout the state's transition. Moreover, it compares factors such as the Gini coefficient, the gross national product (GDP)

and the Freedom House Index to evaluate levels of economic inequality and political inclusivity. Hellman highlights a negative correlation between the GDP and the Gini coefficient of a state,[1] as inequality decreased while income increased. With regards to Kazakhstan's various post-communist reforms, Hellman's theory leads the author to categorize the nation as a low intermediate reformer.[2]

A drawback of the use of Hellman's theory is the publishing year, 1998. As many of the reforms in Kazakhstan were enacted ~~right~~ around the publication of Hellman's theory, the effects of these reforms had not crystalized in either the nation's political nor economic institutions. To compensate for this deficiency, this analysis will draw on ~~more~~ recent sources in addition to information provided in Hellman's original publication. Despite ~~the~~ temporal limitations, it is important to note that Hellman's article provides insight into the rationale behind Kazakhstan's reforms, which is relevant to the understanding of the emergence of the regime's current state.

Kazakhstan's Transition

Political Reform

Kazakhstan's political system is a neopatrimonialism regime, defined by its developing relationship with traditional politics, patrimonial communism and new constitutionally liberal institutions.[3] Using statistics from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Hellman indicates that Kazakhstan has the longest government tenure of all post-soviet countries, 69 months[4], which can be explained by the relationship between formal and informal politics under Nazarbayev's regime. Resembling an oligarchy,

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1 Ibid., 227.

2 Joel Hellman, "Winners Takes All: The politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions." *World Politics* 50:2 (January 1998): 210.

3 Rico Isacs, *Partial System Formation in Kazakhstan*. New York: Routledge, 2011:11.

4 Hellman, *Winner Takes All*, 213.

Nazarbayev's government relied heavily on informal politics to implement reforms during Kazakhstan's transition, as Nazarbayev derived his political power from soft sources, such as personalism, extensive patronage networks and elite conflicts[5]. While this consolidation of informal power allowed him to expedite the reform process, traditional democratic participation has recently been significantly restricted, preventing a complete democratization of the nation's institutions.[6]

Contrary to what has manifested in Kazakhstan, Hellman's theory states that frequent elections and short executive terms are more likely to result in extensive reforms.[7] Generally, broader coalition governments face a lower risk of being exclusively controlled by net short-term winners, which are elites who benefit the most from immediate reforms such as economic liberalization.[8] These elites, however, tend to fight against the completion of these political reforms, as this would eliminate their newly obtained benefits. Consequently, many post-soviet hybrid regimes have only achieved partial political and economic reforms. Short-term winners generally play a greater role in initiating reforms, despite their limited representation and personalized focus[9], but after a certain point, these same elites halt the reform process to safeguard their own interests, creating a conflict between the higher cost of a partial reform on society versus the lower cost of a complete reform.

Despite Hellman's argument, Kazakhstan's low degree of political inclusivity and long government tenure did not inhibit institutional reform. Politically, little change occurred in many of Kazakhstan's institutions, as Nazarbayev's actions relied heavily on his informal relations. Following a period of hyperinflation, rising unrest in the region and internal political disaccord, Nazarbayev dissolved parliament twice at the beginning of the 1990s, assuming sole authority over Kazakhstan. Using the presidential decree, Nazarbayev justified his authoritarian rule, stating: "Yes, dictatorship will come, but it will be a dictatorship of the constitution and of the rule of law."[10] During his authoritarian tenure, Nazarbayev introduced a programme of economic reforms to liberalise the nation's economy, drafted a new constitution in 1995 to support this liberalizing, and scheduled new elections.[11] Nazarbayev passed 141 presidential decrees in 12 months, a majority aimed at economic reform and privatization.[12] Despite exercising his executive power, Nazarbayev remained receptive to legal concerns and cultural pressures.[13]

Economic Reform

To evaluate economic reforms, Hellman explores the standard economic J-curve model. The J-curve is described as a "valley of transition", where reforms will worsen the level of consumption before improving it.[14] Certain transitional costs are incurred with economic reforms, such as unemployment, inflation and declines in production. Hellman notes that the most radical reforms have happened in the most competitive systems, where the general population's interest is valued the most.

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5 Ibid., 208.

6 Isaacs, *Partial System Formation*, 156.

7 Hellman, *Winner Takes All*, 212.

8 Ibid., 229.

9 Ibid., 222.

10 Ibid., 158.

11 Jonathan Atiken, *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan*. London: Continuum, 2009.

12 Ibid., 162.

13 Ibid., 160.

14 Hellman, *Winner Takes All*, 203.

Following the creation of the new constitution, Nazarbayev sought to divert the political instability of this transition on foreign economic influences, specifically targeting the oil industry. Nazarbayev encouraged foreign investment by creating a free-enterprise culture that favors external investment.[15] Nazarbayev intended to blame Kazakhstan's low levels of development, especially in oil-rich regions, on foreign oil companies; however, this strategy would have discouraged foreign investment. Consequently, measures were taken to retain control over these companies,[16] producing a rapid rise in oil extraction in Kazakhstan. This rapid rise in extraction resulted in a resource curse, which is a decrease in industry growth despite an abundance of resources. Kazakhstan's resource curse created a political crisis, where resource extraction became concentrated among informal elite groups.[17] However, this did not lead to an economic crisis, as the close management of the industry created an influx of income. This increase of income improved the nation's human development score, which aligns with Hellman's theory.[18]

Nazarbayev derived his power from a system of elite patronage. Thus, he turned to the zhuzi clan system for support. A pre-soviet societal organization, Nazarbayev assumed that Kazakhstan's elite would emerge from this group.[19] Contrary to this belief, the Kazakhstan' new elite rose from the process of privatization of state-owned industries,[20] also known as the short-term winners who benefited from partial

economic reforms.[21] While these short-term winners initially played an active role in Kazakh government, many failed to retain their positions and the political power associated with such positions, as most lacked close relationships with Nazarbayev.[22] Relying on informal politics, Nazarbayev was able to fracture this elite and remove his opponents from important political positions, replacing them with members of his own network who would support and expedite his economic and political reforms. [23] Nazarbayev's reliance on informal politics ultimately allowed him to consolidate his executive power and to undertake reforms that would have otherwise been impossible. While these reforms resulted in Kazakhstan rapid's economic growth, they also point to a low level of political inclusivity.[24]

In discussing the role of the economic elite within a nation's transition, Hellman states that most post-soviet economies partially reform due to the protected interests of elites that directly benefit from reforms. As the economy is liberalised, and consequently privatized, these short-term winners assume control of the economy.[25] The continuation of these reforms, such as the creation of regulatory practices to balance this newly liberalised market, infringes on the private gains of these short-term winners, making full reforms undesirable. Consequently, these individuals will fight to keep the J-curve at its lowest point, as this allows for monopolies to develop and cement.[26]

15 Atiken, *Nazarbayev*, 161.

16 Wojciech Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

17 Isaacs, *Partial System Formation*, 23.

18 Nygmet Ibadildin, *Combatting the Resource Curse in Kazakhsta*n. Finland: Tampere University Press, 2011.

19 Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil,* 17.

20 Pamela Blackmon, *In the Shadow of Russia*. USA: Michigan State University Press, 2011.

21 Ibid., 10.

22 Ibid., 51.

23 Ibid., 10.

24 Ibid., 12.

25 Hellman, *Winner Takes All*, 204.

26 Ibid., 219.

In accordance with Hellman's theory, Kazakhstan's partial reform can be explained by the desire of the elite to keep the nation's economy at this lowest point on the J-curve to protect their economic interests.[27] Hellman's theory supports the outcome of most post-soviet regimes, where concentrated short-term gains of a minority have dispersed the transitional costs throughout the economy.[28] This manifestation, however, contradicts the primary J-curve assumption, which is that transitional costs only affect certain individuals, the short-term losers, while the resulting gains are distributed throughout the population. Due to these differing assumptions, Hellman argues that it is the short-term winners, not the short-term losers, that need to be included in economic reforms.[29] In Kazakhstan, however, radical economic reform occurred despite Nazarbayev having excluded these short-term winners from the formal political mechanisms of Kazakhstan.

Other Consequences of Reform

Nazarbayev transitioned Kazakhstan's economy into a market economy at the beginning of 1992, reforming the banking system and tax code while liberalizing trade.[30] Generally, prices were dictated by market supply and demand while remaining price subsides were eliminated, except tariffs on utilities.[31] This transition imposed significant costs, such as the need for a new currency due to the instability of the currency

and the monopolization of the resource industry;[32] and supports Hellman's theory.[33]

In order to push through his economic reforms, Nazarbayev had to eliminate the elite from the previous regime, as they would oppose any change that would jeopardize their benefits.[34] Following Hellman's theory, this elite would remain in power following a shift in regimes, but Nazarbayev used his executive action and patronage networks to push out the elite of Kazakhstan's formal political institutions and retain control. Nazarbayev's centralized leadership allowed him to reach out internationally and gain support, which contributed to Kazakhstan's integration into the global economy. For example, stabilisation backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was met with opposition by the majority of parliament, but none the less was s undertaken.[35] In addition, Nazarbayev established a Rehabilitation Bank in coordination with the World Bank, introduced a bankruptcy law, created compulsory medical coverage and modernized the tax system.[36] These changes led the World Bank to declare that as of 1999 "Kazakhstan had made considerable progress in privatizing its economy".[37] Nazarbayev commented on this progress, pointing out "We've [Kazakhstan] managed to keep calm in our homeland. We have begun running our own economy and we know which way to turn for a better life. During this time, we have gained worldwide trust. Investments are now being made in Kazakhstan."[38] Nazarbayev's statement highlights the absence of a revolution in

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27   Ibid., 204.

28   Ibid., 233.

29   Ibid., 234.

30   Blackmon, *In the Shadow of Russia*, 47.

31   Ibid., 51.

32   Atiken, *Nazarbayev*, 151

33   Ibid., 23.

34   Blackmon, *In the Shadow of Russia*, 53.

35   Ibid., 60.

36   Ibid.

37   Ibid., 61.

38   Atiken, *Nazarbayev*, 161.

Kazakhstan, instead highlighting the cooperation between various parties and interests. This relatively peaceful process, which according to Hellman derives from a decentralisation of the elite, ultimately allowed for more extensive reforms to be undertaken, despite low political inclusivity.

In addition to the velocity of Nazarbayev's more immediate reforms, his actions also reflect a long-term focus best exemplified in his international focus. This focus proved to be extremely valuable for the oil industry. A surge in oil extraction by international businesses allowed the nation to conserve its economic status quo in a time of transition, to access international markets, as well as seize the opportunity to restructure its relationship with the oil industry and the wider business community that would prove essential to its future success.[39] In describing his approach, Naysayer writes "You plant potatoes in spring and by autumn you already have a crop to pick. But you need five or six years to get apples from a tree".[40] Nazarbayev's long-term approach, however, runs contrary to Kazakhstan's status as a low intermediately reformed country according to Hellman's theory. In addition, his theory is unable to explain Kazakhstan's international success, which is essential to the understanding of the country's economic reforms.

Conclusion

Nazarbayev has played an historic role in facilitating the transition of Kazakhstan[41]. After his re-election in 2005 and the creation of a constitutional amendment permitting him to run for an unlimited amount of terms, he is expected to maintain power in Kazakhstan in the near future. Moreover, inequality has been decreasing in the state with the introduction of political and economic reforms. The country's overall poverty rate

has fallen by 13 percent, dropping from 30 percent in 2001 to 18 percent in 2006.[42] These positive indicators support the J-curve model, where Kazakhstan has exited the valley of transition and is now seeing the benefits of reform.

Although Hellman's theory explains some aspects of Kazakhstan's partial reforms, certain aspects are left unexplained. Taking the different assumptions made by Hellman, Kazakhstan's beginnings as a post-soviet nation did in fact produce concentrated short-term gains to an elite minority, disproportionately distributing the costs to other areas of Kazak society. Nazarbayev's initiatives, however, reversed this unequal distribution. While the elite continued to maintain significant economic power, Nazarbayev excluded them from the formal political process. This aligns with Hellman's recommendation to restrain the elites by including them in the process of reform. Nazarbayev's actions, however, came at a cost, as he consolidated his executive power through informal political processes that run contrary to democratic participation. This contradicting is what defines Kazakhstan as a hybrid regime. Kazakhstan's transition is not complete, and thus future political and economic reform is likely to occur. Nazarbayev's policies, however, seemed to have struck a functional political-economic balance that has positively contributed to Kazakhstan's development.

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39 Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil,* 151.

40 Atiken, *Nazarbayev,* 161.

41 Blackmon, *In the Shadow of Russia,* 63.

42 Ibid., 63.

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> **"La fin d'une chose marque le commencement d'une nouvelle."**
>
> – Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Le Petit Prince