Canada’s Promise of Sanctuary for Uyghurs Comes Up Short

In January 2023, Mehmet Tohti, a Uyghur Canadian activist, answered a call that appeared to come from Hong Kong. Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, later told Canada’s Foreign Interference Commission that Chinese police had placed a relative on the line to tell him that his mother and two sisters were dead.  He eventually learned that his 76-year-old mother had died in a detention camp. The timing, he said, carried an unmistakable warning: her death was “the cost you have to pay if you continue to advocate.” The call came days before the Canadian Parliament debated a plan to resettle 10,000 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. 

On February 1, 2023, the House of Commons unanimously adopted Motion M-62, calling on Canada to resettle 10,000 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in need of protection. Yet, three years later, as of March 2026, fewer than 300 have actually arrived. At this pace, Canada is nowhere near on track to fulfill its commitment, which is scheduled to conclude at the end of 2026. Such a delay is more than an immigration backlog. Combined with Beijing’s intimidation of the Uyghur diaspora already in Canada, it reveals a wider failure: Although Canada has recognized that Chinese repression tactics cross international borders, it has not built an equally effective system of protection. Sanctuary cannot mean admission alone; it must include both a timely route to Canada and the freedom and protection of Uyghurs’ free speech once they arrive. 

The need for protection begins in Xinjiang, where a 2022 UN assessment documented large-scale arbitrary detention, torture allegations, intrusive surveillance, and stringent restrictions on religious and cultural life. The report concluded that abuses against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups may constitute crimes against humanity, though Beijing defends its policies as counterterrorism measures aimed at combatting separatism, violent extremism, and past attacks. The UN assessment, however, found that China’s counterterrorism system relied on vague definitions and discriminatory indicators of “extremism” that enabled large-scale arbitrary detention. The security rationale therefore does not account for the breadth of the repression it has been used to justify. 

Motion M-62 focuses on those who have escaped China but remain vulnerable in “third countries,” meaning host or transit states other than China and Canada, while also acknowledging that Beijing places intense pressure on governments to detain and deport Uyghurs back to China. In February 2025, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur men after detaining most of them for over a decade, despite knowing that they faced a real risk of torture and other serious harm back in China. Delays in resettlement from third countries to Canada can therefore prolong Uyghurs’ exposure to detention, deportation, or coercion. 

The resettlement process is not simple. Applicants generally need a referral from the UN refugee agency, a designated organization, or a private sponsor, and must pass medical, criminal, and security checks before travelling to Canada. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) claims operational details must sometimes remain confidential to protect applicants, staff, and referral partners. Those are legitimate constraints, particularly when documentation is difficult to obtain, and third-country host governments may not cooperate. 

However, the confidentiality issue does not explain the scale of the Canadian government’s shortfall. By September 2025, more than 140 people had arrived in Canada, while over 740 applications were still being processed. In March 2026, a senior departmental official reported that fewer than 300 people had reached Canada — less than three per cent of Parliament’s target of 10,000. M-62 was a non-binding motion, not an enforceable law, but its unanimous passage created a political commitment. When Parliament promises protection on that scale, the government should match it with sufficient processing capacity, refugee spaces, and transparent aggregate reporting. Publishing totals and timelines would not expose applicants’ identities; it would allow the public to judge whether the promise is being carried out. 

Moreover, arrival in Canada does not necessarily place Uyghurs beyond Beijing’s reach. Transnational repression occurs when a government tries to monitor, threaten, or silence people outside its territory. Uyghur Canadians who spoke to the Foreign Interference Commission described threatening calls, hacked devices, surveillance at protests, online harassment, and pressure directed at relatives in China. One participant also reported physical and verbal assaults while protesting outside Chinese consular buildings. Threats against family members are especially effective because they turn ordinary communication into a source of danger. Tohti testified that his relatives had been denied passports since he left his hometown in 1991, and explained that many Uyghurs in Canada avoid contacting family in China because a phone call from abroad can bring unwanted attention from authorities. This coercion by proxy allows Beijing to impose its will beyond its legal jurisdiction, as a refugee may be physically safe in Canada, yet still unable to protest, organize, or speak publicly for fear of retaliation from Beijing. 

Notably, Canada has begun to strengthen its response to transnational repression in recent years. Bill C-70, which received Royal Assent in June 2024, expanded the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s ability to share information, modernized offences involving foreign-linked intimidation, and created a foreign-influence transparency registry. However, as of March 2026, the government was still working to implement the registry and its commissioner’s office. These reforms, once in effect, will improve the government’s ability to identify and prosecute interference. Still, they will not automatically create an accessible safety net for a person receiving an anonymous call, being photographed while watching a protest, or fearing that a relative will be punished. 

The pathway is thus clear for Canada: protection must become more accessible. Ottawa cannot reliably prevent reprisals against relatives inside China, but it can improve support for people targeted within Canada. A single multilingual portal and hotline should allow victims to report suspicious calls, digital intrusions, and protest monitoring without first deciding whether a case belongs with police, CSIS, or another agency. A trained coordinator could refer victims to law enforcement, cybersecurity specialists, legal aid, or trauma-informed counselling and explain what follow-up is possible. Agencies should proactively brief at-risk communities rather than waiting for victims to navigate several institutions on their own. IRCC should also issue regular aggregate updates on M-62 applications, approvals, and arrivals while withholding identifying and operational details. These measures would connect two policy areas that Ottawa treats separately: refugee resettlement and protection from foreign interference. 

Canada’s promise to Uyghurs will remain largely symbolic if those in danger cannot arrive and those who do arrive cannot enjoy the liberties of free speech, press, and association. Meaningful sanctuary requires both a route to safety and protection from the government that made refuge necessary. 

Edited by George Wu

Featured Image: Protesters call for freedom for the Uyghur people at a rally in Melbourne in 2022. Photo by Matt Hrkac is licensed under CC BY 2.0.