Fighting Fire with Fire: Artillery in the Russo-Ukrainian War
February 24, 2022, heralded the largest conventional war on European soil since the 1940s. What was initially envisioned to be a swift, crippling incursion has instead unfolded quite contrary to expectations. Today, well over three years following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the latter has upheld an admirable resistance, with artillery at its heart.
In World War I, artillery was the decisive means of combat for operational success. Since then, its centrality has arguably been eclipsed by other innovations in military technology—tanks, air power, and, most recently, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). However, artillery has been integral in dictating the balance of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and it is imperative to sustain discussions of artillery capabilities with vigour.
Descending from a time-honoured instrument of combat, contemporary artillery systems are designed to provide indirect, long-range fire support to combat arm units. With 80 per cent of casualties on both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian war attributable to artillery fire, it is little wonder that in 1944, Joseph Stalin christened artillery the “God of War” in deference to its lethality. The delivery of corporeal devastation aside, artillery is known to inflict veritable psychological distress.
Artillery’s centrality in this conflict notably derives from Russia’s fidelity to the gun. Artillery can be massed; it is less vulnerable than aircraft forces to the whims of weather and can be swiftly deployed as it falls under the operational purview of the Army. Vis-à-vis the West, Russia maintains not merely a formidable artillery repository, but also staggering production capabilities. Unlike its foreign peers, Russia’s Missile Troops and Artillery exercises a broad range of functions, comprising traditional, nuclear, and reconnaissance roles. With substantial Soviet-era inheritances to boot, Russian artillery remains a fearsome entity to contend with.
Note that this endowment bias is critically shaped by doctrine and historical circumstance. Russian employment of en masse fires aligns with traditional doctrine in favour of volume, suppression, and maneuvering by fire. Modernization yields to doctrine; Soviet-era experiences in Afghanistan, and more recent expeditions in Chechnya and Georgia, have borne little reason to deviate from a reliable framework. Enabled by numerical superiority, Russia’s strategy has consequently been to overwhelm Ukraine via sustained bombardment. Moscow’s persistent efforts to deplete Ukraine’s arsenal imbue the war with a fundamentally attritional character. The invocation of the 21-year-long Second Northern War, parallel to the conflict in Ukraine, further suggests Russian expectations of a protracted engagement.
Fire ought to be fought with fire—artillery fire, at least. One of the most effective counters to artillery shelling is, fittingly, counter-battery fire. Given that unguided tube artillery systems are significantly cheaper than prestige investments in aerial capabilities and air defence, strengthening and deploying Ukraine’s own gunnery capabilities has been crucial, thus reinforcing the centrality of artillery in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
At the outset of the war, Ukraine’s military capabilities were fundamentally inadequate. Having been bequeathed Soviet-era legacy systems like the D-30 and 2S1 Gvozdika at the USSR’s dissolution, Ukraine initially relied upon medium-calibre guns that offered limited range and accuracy relative to the modern 155mm artillery prevalent among NATO members. Russia, likewise, liberally employs many of these heirloom systems but compensates for their obsolescence through sheer numbers—a capacity that Ukraine cannot hope to match. However, through prudent aid packages, joint production deals, clever requisition and burgeoning domestic production, Ukraine has been able to ameliorate its initial deficits. While Ukraine is plagued by quantitative deficiencies, it has gradually compensated through the acquisition of more accurate, long-range artillery systems, like the HIMARS and Caesar 155mm howitzers, versus Russia’s 152mm. Furthermore, material constraints have spurred astounding battlefield innovation; Ukraine’s extensive utilization of drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and strike functions exemplifies how dire necessity has precipitated tactical ingenuity.
Wartime often provides critical junctures for dramatic transformations in doctrine and practice. Since 2022, the unprecedented scale at which drones have been used has systemically transformed wartime strategy. Concealment is increasingly impeded; long-range artillery, which traditionally relies on distance and cover, can no longer hide as easily behind the front line. With both Ukraine and Russia sporting robust drone industries, artillery forces on either side of the front line must learn how to navigate a potent arbitrating force.
Intuitively, one might presume that drones spell the end for artillery. Barring self-propelled guns, towed artillery units are far less operationally mobile than their armoured or infantry counterparts and are therefore more vulnerable to drone reconnaissance and loitering munition—facilitated retaliatory strikes. Yet, artillery’s persistence is assured, in both the present and the future. Currently, widespread proliferation of drone use has stimulated the induction of tracked and wheeled mobile artillery. This preserves the core purpose of artillery whilst bestowing upon the arm a functional improvement by virtue of heightened maneuverability.
In consideration of coming times, the threat posed by drones is systemic, not arm-specific, and thus demands a solution rooted in electronic warfare and air defence. We exist in a period wherein UAS and counter-UAS capabilities are highly dynamic—each technical innovation will furnish one with a temporary advantage over the other. This hearkens back to the early proliferation of tanks during the First World War, which initially disrupted battlefield dynamics until robust countermeasures such as anti-tank guns and improvised explosive devices emerged.
Once counter-UAS technologies are consolidated, attention will likely pivot back toward traditional arms, such as artillery. Notably, tube artillery is largely resistant to signal jamming, a key advantage over non-fibre optic drone systems. While drones offer precision and autonomy, they lack the volume of fire and explosive yield wrought by artillery bombardment. Given its aptitude in spotting, targeting, and battle damage assessment, UAS use ought to be anticipated as a force multiplier for artillery—not a blanket replacement.
It bears remembering that the actual weapon is not the artillery gun, but the shell it fires. Thus arises an inevitable problem: ammunition shortages. Ukraine remains outgunned—though this gap is slowly closing—while shell supply has been bottlenecked by legislative infighting and supplier delays. Artillery production infrastructure in the West has long been neglected, increasingly to Ukraine’s detriment. Russia’s sustained shell output continues to outpace that of Ukraine’s allies and is bolstered by assistance from countries like North Korea.
Moscow objects most vehemently to systems that enable Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory, decisively alter air superiority, or materially strengthen Kyiv’s ability to conduct offensive combined-arms operations. These capabilities are seen by the Kremlin as fatal threats to the calculus of the war and therefore elicit the strongest political pushback. Artillery reinforcements give Ukraine the wherewithal to sustain its defence within the bounds of conventional warfare. It enables Ukraine to remain militarily viable, without inflating the risk of horizontal or nuclear escalation.
The Russo-Ukrainian War has well-evinced artillery’s enduring relevance, even amid rapid technological change. Far from being a relic of warfare, artillery retains an indelible role in the twenty-first-century battlescape. At present, President Zelenskyy has committed himself to achieving a “just peace,” and the United States lacks the leverage to compel a settlement as it did in Gaza. Unless an agreement satisfactory to Kyiv is brokered, prospects for the cessation of hostilities remain tenuous. It is, thus, of the utmost importance that Ukraine’s artillery needs are satiated—to defend its sovereignty, and to preserve stability in Europe.
Edited by Georgia Massis
The author would like to thank Maj. Mykola Lenchuk and Brig. Dhiraj Ramanand for their insights.
Featured image: 110th General Marko Bezruchko Mechanized Brigade artillerymen showing RM-70 MLRSs donated by the Czech Republic during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Photo by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine is licensed under CC BY 4.0.
