Proceed With Caution: New START’s End May Signal a New Beginning
Uncertainty. Unwilling cooperation. Unrestrained cross-border strikes. It seems as if the world has reached its breaking point, and so has nuclear arms control. Perhaps the “rupture” in the international world order that Prime Minister Mark Carney referred to at Davos also applies to the looming threat of a new arms race.
Now that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as the “New START,” officially expired on February 5, 2026, the formal arms control agreement between Russia and the United States–who together hold over 80 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons–has ended. In its collapse, nuclear safety experts have voiced concerns about a potential escalation of nuclear tensions, with some arguing it could lead to an unrestrained acceleration of the arms race, while others view it merely as a transition that must be heeded with greater caution. Nevertheless, increasingly protectionist agendas and a lack of trust mean that cooperation negotiations will be unlikely in the coming years.
The New START was not the first arms treaty between the United States and Russia. Ratified on April 8, 2010, the New START effectively replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009. The treaty had two main objectives: to limit the number of deployed warheads between the two largest nuclear arsenals and to expand clarity and stability in arms relations. Specifically, in addition to the 1,550 cap on deployed nuclear warheads, both sides are obligated to regularly share information, as emphasized by the required random on-site inspections. Having said this, Russia sought methods to evade the rules. It has primarily done so by developing new types of warheads, such as cruise missiles and the hypersonic Oreshnik, which are not specifically subject to the treaty’s rules. The development of new delivery systems is rather clear evidence that countries are daring to take the risk to test limits rather than preserve them.
According to international relations scholar and professor Monica Duffy Toft, the New START “reduces risks of misinterpreting normal activity as preparing for a nuclear strike.” As such, one may assume that the best course of action is to negotiate another arms agreement. However, each country’s leader has responded differently. While Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has voiced a willingness to extend the agreement for one year, US President Donald Trump has rejected the offer, stating that he will proceed “on his own timeline”. Despite this, experts have urged Trump to take steps to avoid “catastrophic” misinterpretation should a crisis emerge. Moreover, the United States will need to include other nuclear powers, particularly China, to ensure long-term stability. As neither country appears willing to reach a new agreement, future cooperation between the two powers is unlikely.
Despite these challenges, the possibility of the United States and Russia expanding their nuclear arsenals in a short period is highly unlikely and would take years to materialize. The United States faces depletion in natural resources, specifically plutonium pit production. On the other hand, Russia’s economic decline is underscored by falling oil prices, Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, an acute labour shortage, and pressures from the transition to a wartime economy. Thus, despite both countries having the ability to increase currently deployed warheads, actually building new delivery systems–which require not only raw materials but also sufficient manpower–would take much longer. Ultimately, Russia is not at a bargaining advantage, and, frankly, neither is the United States.
It is then perhaps not completely surprising that the emerging dominant force lies in the east. China’s recent growth in nuclear armoury supersedes that of any country, not only in terms of quantity but also in variety. Take the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), for example. Whereas Russia’s growth is 1 per cent and the United States’ is -11 per cent, China’s ICBM growth between 2012 and 2025 is 88 per cent.
Despite China’s growth, its arms inventory remains a fraction of those of Russia and the US. As such, President Xi Jinping has refused to enter future negotiations. From a rational standpoint, China should avoid entering negotiations given its current strategic disadvantage. Due to significant uncertainty and leaders’ inability to ensure one another’s compliance with an agreement, a multilateral agreement is ultimately unlikely, especially as countries increasingly seek to use nuclear arsenals to protect their sovereignty.
The end of New START may not be so much a rising military threat as deliberate political signalling. Given that leaders will unlikely make the best decision regarding arms control, having more nuclear weapons will be seen as a form of political propaganda to exert dominance. Applying a political theory approach that reality is constructed by norms and social interaction–the core message of constructivism–it can be argued that the strategic utility of nuclear weapons depends not on the quantity, but on the extent of country relations. That is, although country C may possess more nuclear arms than country B, country A could be more likely to go to war with country B insofar as their relations are more intertwined. In a broader context, this may mean mounting tensions between nuclear-rich states and non-nuclear states. In fact, this has already begun to take shape with the United States’ strikes on Iran.
Future negotiations need to address current nuclear realities. We must discern that this is not necessarily a technology game, but a fragile political one, shaped by the geopolitical shift from a historically hegemonic West toward a multipolar East and South. If nuclear weapons are to be seen as tools of pressure and coercion, the purpose and mechanism of arms control need to be redefined.
Edited by Idan Miller
Featured image: Photo by Dan Meyers. Licensed under Unsplash License.
