Can Middle Powers Lead the Way?

The 56th Annual World Economic Forum Meeting in Davos this January set the tone for world leaders, with global collaboration at the forefront of strategic priorities. One of the most notable speeches was delivered by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who both condemned a “rupture” in the international system and offered a firm plan of action led by middle powers. The rupture that Carney described as “the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality” refers to the recession of a world order founded on the stability of international norms and conventions. Other prominent actors, including Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, emphasized the permanence of this fracture. 

The recognition of the end of the international order as we know it has led middle-power leaders to call for concrete action to shape the new order. Initially, described by 16th-century Italian political scholar Giovanni Botero, middle-power actors are states that are indeed below the global superpowers in terms of strength and influence, but still capable of holding their own among their global counterparts. While existing obstacles have previously prevented middle powers from exerting a stronger influence on the world order, the breach in the international system creates an unprecedented opportunity for, and necessity of, middle-power collaboration.

The success of this historic task depends largely on middle-power states’ ability to leverage economic trade agreements to forge new partnerships. Specifically, trade provides a tangible avenue for middle powers to reduce their resource dependence on the American hegemon and uphold the conventions that previously ensured international stability. 

When considering middle-power trade alliances, the nature of middle-power relations presents two primary hurdles to new trade agreements: divergent interests among middle-power actors and the lack of inclusion of emerging economies. These two obstacles call into question the actual ability of middle-power states to truly influence the evolution of the new world order. 

When it comes to the lack of inclusion of emerging economies, the obstacle lies in states’ ability to pool resources effectively without including all countries. If smaller state interests are not taken into account and therefore excluded from new treaties, this may erode the effectiveness of new trade agreements to produce sustainable and cooperative outcomes. In terms of divergent interests, there has been a strong incentive for middle powers to defect from new trade agreements to ensure their economic preservation. These constraints appear to provide strong grounds for doubting the capacity of middle-power states to take the world order into their own hands. 

This said, Davos demonstrated compelling evidence that middle-power states are, in fact, uniting around a new focal point in the face of global insecurity, addressing the first of the two primary constraints. The current shift in global power relations creates a unique common interest for all middle powers: the preservation of global security and stability, which outweighs, in part, the economic incentives to defect. New economic alliances are already forming, including what is now known as the “mother of all deals” between the European Union and India, set to create a market worth approximately $27 trillion USD by opening service subsectors between the EU and India. Beyond this, a notable trip to Beijing, the People’s Republic of China, by Mark Carney in January of this year marks the first visit to China by a Canadian Prime Minister in nearly a decade. The outcome of this journey was a joint statement issued by Carney and Chinese President Xi Jinping, establishing a monumental partnership between the two countries. This partnership will involve collaboration on resource provision, investments in sustainable energy sources, including solar and wind, and tariff reductions to expand markets between the two countries. These two economic alliances demonstrate that middle-powers are willing to stand by their commitment to global collaboration promised at Davos, overcoming the barrier of conflicting interests.

Not only has the rupture of the international order served as a crucial focal point, uniting middle-power states by providing a paramount common interest, but this process has also placed strong emphasis on the roles of emerging economies in the reconstruction of the world order. As stated by Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, in Davos, “the multilateral order that was created after World War II was created in the image of the West…we now need to change the power structure and give agency to the bigger players in the global South.” When it comes to trade alliances, this calls for reconfiguring trade agreements to include and protect the interests of emerging economies, particularly those in the Global South. 

The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026, a report by the World Economic Forum that measures global cooperation across five pillars, shows that trade reconfigurations are already underway, leading to increasingly diversified trade agreements. While the report estimates an overall decline in global cooperation due to new trade barriers, future trade agreements between emerging economies offer a beacon of hope for increased global collaboration. For example, the initiation of the Future of Investment and Trade (FIT) partnership in 2025, uniting 16 “small and medium-sized countries” to “strengthen the rules-based trading system” and fostering cooperation among members. Initiatives such as the FIT partnership represent a strong undercurrent of trade reconfigurations that aim to promote smaller economic coalitions among states. 

Further evidence of increased inclusion of emerging economies and middle-power states in multilateral agreements is the World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (ASF) adopted in 2022. Throughout the two-decade-long negotiation process for the agreement, the largest proportion of written submissions was issued by various small- and medium-sized country coalitions of the Global South and by a group of countries classified as Least Developed by the WTO. This demonstrates the pre-existing ability of current and emerging middle powers to influence multilateral treaties and, indeed, reinforces their position at the head of the new world order. By working towards successful resource pooling and the creation of multilateral agreements that are shaped by the voices of smaller economies, it appears that a standard of dialogue and partnership is being set in the development of a new global structure. 

The overall takeaway from Davos is two-fold: leaders recognized the permanence of the “rupture” of the world order, and a necessary commitment of middle-power states to collaboration was established. While evident obstacles have previously lain in the way of middle-power states seeking to expand their global positions, these no longer act as barriers to the influence of current and emerging middle powers; the fracture of the international order is providing a cataclysmic force that is motivating unprecedented partnerships among smaller members of the global community. There is a new focal point to unite middle powers, and recent developments in trade agreements point to a pre-existing trend of trade reconfiguration. Without cooperation among medium and small powers, the alternative outcome risks a system operating on a foundation of self-interest and protectionist principles. Yet there is strong reason to be hopeful about the preservation of the stable and reliable features of the norms-based order as middle powers work to reform this structure through diversified partnerships. 

Edited by Shumyle Eman Shahid

Featured Image: Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, 2026. Photo by the World Economic Forum is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.