Opinion | Operation Sindoor and Diminishing Cultural Disunity Within the Indian Armed Forces
The maxim “Sevā Paramo Dharmaḥ”—Service before self—yields a potent distillation of the National Defence Academy’s institutional climate, which has long been upheld as the crucible of India’s military leadership. Yet, in consideration of the distinct service cultures that exist alongside the army, how sound is this saying beyond the individual serviceperson? India’s most recent military encounter with Pakistan, in the spring of last year, may offer a medium to deliberate this further. With Operation Sindoor as a focal point, the country’s historically asymmetrical inter-service coordination might be balancing out. Thus, the “self” is embodied by each of the three services charged with safeguarding India. In essence, has the Indian Army successfully put service before itself?
“Service cultures,” here, describe the distinct ethos of each service within the Indian Armed Forces. Akin to the positioning of culture as an inherited socio-cultural legacy, such organizational cultures derive from shared beliefs, experiences, traditions, and professional specializations. This sense of “self” is further tempered by perceptions of personal identity vis-à-vis other collectives.
While military culture is discernible in even the smallest operational units—platoons—it is arguably most cohesive at regimental levels. In particular, the Indian Army’s recruitment practices produce regimental cultures that mirror the ethno-religious diversity of the populace it serves. Beyond this, each service arm within the Army—be it the infantry, armoured, artillery, or engineers—cultivates a distinct organizational culture and often views itself as a unique entity.
One level higher, these subcultures begin to obscure amidst the relationships between the three services: the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force. While intra-service subcultures—across regiments or service arms—interact frequently through shared institutional structures like war colleges, joint brigades, and divisional commands, the three services themselves remain comparatively isolated. Efforts at integration consequently tend to be far more complex, necessitating broader vision, deeper institutional restructuring, and a fundamental alignment of distinct service cultures.
In spite of their imperceptibility, organizational cultures can work both in favour of and against national security interests. Organizational culture serves as a powerful moral centre of gravity; transcending socio-cultural differences, service cultures bind personnel in pursuit of common objectives. Over time, however, it does not suffice to merely modernize technology; it is imperative to regularly assess whether existing service cultures are conducive to the achievement of said objectives.
While distinct, or even competing, service cultures do not inherently imply irreconcilable animosity, they do create space for friction and inefficiency. Such tensions have manifested in past operations and can be minimized through intentional effort.
Conventionally, civilian leaders in the Indian government provide broad mission objectives, thereafter delegating their achievement to the military. The extent to which each service is involved in operational planning and execution is left to the discretion of military leaders. Within this structure, the Army holds disproportionate influence in the decision-making process, often overshadowing the roles of the Air Force and Navy.
Limited implementation of aerial capabilities in the 1962 Sino-Indian War exemplifies such inefficiencies. This conflict saw India suffer an indelible loss at the hands of China for several reasons, but the opportunity to lessen the magnitude of this defeat was rendered a retrospective possibility by inter-service cultural shortsightedness. Some submit that judicious involvement of the Air Force may have even precipitated a dramatically different outcome. Irrespective of whether the Air Force’s inclusion could have truly done so, its gross under-utilization during that period is a fact.
It is also instructive to revisit more recent retaliations wherein enduring limitations of inter-service coordination were revealed. 2016’s surgical incursions—following attacks on a brigade headquarters in Uri—were Army-led, with limited involvement from the Air Force or Navy. Jointness here was minimal, and cultural convergence still elusive. Comparatively, the Balakot airstrikes in 2019 displayed assertive use of air power, indicating a functional evolution but not yet a cultural shift. While the operation challenged Army-dominant inclinations, it largely gestured towards incipient inter-service convergence.
Early in 2025, on April 22, an attack on civilians in Jammu and Kashmir spurred Indian forces to undertake Operation Sindoor, aiming to immobilize cross-border infrastructure. A notable evolution in India’s punitive approach to regional insurgency, the operation demonstrated commendable inter-service synergy. The roles played by each service in Operation Sindoor were determined internally—shaped equally by operational necessity and cultural transformation. The mission thus invites deeper deliberation on the evolution of joint coordination within India’s armed forces.
Of the nine points of interest targeted, the Army was responsible for neutralizing seven. The Air Force dealt with the two deeper targets while maintaining aerospace control through its Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), in tandem with the Army’s Akashteer system. Remaining on standby for escalation, the Navy reinforced maritime deterrence in the northern Arabian Sea. Each service was also represented at public briefings, reinforcing this sense of jointness in the public eye.
Effective coordination across land, air, and sea enabled India to achieve operational objectives without escalation beyond conventional thresholds. Seamless coordination across the three domains bore a decisive outcome, culminating in a ceasefire agreement with Pakistan.
That such operational cohesion was achieved despite the nascence of structural integration within the military strongly suggests that the outcome of Operation Sindoor was driven less by formal institutional mechanisms and more by a cultural shift—from an ethos of single-service primacy to one that increasingly values tri-service collaboration.
To quantify the influence of culture is inherently challenging, especially in determining whether functional coordination reflects genuine cultural alignment. To what extent, then, can recent shifts be attributed to a growth in inter-service unity?
In security and defence, outcomes rarely derive from a singular factor; the assertion here is that culture matters. A clear distinction must be drawn between inter-service synergy and cultural alignment: although not synonymous, the former is often a function of the latter. It is more productive, thus, to view institutional and technical reforms as complementary to cultural transformation, rather than diametrically opposed.
Another limitation is manifest in the absence of a formal Indian National Security Strategy (NSS), which presents a lack of overarching doctrinal guidance on inter-service coordination. Regardless, tri-service leaders increasingly stress the necessity of jointness in public statements and doctrine-adjacent discourse, suggesting a growing commitment to cultural alignment between the services. While such intent rouses cautious optimism, the absence of a unified code implies that much remains contingent upon internal momentum.
Institutionally, the powers of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) remain unsatisfactory. The CDS, while tasked with enhancing jointness, lacks operational authority; this still resides with the individual service chiefs. Hence, the CDS functions as a coordinator rather than an authoritative commander, limiting the position’s ability to enforce integrative initiatives in practice.
While the seamless consolidation of India’s three services is wanting, Operation Sindoor is substantially symptomatic of tri-service cultural convergence. It can be said that the Indian Army has indeed placed service before self—this time. As India’s security environment grows increasingly complex, enabling the Air Force and Navy to operate fully alongside the Army will be essential. This necessitates not only institutionalized mechanisms for enduring coordination, but more urgently, a critical awareness of how intangible cultural divides can constrain operational efficacy.
Edited by Annabelle Zehner
Featured image: “A member of the Tri-Services Guard of Honour from the Indian Air Force” by Abhisit Vejjajiva is licensed under CC-by-2.0.
