From Periphery to Player: Africa’s Voice in the Shifting International Order

We are living through a moment of profound transformation in the international order. New coalitions, such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), are positioning themselves as alternatives to US dominance, rooted in South-South cooperation and multipolarity. These blocs are pushing for reform across global financial, diplomatic, and governance structures. For African states, long relegated to the margins of global power, this shifting terrain presents new opportunities—and risks. On one hand, it opens doors to fairer economic rules, more representative governance, and diversified partnerships. On the other hand, it raises the spectre of new dependencies, sharper geopolitical rivalries, and continued marginalization within emerging coalitions.

Amid these shifting dynamics, many African countries are actively rethinking their foreign policy approaches. Far from passive recipients, many governments are now leveraging multilateral platforms, broadening partnerships, and seeking a more strategic role in global affairs. Still, structural constraints, from fragmented diplomacy to institutional weakness and various levels of dependency, continue to limit the stretch of this agency.

Global powers have long treated the African continent as a theatre for influence and exploitation. Today’s rivalries echo many of the past—driven by the same pursuit of resources, markets, and influence. China is Africa’s top trading partner and creditor, pouring billions into infrastructure via the Belt and Road Initiative. The US has re-engaged, too, but with a markedly different approach—one that has oscillated sharply between administrations.

US President Donald Trump hosts a multilateral luncheon with five African leaders during his July 2025 summit in Washington. Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok. Licensed under www.usa.gov/government-copyright.

Under President Joe Biden in 2022, Washington struck an inclusive tone. Nearly every African head of state was invited to the US-Africa Leaders Summit, which emphasized collaboration on infrastructure, health, and climate policy. Biden’s rhetoric framed Africa as a partner rather than a problem. 

Three years later, the contrast could not have been sharper. President Donald Trump’s July 2025 Summit in Washington featured only five leaders from Africa: Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal. The White House promoted the meeting as a dialogue on trade and regional development, but the guest list told a different story. In excluding major players like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa, the Trump administration reveals its transactional logic: Washington signalled that its focus was on securing strategic resources and curbing migration flows from the continent. 

One moment particularly captured the tone of the summit: Trump praised Liberian President Joseph Boakai for his “beautiful English,” asking where he had learned to speak so fluently. English is the official language of Liberia. Although the remark may have been intended as a compliment, it was widely viewed as patronizing—reigniting criticism of US diplomacy as steeped in outdated assumptions and neocolonial attitudes. More broadly, it exposed how Western engagement with Africa can oscillate between performative gestures and veiled dominance rather than through genuine collaboration.

“Prime Minister Kier attends the G20 Summit in Brazil in November 2024.” South Africa is a full member and the African Union is a permanent guest. Their participation shows Africa’s growing role and efforts to gain influence and representation in global affairs. Picture by Simon Dawson. Licensed under cc-by-2.0.

African diplomats seem to have a growing awareness of this dynamic and are doubling efforts to navigate it more deliberately. States, along with the African Union (AU), are increasingly investing in alternatives. The AU’s admission as a permanent member of the Group 20 in September 2023 was a move that symbolically acknowledged the region’s demographic and economic weight. African policymakers used the opportunity to highlight the continent’s role as a global stakeholder, and not merely a developmental recipient.

Nigeria led a major diplomatic shift in 2024 to move global tax negotiations from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a club of mostly wealthy countries, to the UN instead, where all countries have a voice. This was a major step toward reducing tax avoidance and ensuring that more revenue stays in countries where businesses operate. 

The strategic question is now how Africa can wield that relevance in a system reluctant to share power. Multilaterally, the AU continues to push for institutional reform through frameworks like the Ezulwini Consensus from 2005, which still calls for at least two permanent African seats on the UN Security Council. Though largely ignored by the Council’s core powers, the Ezulwini Consensus has become a rallying point for Africa’s claim to overdue representation in global security decisions.

This search for alternatives extends beyond the UN system. Africa’s engagement with BRICS has intensified. South Africa’s longstanding membership, along with the invitation extended to Egypt and Ethiopia to join in 2024, reflects a continental interest in diversifying diplomatic channels. For many states, BRICS presents itself as an alternative to a Western-dominated world and a platform where developing countries can push for reforms in global finance, trade, and technology transfer.

However, the promise of BRICS remains uneven. While African countries have a seat at the table, that seat has yet to translate into real influence: African members have little say over the bloc’s economic agenda. Proposals for local currency trade have been blocked, and members like South Africa still face Chinese tariffs, revealing the gap between BRICS rhetoric and actual influence. Despite ambitions to challenge Western dominance, BRICS currencies account for less than 5 per cent of global financial transactions. Proposals for a shared currency or de-dollarized trade have stalled, hindered by diverging priorities among members, particularly between China and India, as well as by a lack of institutional power. Nonetheless, these moves point to a broader truth: Africa is learning to play the game more actively. It is navigating great-power competition with greater agency and a more strategic calculus, building leverage where possible while also managing the risks of fragmentation and dependency.

In light of all this, we see Africa trying to assert itself in the global order. The continent is pushing back—seeking space, voice, and value in arenas long dominated by others. It is important to note, however, that without stronger continental cooperation, technical capacity, and sustained investment in state institutions, Africa’s geopolitical agency risks plateauing. The continent is moving, but whether it can lead remains an unanswered question. The road ahead will require the political will to turn presence into power.

Edited by Maisie Minnick

Featured Image: “BRICS summit 2019.” Photo by Alan Santos. Licensed under cc-by-2.0