Opinion: Trump Is Changing the Rules of International Relations, and NATO Is Helping Him Do It

The annual summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) concluded on July 8 in Ankara, Turkey, sending heads of state and their black SUVs back to the countries from which they came. The result was a full slate of tangible commitments, including air defence licensing agreements, a security and resilience bank, and too many letters of intent to count. Despite this, the press has largely honed in on one outcome: the successful two-day appeasement of US President Donald Trump. Though he left the summit declaring his “tremendous love” for NATO allies, his arrival was characterized by berating alliance members over their failure to provide the United States with support for its ongoing war in Iran, and a reminder of his desire to take control of Greenland from fellow NATO member Denmark. 

The key to this stunning reversal of attitude? Put simply, ego management. While personality navigation and the need for reputational wins to translate into domestic approval ratings have always been a part of international diplomacy, NATO’s approach to securing American cooperation demonstrates a uniquely personalistic phenomenon that begs to be examined as novel. 

Before examining the future of international relations, it’s important to understand its past. While IR is dominated by several key schools that dispute one another over the basic assumptions underlying the international system, a few major names – game theory and institutionalism – converge on entities like NATO. Game theory assumes that players (like states or corporations) are rational and will maximize their own interests, knowing that other players will simultaneously do the same.

This is where institutionalism comes in: entities like NATO exist to alter state behaviour towards long-term collaboration. Fundamentally, institutions like these make sense because they help state actors feel confident that others will behave predictably. They also increase the practical and reputational costs of “defection,” or the pursuit of singular self-interest at the expense of the institution’s expectations and other included actors. 

Institutionalism helped define the rules-based international order. Unfortunately, for fans of a good global diplomatic forum, the world is coming to realize that this order is ceasing to exist. It comes as no surprise, then, that the institutionalist paradigm might be deteriorating, too.

Realism assumes states are the primary and unitary actors, making bargaining between two diplomats the embodiment of their respective states’ interests. The 2026 NATO Summit demonstrates how Trump’s own interests have been factored in alongside the policy demands of the US, adding an extra dimension to the game theory matrix. The language used in negotiation strategies by NATO members when approaching the US is evidently sensitive towards Trump’s emotions, with phrases like “managing” the president and endeavouring “not to extremely offend him” (in the words of Canada’s former NATO Ambassador Kerry Buck and an anonymous senior NATO diplomat, respectively). 

As Politico reported, allies deliberately designed the summit’s agenda around mitigating potential outbursts that might derail negotiations. This took the form of planned concessions on increased spending, industry advancements, and signalling support on Iran. 

While policy concessions were undoubtedly important, what stood out in NATO’s diplomatic landscape were the reputational aspects of “Trump management.” Take, for example, NATO Chief Mark Rutte’s framing of the 2026 summit successes as personally belonging to Trump, with commentary like “your win,” and calling him “Dear Donald.” Needless to say, there was no “Dear Friedrich,” “Dear Andrej,” “Dear Mark”… you get the picture.

Circling back to game theory — we can grant that increased NATO spending, defence contract announcements, and support in Operation Epic Fury are in America’s interest. We can even grant that catering to the reputational interests of a bargaining partner, i.e., their domestic popularity, is still in the spirit of realist motivations. What we cannot explain, however, is the aspects of NATO accommodation that have no connection to national interest. 

Case in extravagant point: at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Trump stayed at the Huis Ten Bosch palace, becoming the first US president to do so and marking an unprecedented gesture towards a non-royal by the Dutch king. This holds no clear foundation in the American policy agenda nor connection to a claim for diplomatic success on Trump’s part. As such, it demonstrates that NATO’s ‘Trump strategy’ is best described as a personnel management one, catering to the unique psychic profile and ego-based volatility of a single actor.

It’s worth returning to the point that no diplomat, head of state, or policymaker is devoid of emotion or ego; manipulating the way others perceive oneself in negotiations is not a new strategy. Perhaps most famously is Richard Nixon’s “madman theory,” a strategy wherein the negotiator makes their opponent believe that he is emotionally volatile and impulsive to the point of being willing to act outside of the rational options that game theory would provide them. While some observers suggest that Trump is employing this strategy in Iran, to apply it faithfully – feigning emotional volatility for negotiations’ sake – to the NATO summit would be a fundamental alteration of what even Nixon had in mind. While Nixon feigned madness to adversaries, Trump would be feigning it to allies. It might also be helpful to note here that Nixon resigned from the Oval Office in disgrace, and had his stability questioned by his inner circle; we might very reasonably question this choice of role model.

Trump has a maximum of two and a half years left in office. Unfortunately for NATO, the problem doesn’t end with the next swearing-in. The issue is one of precedent, not just this president. In a system dominated by a “madman,” what’s to stop the emergence of another one, a politician who decides to leverage their differentiated interest to force conformity from allies in an international forum? The success of one bargainer banking on the convincing ability of a carefully timed outburst or the perception of instability may lead to the emergence of more — not necessarily to compete with the US in NATO, but to wreak havoc on associations designed to ensure collaboration in issue areas or geographic regions. 

Institutions, the theory goes, create predictability; that’s why nations buy into them despite the costs of compromise. The question, then, becomes: what if that predictability, built on leaders working for the interests of the states they represent, goes away? So, are we heading for an institutionless, isolated global system in which “madmen” run wild with unchecked egos? No, I don’t think so. There are still real benefits to collaborating through institutions, and reputational effects of abandoning them, that will keep NATO running for years to come. Nevertheless, we should think critically about the kinds of interests being brought to the table, and second-guess the idea of electing heads of state whose negotiation is branded with a willingness to kick that table’s legs out from under it. 

Edited by Koena Banerjee

Featured Image: Photo by Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0