Have the Seeds of an Asian Spring Been Sown?

If one had to choose a theme song to describe Nepal’s summer, it would be ABBA’s “The Winner Takes It All.” Flooding the internet with TikToks, reels, and edits of corrupt politicians and “nepo-babies” to the song, the ignited youth of Nepal decided to change this narrative on their own. What was originally planned as a peaceful protest against corruption would transform into a revolution. On September 9, student protestors burned the parliament, leading Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to resign. Three days later, Sushila Karki was chosen as the interim Prime Minister through social media platform Discord–yes, Discord. 

Tensions were already brewing in the region’s undercurrents, driven by rising unemployment and resentment towards the affluence and wealth of those in power. But the immediate tipping point has been attributed to the government’s ban on 26 social platforms, framed as a regulatory move against fake identities and hate speech, but perceived as censorship aimed at silencing dissent. The culmination of these sentiments led to protests by the youth, which spread through Nepal from Kathmandu to Pokhara. Social media quickly became the anchor through which protests spread, with roaring praise for the Nepalese youth. Across Asia, youth began calling for similar revolutions against their governments, pushing some observers to term it an “Asian Spring”. However, the important question now is: will this movement herald waves of resistance from Asian societies against corrupt governments? Further, will the resulting change be sustainable for regimes and governance? 

There has been an increase in youth-led protests across Asia, headed by the 2022 Sri Lankan “Aragalaya” or “the struggle,” a series of mass protests against the Rajapaksa family. The ruling democratic family of Sri Lanka was accused of mismanagement of governance and economic policies. This caused the biggest economic crisis in Sri Lanka’s history and led to the overthrow of the government through student and youth-led protests. The protests went on for four months; parliament members started resigning, with the former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe resigning and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fleeing the country. Finally, in 2024, by a majority vote, left-leaning and pro-poor candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake was elected as the next president.

In Bangladesh, the July Revolution began in 2024 as a student uprising and youth-led protest against Bangladesh’s quota reform movement, which reserved quotas in civil service jobs for the descendants and relatives of war veterans during the independence movement. This reform ignited significant backlash from an already highly unemployed youth, with a country facing economic slowdown and patronage politics. The uprisings devolved into mass killings against the protestors, and finally demanded a resignation from then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, as she fled to India amidst the violence. Following this was the formation of an interim government headed by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus.  

Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi protests established a precedent for future youth-led protests and the power to overthrow governments. Large-scale uprisings triggered by economic stagnation and corruption amongst country elites have led young people to mobilize for change. The demonstrations which have taken place in the past three years show growing sentiment in the youth of Asia—frustrated with corrupt governments, economic impasse, and stagnant mobility—which was synthesized by specific tipping points, such as the social media ban in Nepal, job quotas in Bangladesh, and economic collapse in Sri Lanka.

Prominent leaders of BIMSTEC countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, among others. “Sheikh Hasina With BIMSTEC Leaders, Goa, India, 2016-10-16” by the Press Information Department of Bangladesh is licensed under the Public Domain. 

Purely in principle and theory, the conditions for these youth-driven protests exist in larger South Asian countries like India and Pakistan. High youth populations, economic inequality, rampant corruption, and digital fluency are all markers of a reform of the same nature. However, for India, a country of 1.4 billion people, it is highly unlikely that people can mobilize well enough to take down the government, unlike Nepal, a country of around 30 million people. In political science, the 3.5 per cent rule is a good indicator of why it’s significantly harder to bring down governments in larger countries. Harvard political scientist Erica Chenoweth observed that non-violent protests, when 3.5 per cent of the population engages, are twice as likely to topple governments. This establishes a pristine image of how people need to organize against their government. However, given the larger bureaucracies of bigger states, entrenched power structures, more varied regional diversities, and greater state capacities to suppress dissent, it is almost impossible for large-scale demonstrations like those in Nepal or Sri Lanka to take place.

In Nepal, particularly, the ability to bring about fundamental change depends on the decisions the youth make during the March elections in 2026. Although the Nepalese youth have been congratulated and commended for their swift show of power in standing up to the corrupt regime, and rightfully so, the real challenge lies in the post-protest period, when regimes are vulnerable and calculated decision-making is crucial. The “Arab Springs” have largely been unsuccessful in curbing autocracy, so will the “Asian Spring” be able to overcome the barrier to sustainable change? 

Few digitally-driven protests have led to sustainable changes in regime and regulation, especially when the premise of digitally organized protests does not grant anyone the status of “leadership”. As trends shift on social media, so does the momentum of the protestors. Without sustained pressure from the pioneers of change, the ability of the youth-led protestors to eradicate corruption and nepotism within governments is largely lost. This was seen in 2006, during the millennial-led protests in Nepal, which ousted the monarchy. But due to a lack of sustained momentum and leadership, the aftermath led to a Maoist insurgency and a decade-long civil war, while the economy stagnated. 

TikTok, Instagram, Discord, WhatsApp—these were the most fundamental tools the youth in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines had at their disposal while organizing the protests over the summer. While this might seem trivial to older generations, no single medium has been able to mobilize and persuade people more than social media has. The media has dubbed the protests as “Gen-Z protests over social media bans”, not only controlling the narrative but also trivializing the deeper systemic issues they were fighting against. Controlling the narrative and trivializing the movement undermines the protestors and dissuades any future dissent inspired by the protests. 

The media has continued to villainize and distort narratives around the youth-led protests, but it is the integrity of the transitional period which will determine whether this is an inflection point in Asia’s history of overcoming adversity and creating meaningful change. If the people are organized, narratives are kept in check, and institutions are strengthened, then the “Asian Spring” may bloom. However, failures in accountability and responsibility may make this revolt another chapter of frustrations in the region’s long arc for accountable governance. 

Edited by Jacob Van Bergh 

Featured Image: “2025 Nepalese Gen Z protesters in front of Bharatpur mahanagarpalika office” by हिमाल सुवेदी is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.