European Airspace: The New Front in Russia’s Hybrid War
Since February 2022, the Russo-Ukrainian war has demonstrated to the world that the nature of modern warfare is evolving at an unprecedented pace. Wars are no longer defined solely by physical combat and conventional land operations, and Russia is determined to stay ahead of the curve.
Evidence of Moscow’s use of hybrid warfare has been apparent since its 2014 invasion of Crimea, and the trend has only intensified over time. In the past year, Russia has built an extensive portfolio of hybrid warfare operations targeting Europe. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that incidents of confirmed Russian sabotage against European critical infrastructure increased by 246 per cent between 2023 and 2024. These attacks include sabotaging the Estlink-2 power cable between Finland and Estonia in December 2024, causing significant energy and communications disruptions across the Baltic region, and orchestrating disinformation campaigns in Moldova aimed at undermining the pro-EU ruling party ahead of the country’s parliamentary elections. These campaigns show no signs of slowing, especially as Russia appears to be entering a new phase of hybrid operations: overt incursions into Europe’s skies.
Russian violations of European airspace are not a new phenomenon, but they have multiplied in recent months. In the span of just a few weeks in September 2025, Moscow repeatedly violated European airspace. On the night of September 9, over twenty Russian drones entered Polish airspace, several of which were shot down by Polish jets. On September 19, Estonia reported that three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violated its airspace over the Gulf of Finland for approximately twelve minutes. In addition, unidentified drones have been sighted over Denmark, Germany, and Belgium near critical infrastructure, including airports, military installations, and logistics hubs. Although the latter incidents were not confirmed to be of Russian origin, the evidence and circumstances point to their potential involvement.
These incursions have generated significant diplomatic vexation in Europe, primarily because of their far-reaching legal implications. In particular, these operations violate the sovereignty of independent states under international law, which guarantees that every country has control over the airspace above its territory (Article 1 of the Paris Convention of 1919 and Article 1 of the Chicago Convention of 1944). In addition, the International Civil Aviation Organization requires that civil aircraft obtain prior authorization before entering another state’s airspace, while military aircraft must receive explicit bilateral permission. If drones or jets are armed, or are perceived as a military threat, their presence violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against another state.
Beyond these established legal principles, these incursions represent a larger geopolitical threat. Many of the European countries affected by these incursions are also NATO members and are therefore subject to Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, a clause that enables member states to consult one another when they believe their sovereignty or territorial integrity is under threat from another nation. This raises a crucial question: if a state cannot adequately defend its airspace and borders, what does that reveal about its ability to uphold its defence credibility? Both NATO and the EU are aware of the challenges posed by airspace vulnerabilities and have responded accordingly. On September 23, NATO emphasized that in the name of collective defence, such incidents must not recur and that its responses will be robust if they do. Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radek Sikorski warned, “If another missile or aircraft enters our space without permission, deliberately or by mistake, and gets shot down…please don’t come here to whine about it.” On October 8, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, urged Europe to adopt a new mindset, moving beyond a purely reactive posture toward deterrence and coordinated action.
From a practical standpoint, the presence of unidentified objects outside a state’s control can severely disrupt critical infrastructure; in many cases, a single unidentified object is enough to shut down facilities such as commercial airports, as occurred in Poland.
The ease with which Russia has encroached on European airspace reveals a deeper reality about the continent: both collective organizations (NATO and the EU) and individual states were unprepared for this form of hybrid warfare. Moscow is now executing operations that Europe once believed Russia would never dare to undertake. This lack of preparedness has fostered a reactive posture, with states acting largely “in response to” rather than “in anticipation of” threats, thereby undermining their credibility. NATO itself has acknowledged that it did not project the strongest possible image.
One must recognize that European states are in a challenging position when confronting the complexities of this form of hybrid warfare. Although Russia’s covert actions have been exposed, Moscow has never openly acknowledged responsibility. The Kremlin has employed a strategy of plausible deniability, which is a central advantage of hybrid warfare. Avoiding clear culpability frequently yields strategic dividends, and the lack of definitive evidence limits the options available to victim states in responding to the aggressor. Plausible deniability has thus become a core instrument of Russian foreign policy doctrine. Additionally, Europe, which has historically relied on the military support of the US, can no longer depend solely on America’s defensive capabilities. European states now find themselves with a degree of military responsibility not seen since World War II and must, in many ways, relearn how to coordinate and act collectively on their own, which may take some time.
Moscow is deliberately testing Europe’s military and political resolve by probing European airspace aggressively yet carefully to test the strength of Euro-American relationships. Since January 2025, the US retrenchment from Europe in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has allowed Russia to observe a declining American NATO commitment firsthand, which Moscow has since exploited to provoke Europe as it increasingly attempts to act independently. However, although the likelihood of continued escalation is high, to what extent can Russia push provocations against Europe and NATO? In reality, the Kremlin lacks the military capacity to confront either unilaterally in a fight. This suggests that limits do exist regarding Russia’s provocations, particularly in terms of engaging in fair hybrid or physical warfare. Nonetheless, Moscow is daringly testing just how far it can push Europe.
Ultimately, Russia’s incursions into European skies are shaped by both geography and geopolitical ambitions. Historically, Russia has struggled to secure reliable access to the oceans, a factor that significantly affects a state’s economic potential, trade routes, and territorial security. Its limited warm-water ports have long constrained naval power projection, forcing Russia to seek alternative avenues to assert influence. Geographically, Russia is nearly landlocked and difficult to defend, particularly in the flat western regions west of the Ural Mountains, which leave it exposed to potential invasions and make traditional territorial defence challenging. In this context, Russia’s vulnerabilities have driven it to increasingly rely on airspace operations as a strategic tool. By asserting dominance in the skies, Moscow can demonstrate military reach and signal geopolitical strength without committing to a full-scale ground confrontation, turning hybrid air operations into a cost-effective means of compensating for structural geographic and strategic limitations.
Edited by David Amm
Featured Image: “Press conference by the NATO Secretary General” by NATO is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
