Who Controls the Nile? Power, Development, and a Zero-Sum River

The Nile River floods seasonally, but when waters inundated Egypt and Sudan in early October—displacing thousands and destroying millions of pounds of farmers’ crops—political leaders were quick to point fingers.

Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation said that last year’s Nile floods were caused by “reckless unilateral measures by Ethiopia in operating its illegal dam.” The ministry proceeded to say that Ethiopia’s “practices lack the most basic principles of responsibility and transparency and represent a direct threat to the lives and security of the peoples of downstream states.”

Sudan, mired in an ever-bloodier civil war and an escalating humanitarian crisis, was less combative, promising close coordination with Egypt and Ethiopia to achieve common interests and prevent future harm. Days later, however, Sudan reiterated Egypt’s firm rejection of unilateral measures on the Blue Nile.

Ethiopia has fired back, describing Egypt in its “colonial-era mindset” as using a “belligerent approach” to “advance Egypt’s unlawful and hegemonic ambitions over the Nile River basin,” and ultimately “undermining Ethiopia” on “the path to prosperity.” According to Addis Ababa, Egypt is dragging Sudan into this crisis, despite Ethiopia’s defence that the dam is essential to prevent “historical destruction.”

This fiery rhetoric between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia is nothing new. For 14 years, Egypt and Sudan have opposed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), while Addis Ababa has faced construction delays and rising costs. Ultimately, the $5 billion USD dam was inaugurated in September 2025.

The Nile runs from South to North, with up to 85 per cent of its total flow during the rainy season coming from the Blue Nile—a tributary that begins in Ethiopia. The GERD dams the Blue Nile, promising 5,150 megawatts of electricity, which would more than double Ethiopia’s current capacity.

The largest dam in Africa is more than just a big infrastructure project. Built independent of foreign aid, Ethiopia hopes to fulfill a historical dream of delivering electricity to the 60 per cent of Ethiopians who lack it. This would also provide constant power for businesses and the ability to sell energy to neighbouring countries. Ethiopia ultimately aspires to be energy-sovereign and, with the GERD catering to Ethiopian nationalism, seeks to truly become a great power. Now, Ethiopia believes becoming such a nation is a real possibility.

The GERD is already providing electricity to nearby villages, but Egypt remains unconvinced by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s assurance that the dam will not harm Ethiopia’s Sudanese and Egyptian brothers. 96 per cent of Egypt is desert, and the vast majority of the population lives along the banks of the Nile. The Nile is essential to Egypt’s development vision, but more importantly, Egypt relies on the Nile to support its agriculture. The agricultural sector currently contributes one-eighth of the country’s GDP, employs one-fourth of the workforce, and provides exports that constitute a significant share of foreign exchange. Beyond agriculture, water is essential for the basic needs of over 5,000 people per square mile along the banks of the Nile in Egypt. When access to the Nile is compromised, these livelihoods are too.

This is Egypt’s sticking point. Any reduction in the Nile’s flow is devastating, and Ethiopia controls 85 per cent of its waters. There now exists a real possibility that Ethiopia can parch Egypt—a possibility that, no matter how improbable, Egypt will refuse to entertain.

For Sudan, the stakes are higher. The Blue Nile flows from Ethiopia into Sudan to meet the White Nile—the river’s other major tributary. Given Ethiopia’s full control over the Blue Nile, Sudan remains entirely reliant on Ethiopia’s goodwill.

It is impossible to guarantee Ethiopia’s present or future cooperation, especially considering its internal instability and growing imperial ambitions. The GERD has thus become a dilemma of national security, as Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia navigate a zero-sum game between development and geopolitical interests.

For Egypt and Sudan, securing the Nile’s flow is essential to the survival of their populations. This, however, comes at the cost of Ethiopia’s controlling interest in the Nile.  Ethiopia’s desired energy sovereignty demands concessions from Egypt and Sudan—concessions they will both refuse to make.

There is no easy solution to this crisis, and any gain for one state carries inevitable costs for others. Across the Global South, such security dilemmas will only intensify as the ambitions of developing states collide. For those living along the banks of the Nile, access to water, electricity, and basic survival continues to hinge on political negotiations and regional stability.

Edited by Chloe Nairne

Featured Image: “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam aerial view” by the Prime Minister Office of Ethiopia is licensed under Public Domain.