Fractured Command: What China’s Military Shakeup Reveals About a Nation Unable to Fight

Xi Jinping’s most trusted generals are gone. In January 2026, General Zhang Youxia, first-ranked vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and China’s highest-ranking military officer, was placed under investigation over “serious discipline and law violations.” Three months earlier, the second-ranked vice chairman, General He Weidong, was also arrested and removed from office. Both men were once considered close loyalists and proponents of Xi’s consolidation of military power since 2012. The purges are historic: no military officer serving as vice chairman has been removed while in office since 1971, and never before have both been ousted at once.

Their downfall eliminated two powerful factions that had controlled the military’s hierarchy for years. Zhang, due to his status as one of the last officers with active combat experience, held immense influence within the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) traditional and conservative power base. He was also quite close to Xi, as his family has historically had close personal ties to Xi’s. On the other hand, He Weidong, whose career was based in the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command, represented Xi’s political base in Fujian Province and his strategic interests over Taiwan. The timing of their arrests was no coincidence. Since 2023, a wave of purges in the PLA high command has wiped out the majority of China’s top military commanders. So far, two ministers of defence, five out of the six members of the CMC, and the majority of commanders of the PLA’s service branches, theatre commands, and staff departments have either been expelled, arrested, or removed. The downfall of the two vice chairmen was the culmination of these purges.

The purge campaign traces back to a 2022 report published by the United States Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). Information within the report, which detailed the entire structural and operational organization of the PLA Rocket Force (China’s strategic and tactical missile units), was believed to have been leaked by a high-profile source within the PLA. This prompted a massive investigation into its senior leadership, and by September 2023, two commanders were stripped of their positions. Due to the scale of the scandal, other serious problems were uncovered, including widespread corruption, particularly around the misappropriation of defence funds and mass-procurement fraud within China’s military equipment and research industries. These implications, as current developments have shown, will deliver crucial setbacks to the PLA’s combat readiness—especially on Taiwan.

China’s military mandate over Taiwan revolves around the supremacy of its aerospace, strategic missile, and naval forces. The PLA’s strategy relies on precision-strike capabilities to deter US and allied forces from intervening against Chinese troops in the region. However, the volume of procurement fraud scandals has rendered a large component of China’s strike arsenals completely inoperable. Strategic missiles, according to US intelligence sources, were filled with water instead of fuel. Silos used to hold these missiles across Chinese bases were also improperly constructed, making active launching impossible. Punishments for these actions reached the very top, as General Li Shangfu, the minister of national defence who also served as the former chief of equipment development, became the first member within the CMC to be expelled.

If the backbone of China’s Taiwan strategy is operationally dysfunctional, then its ability and will to deploy the PLA will be severely constrained. As a result, the goal that Xi had set for invasion plans to be ready by 2027 seems unattainable.

Leadership of the PLA’s operational forces was also hollowed out. The CMC Joint Staff Department, which is responsible for coordinating combat operations across all theatre commands, saw its chief of staff, General Liu Zhenli, removed alongside Zhang Youxia. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command, responsible for all Taiwan-related combat operations, saw its commander, a Xi loyalist from Fujian, purged along with He Weidong. So far, there have been no replacements for the majority of these positions. As a result, a functioning military command structure has collapsed throughout the Chinese military. Generals who have survived the rounds of investigations are in no position to fight, as they would be more concerned with their survival than planning an invasion. In a climate of constant arrests and investigations, initiatives from senior commanders are paralyzed. No officer would want to risk making decisions that could potentially implicate them in mismanagement and corruption. As a result, China now commands a military that exists on paper but cannot wage war.

Although bringing down senior officials has allowed Xi to tackle widespread corruption across the military’s high command, he also created a severe leadership vacuum throughout every level of the PLA’s operational structure. Successful invasions require strong coordination from service branches, theatre commands, and staff departments. China’s military currently lacks leaders for all three. In addition to the extensive vacancies of commanders, the PLA is also institutionally vulnerable. Militaries function through top-down command structures. Without commanders to transmit orders, doctrines, and strategies to operational units, the PLA will be incapable of executing complex operations anytime soon.

The consequences don’t stop at military capability. In Chinese politics, control of the PLA equals control of the state. Deng Xiaoping held paramount power for 11 years by retaining control of one office: chairman of the CMC (commander-in-chief). However, rival factions within the CCP may interpret these current developments as Xi’s inability to use the military as leverage in internal party disputes. This, in turn, will have disastrous consequences for his ability to maintain his grip on political power.

Xi, as chairman of the CMC and commander-in-chief, has relentlessly purged generals who were loyal to him. Doing this will send a signal to other officers and politicians that loyalty does not guarantee their political protection. After all, he was able to wipe out the entire CMC—generals he had handpicked—in less than two years. This, as a result, will cause disillusionment among the highest echelons of China’s military and political elite. Consequently, a disillusioned military will also cause Xi to gradually lose his control and influence politically. Because Xi’s mandate heavily emphasizes resolving the Taiwan issue, a weakened grip over a weakened PLA will severely undermine his political legitimacy. As the 21st Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which will select China’s next leadership, is set to begin next year, Xi will face a double crisis. If he cannot deliver on Taiwan while simultaneously losing control of a fractured PLA, the consequences will be detrimental for Xi’s political survival into the next half-decade.

Edited by Stellar Zhang

Featured Image: “Zhang Youxia (2017-12-07) 01” by Kremlin.ru is licensed under CC BY 4.0.