The Legality of US Airstrikes and Regime Change in Venezuela

Since September 2025, US forces have launched targeted attacks against Venezuelan boats, destroying at least 21 vessels in 20 distinct strikes in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific. These airstrikes are part of a broader American foreign policy effort known as Operation Southern Spear, which intends to remove “narco-terrorists” from the Western Hemisphere and end the flow of illegal drugs into the US. These attacks have targeted vessels supposedly affiliated with Venezuelan drug trafficking, leading to the death of at least 80 individuals, several of whom appear unassociated with the illicit drug market targeted. The strikes may also reflect wider American strategic aims in Venezuela: accessing the country’s plentiful oil resources, reasserting prominence in Latin America, and, most recently, removing authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro. The forcible removal of Maduro sets a consequential political precedent, with the potential to reshape regional power dynamics in Latin America and beyond. Yet, regardless of the political nature of US intervention in Venezuela, the international legality of these attacks on Venezuelan vessels remains unresolved.

The international legal system refers to the rules and norms that govern the conduct of states, individuals, and intergovernmental organizations. Unlike domestic legal systems, where individuals are automatically bound by active laws and the national government enforces compliance, international law is consent-based and lacks a universal enforcer. Despite these potential structural weaknesses, states generally demonstrate a profound respect for international law, both in their domestic codes and international behaviour. In the case of the US, this respect is even more ingrained. The US adopts a relatively monist approach, under which international law is treated as automatically integrated into the domestic legal system, whereas many other countries—including Canada—instead choose to practice dualism, treating international law as entirely separate, requiring incorporation into domestic law before it becomes binding. Relevant to the US airstrikes on Venezuelan boats, international law includes designations of when states have the right to use force, regulates conduct on land and sea, and outlines the laws of war. 

To address the most fundamental question—Does the US have the legal right to use force against Venezuela?—one need look no further than the UN Charter, the United Nations’ constitutional document. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that all its members, including the US, must refrain from using force against the sovereignty of another state. The Charter offers only two scenarios in which force is acceptable: in self-defence and under UN Security Council authorization. This general prohibition on the use of force is known as jus ad bellum. Trump has attempted to justify the US’s use of force in the form of airstrikes by invoking self-defence, substantiating this claim by referring to the many thousands of Americans who die from drug use. Effectively, the Trump administration has implied that by aiding illegal shipment and provision of these goods to US customers, these alleged narcoterrorists have conducted an attack on the US, activating their right to self-defence. However, the UN Charter clearly states that self-defence is only permitted if use of military force occurs or is imminent, a condition clearly not met by American deaths from drug overdose. Further, self-defence responses must be necessary and proportional, not exceeding the amount of force necessary to neutralize an imminent or ongoing attack. Obliterating Venezuelan vessels far exceeds the amount of force needed to cease the flow of narcotics into the US, and the escalation of Operation Southern Spear into a project of regime change affirms this: The US’s airstrikes are not self-defence measures; they are excessive reprisals unjustifiable under international law.

Further, the Trump administration’s siege on these vessels has occurred in international waters, a region of the sea understood in international law to be reserved solely for peaceful purposes. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, states that all waters not within 250 miles of a state’s coastline are considered res communis, meaning they belong to no single state and are open for peaceful use by all. However, Article 108 of the Law of the Sea Convention places an effective limit on the principle of res communis. The article clarifies that states may “suppress traffic” of boats transporting illicit substances even if they are in the high seas, offering a potential loophole for the US’ conduct. Yet, the phrase “suppress traffic” in no way implies a right to use force. At most, Article 108 would permit the US to demand that drug trafficking boats cease their transit; what Article 108 does not permit, however, are air strikes that result in these boats’ complete annihilation. As such, while the Law of the Sea Convention does initially appear to offer a potential international legal justification for the Trump administration’s airstrikes, the principle of the high seas as a zone for peaceful transit overrides these would-be exceptions. 

Another international legal component to be considered is jus in bello, or international humanitarian law. Violations of international humanitarian law include torture, excessive targeting of civilians, and other war crimes. These are distinct from violations of jus ad bellum, discussed previously, because where jus ad bellum outlines when states may use force, jus in bello determines how states may use force. Prime in international humanitarian law is the expectation that collateral damage in the form of civilian death be minimized whenever possible to mitigate unnecessary or disproportionately high amounts of suffering. Obligations of states engaging in military action vary depending on the type of conflict. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 distinguish international armed conflicts (CA2 conflicts)—those between states—from non-international armed conflicts (CA3 conflicts)—those involving one or more non-state actors, such as a civil war. The US has claimed that its airstrikes represent a CA3 conflict, in which the US is at war with narcoterrorist actors. Yet, for the airstrikes to qualify as a CA3 conflict, they must first constitute a conflict to begin with. In this context, one must draw a distinction between an armed “conflict” and an armed “attack.” Conflict implies reciprocal action by both parties, where an attack is one-sided, executed by one party against an unresponsive other. Seeing as neither Venezuela nor narcoterrorist organizations have pursued military action against the US, the US is therefore committing an armed attack, not engaging in an armed conflict. The Trump administration has repeatedly attempted to locate loopholes in this legal definition, saying the state is engaged in a “war on drugs.” However, there is no precedent in international law for the recognition of a “war on drugs” as an armed conflict, as it stands more as a public health metaphor than a definition with legal merit under jus in bello. 

The failure of these airstrikes to qualify as a conflict bears severe impacts for the legality of the US’s actions. Under the designation of an armed conflict, CA3 or otherwise, states are permitted to attack unlawful belligerents, individuals who are involved in combat but are not members of armed forces or militia. If the situation does not amount to an armed conflict, these individuals are no longer deemed unlawful belligerents—instead, they are viewed as civilians. As such, any action to target such individuals—narcoterrorists or otherwise—would be unlawful. It therefore follows that US airstrikes, not amounting to an armed conflict to begin with, represent illegal attacks against civilian groups.

Overall, Trump’s actions against Venezuela violate the jus ad bellum prohibition on the use of force, breach the principle of res communis, and represent the unlawful targeting and destruction of civilians in explicit violation of jus in bello. Despite this, the Trump administration has continued to aggress Venezuelan boats in open defiance of international law—a pattern only heightened by the latest violation of Venezuelan sovereignty through the forcible removal of Nicolás Maduro. This conduct, although reminiscent of prior US intervention projects such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, should not be mistaken for a uniquely American disdain for the international legal system. States routinely disregard legal constraints when perceived threats to national interests are high. As such, highlighting the international illegality of the Trump administration’s actions against Venezuela is a necessary but not sufficient step. Ending the US siege on Venezuelan vessels will require political, not merely legal, solutions.

Edited by Shumyle Eman Shahid

Featured image: “A U.S. Coast Guardsman conducts a counter-illicit drug trafficking exercise in the Pacific Ocean” by Official U.S. Navy Page is licensed under the Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons.